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The Construction and Maintenance of Social Self-Presentation in Ingratiation Encounters: an Experimental Study

by

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INTRODUCTION

The present study sets out to investigate some of the factors which are related to the form of self-presentation an individual puts forward at one particular time and in one particular situation. In particular, we shall be concentrating on social interaction situations where one actor is motivated to ingratiate himself with the other. Further, we shall primarily be interested in changes in the degree of favourability of the subject's self-presentation. A subsidiary aim of the research is to examine the way the individual copes with evidence of his own self-presentational variability.

In chapter I we examine a number of different approaches to the variability of self-presentation. We discuss the adequacy of these approaches and suggest how future study in the social psychology of this area should proceed. Also, we select one area of behaviour, ingratiation-motivated behaviour, upon which to concentrate. This area has already received a degree of research attention. This is reviewed and assessed as regards its need for systematisation, replication, expansion and improved methodology. In particular we elucidate a number of factors which when present in an ingratiation-motivated interaction facilitate a self-enhancing presentation. It is also argued that a full understanding of this area must involve the study of person as well as situational variables. Two possible variables, the sex and esteem level of the subject, are suggested for preliminary study. Finally, we introduce the subsidiary aim of the research to examine the problem created for the individual by a manipulated self-presentation which deviates from his core concept of self. Specifically we address ourselves to two questions. What creates such conflict states? How are they

coped with? On the basis of previous research and drawing upon dissonance theory a number of hypotheses are advanced. Our person variables are again included at this stage.

In chapter II we describe an experiment which seeks to examine some of these problems. By means of a complex interaction situation involving a number of different self-presentations, information is gathered on the basic principle governing self-enhancement in ingratiation-motivated situations and on the moderating effects of our personal variables, if any. The experiment also sets out to test our hypotheses concerning the reduction of conflict after a manipulated self-presentation.

Chapter III contains a complete analysis of the results of this, our first experiment. The principal statistical technique employed is analysis of variance.

In Chapter IV we set out to examine those factors which made for a self-derogating presentation in an ingratiation-motivated interaction. We review the previous research in this area and drawing it together with some of the findings from experiment 1 derive a number of tentative hypotheses concerning more complex patterns of self-presentation.

Chapter V describes an experiment designed to test these hypotheses. The basic experimental situation involves a realistic job selection interview within which a number of situational factors are manipulated in order to ascertain their effect on the candidate's self-presentation. The sex variable was retained in this second experiment.

The statistical analysis of the results of experiment 2

are contained in Chapter VI. Again, analysis of variance is the main technique employed.

Finally in Chapter VII we review the findings of our experimental work. We draw attention to some unanswered questions in this area and suggest how future research may go about answering them. In particular we discuss the implications of this area of research for the future study of ingratiation-motivated behaviour per se, and further its possible contribution to other related aspects of social psychology.

CHAPTER I

I The Variability of Self-Presentation

"See the same man, in vigour, in the gout;
Alone, in company; in place, or out;
Early at business, and at hazard late;
Mad at a fox-chase, wise at a debate;
Drunk at a borough, civil at a ball;
Friendly at Hackney, faithless at Whitehall."

(Pope, Essay on Man)

The capacity of the individual to display quite different sides of himself depending upon the social context is as much a part of popular knowledge today as it clearly was 250 years ago when Pope was composing the above lines. We know intuitively (and have observed) that the conservative, prudish, family father may be the bon viveur of the golf club. The quiet respectable figure in the dock is not the one who committed the breach of the peace. Indeed this knowledge is not confined to other people. When we turn the analysis inwards we may recognise this aspect of ourselves also.

This store of folk-knowledge has been considerably enriched by the work of Goffman (1956), in particular by his emphasis on the flexibility of self-presentation and its relationship to the particular evoking social context. He draws attention to the many objectives that the individual may bring to an interaction - to be liked, to insult, to gain information or to bring the relationship to an end. In all such situations the "actor" manages his own "performance" in such a way as to give the impression which will lead his audience to act or react in accordance with the actor's purpose. Goffman analyses these performances

and illustrates his thesis with an abundance of anecdotal evidence drawn from anthropological, sociological and literary sources. He contends, for example, that the performance consists essentially of three aspects:

(1) the setting, i.e. the physical backdrop to the performance;

(2) the personal front, i.e. the appearance and manner of the performer, and

(3) the actual performance content.

In other words, what one does, the way one does it and where it is done.

A more formal demonstration of this variable aspect of self-presentation is illustrated by the work of Jourard and Lasakow (1958). They have shown how the degree of self-disclosure an individual indulges in is related to a variety of situational factors. Gergen (1968) has gone further and gathered together a number of findings on self-presentational change. He categorises those factors inducing such change into three groups:

1) The other person: the kind of behavioural style of the other person in the interaction has been shown to have a clear impact upon how we present ourselves towards him. For example, in a study conducted by Gergen and Wishnov (1965), subjects were confronted with another person who was either very boastful and egotistical or humble and self-effacing. It was shown that subjects changed their own self-presentations in such circumstances. They tended to match the behaviour of their partner, becoming more positive to the boastful other and more modest to the humble.

2) The interaction environment: the total mass of the situational cues as to what is happening in an interaction and what is going to happen also play an important part in determining the form of the individual's self-presentation. For example, the expected duration of the acquaintance has been shown to have a significant influence on how an individual presents himself to a stranger. In the Gergen and Wishnov study subjects were presented with a stranger whom they either did not expect to meet again or with whom they expected to have a protracted relationship. Subjects anticipating future contact became significantly more revealing in comparison with a pre-experimental measure, whereas non-anticipation subjects did not change.

3) Motivation: in this category we return to the goal that the individual brings to the particular interaction, the area analysed extensively by Goffman. If the individual wishes to create an impression of ability and responsibility, as at a selection interview, then he will clearly present himself differently than if he is seeking to get rid of a persistent door-to-door salesman.

Thus far we have seen the knowledge of self-presentational variability move from the anecdotal level to controlled experimental demonstration. Indeed this is quite proper in that one of the tasks of social psychology must be precisely this - to take that which is "common knowledge" and demonstrate it and refine it within controlled conditions. However, this is not the whole task or the whole story. If it were our current knowledge would be more satisfactory than it is. Rather we must go further and bring together the findings of such

research into more systematic stores of knowledge. If this is not done the various research findings remain discrete, isolated pieces of empiricism which will eventually wither from a lack of support, from a lack of a place in a wider context. In this respect, Gergen's attempt to categorise the factors related to self-presentational change is an admirable one. However, simultaneously it must be felt to be inadequate. Contrary to Gergen's thesis that there are three sources of variability in self-presentation, the other person, the interaction environment and the individual's motivation, there is in fact only one, the last of these. The only factor which influences the individual's self-presentation is his motivation at that point. It is certainly true that the nature of the other person or the whole interaction environment affects his presentation, but only in so far as they affect his basic motivation. Thus, for example, in the case of the expected duration of the relationship the reason why the self-presentation is different when future interaction is anticipated is not that per se, but rather because this fact changes the motivation of the individual involved.

It is our contention, therefore, that one of the tasks of social psychology should be to examine the impact of differing motivations on self-presentation. We should be seeking to determine what factors influence the shape of a self-presentation within a particular kind of motivation. This will result in us asking questions like: How does the nature of the other person influence the self-presentation of an individual seeking to be liked? - which is more meaningful than simply asking: How does the nature of the other person influence the self-presentation? A main aim of the current research was therefore to take one kind of motivationally-induced change in behaviour and analyse those factors within it which influence the

precise form of the self-presentation. The particular kind of motivation we have selected is that of ingratiation. In the following section we shall examine its nature and our reasons for concentrating our study within this area.

II. Ingratiation-Motivated Behaviour

We have suggested that a particular task of social psychology is to study the forms and determinants of changes in self-presentation within certain motivational settings. The motivation we are concentrating on in the current research is the motivation to ingratiate. Our reasons for concentrating on this area are essentially twofold. Firstly, we would contend, and will show, that it is a fairly ubiquitous social phenomenon. It is also conceivable that the study of such ingratiation interactions will have implications beyond explicitly ingratiation encounters. Since a great deal of everyday social interaction can be viewed in terms of attraction seeking, a concentration on the more "extreme" forms of this process may shed light on its more normative aspects. Secondly, in comparison with other forms of motivation, ingratiation has received a degree of research interest already. We will be discussing some of the problems and inadequacies within this work later, but its existence provides a basis for some progress in our current project.

Attention to ingratiation behaviour from the standpoint of psychological research stems largely from the work of Jones (1964). Jones defines ingratiation as:

> "... comprising those episodes of social behaviour that are designed to increase the attractiveness of the actor to the target[1]." (Jones, 1964, p.2)

1. Target, i.e. the person to whom the ingratiation attempt is directed.

At the same time he recognises that this definition is over-inclusive, incorporating as it does a whole range of attraction seeking behaviours which do not fit with the popular conception of ingratiation behaviour. He maintains that the distinction between ingratiation and attraction-seeking rests in the aspect of ingratiation of being beyond the normative expectations of everyday attraction seeking. To illustrate this point Jones looks at ingratiation behaviour in the light of a variety of theoretical approaches to social interaction. For Goffman (1956) much of social interaction may be viewed in terms of the implicit "face-saving" contract that the actors share. In this way the two actors seek to defend their own face and protect the other's, thus to get through the interaction together successfully. Ingratiation involves a violation of this contract. The ingratiator seeks to show that he is a party to the face-saving contract while in reality his aims go beyond the immediate interaction. He seeks to increase his benefits in the future by emerging with a better face than when he started. From a different perspective Homans (1961) proposes an economic-based view of social interaction. Two actors are involved in an exchange relation in which they seek to maximise their rewards and minimise their costs. Also, to each interaction an actor brings his own investments in the shape of wit, expertise or control of resources. Finally, and this is Homans' equivalent to Goffman's contract, the actors share a norm of "distributive justice" which essentially maintains that rewards obtained from the interaction will be proportional to the costs incurred, and that the net rewards or profits will be proportional to the investments possessed. In these terms the ingratiator's aim is to exploit the distributive justice contract. He does this by seeking to increase his rewards beyond that merited by his actual costs and investments. For example, he may seek to convince the target that his costs are higher than they really are, as

in the case of the student who tells his tutor that the essay he has handed in was done under the considerable pressure of competing work requirements. More obviously, the ingratiator may pretend that his investments are greater than they really are. This is clearly the strategy of the social climber who invents an aristocratic ancestor.

Finally, ingratiation behaviour may profitably be viewed in terms of Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) matrix model of interaction. By this model two actors interact within the framework of a mutual matrix of outcomes. They are interdependent and therefore must take account of the other's outcomes in attempting to achieve their own. If one individual in the interaction is relatively powerless (as an ingratiator would probably be) then he must submit to the matrix cell choice of the other person. As long as the interaction remains confined to the particular, relevant outcome matrix then the ingratiator is lost, since he cannot influence the outcome values in each cell. However, the ingratiator may seek to complicate the issue by introducing irrelevant, extraneous material which is not governed by the particular outcome matrix involved. This is another example of how the ingratiator's perspective is wider than that of the other person. Jones quotes the example of the executive who seeks to complicate and eventually change the outcome matrix between himself and his manager by being amusing and pleasant to be with.

So far we have been examining the nature of ingratiation but a crucial question in seeking to formulate the determinants of an ingratiation self-presentation is what makes a person ingratiate? One common model of behaviour holds that behaviour is a joint function of the value of the goals to which it is directed and the probability of success in achieving those goals (cf. Escalona, 1940; Rotter, 1954;

Tolman, 1955; Atkinson, 1957). The decision to ingratiate may profitably be viewed in these terms and Jones has sought to place his analysis within this context. He proposes three main factors in determining whether the actor will ingratiate or not. Before examining these it will be useful to adopt Jones's notational system where p is the potential ingratiator, o the target and x the form of the potential ingratiating performance. Further, y is the benefit or goal desired by p and z stands for o's disapproval or other negative outcomes which may occur for p.

1) Incentive-based determinants: This category encompasses all those factors which determine the value of y to p. In particular it refers to the importance of y to p, the uniqueness of o as a source of y and o's potential and likelihood of delivering negative z's to p. For example, a suitor's decision to ingratiate himself with an attractive girl and ask her out will depend upon how much he wants to go out with her, whether she is the only girl for him or merely one of several possibles and how hurt he would be by her rejection.

2) Subjective probability of success: If it were simply a matter of attempting to achieve a desired goal by ingratiation then such behaviour would be even more prevalent than it is. However, as the incorporation of z into the model makes clear, it is not simply a matter of achieving or not achieving the desired goal. In this case failure would leave you no worse off than before. Rather p runs the risk of experiencing z's if he should fail and this must be borne in mind in assessing his likelihood to ingratiate. Relevant factors in this area are, for example, how valuable will the x's be to o and is y a likely response to such x's. In terms of our previous example, will the desired

girl be particularly appreciative of a compliment or will she be sated by such attentions. Also, even if she should be grateful for the compliment will she respond by perceiving the suitor as such and agree to go out with him, or will she be more likely to think of him as a charming, old gentleman but never a romantic partner.

3) Perceived legitimacy: Popular notions of ingratiation and our previous theoretical analysis both include an element of the immorality of the behaviour. It is a somewhat seedy aspect of our motivations. Jones argues, and we will have more to say about this later, that much of the time we can convince ourselves that we are not being ingratiating. However, there are also situations where we feel that ingratiation is justified. For example, the captured explorer who escapes certain death at the hands of natives by excessive flattery and the giving of gifts to the chief is unlikely later to suffer agonies about his lack of sincerity.

In actual fact Jones has created an unnecessary factor with his inclusion of the perceived legitimacy concept in his analysis. The ethical legitimacy of indulging in an ingratiating performance can be considered as part of the incentive category. In these terms the value of y to p will be a net value, that is less any costs involved in the performance of x. The perception of x as being ethically dubious will therefore have to be deducted from the value of y, making it less of an incentive. In some cases the ethics will be so dubious as to outweigh the value of y and ingratiation will not then take place. Equally, as in the case of the explorer, practically no ethical doubts arise and y can be pursued without reservations.

This formulation of Jones is very similar to Simmons and McCall's (1966) role-identity model of interaction, a more formal development of Goffman's position. In this model the individual is conceptualised as having a variety of role-identities. Among the factors Simmons and McCall list as determining which particular role-identity will be enacted in a given setting are the relative need for the various rewards associated with the enactment of different role-identities and the "perceived opportunity structure", which is understood as the extent to which the actor perceives opportunities for the profitable enactment of a role in the given circumstances.

In the current research we have taken this basic definition and theoretical outline of ingratiation behaviour as our starting point and have sought to examine empirically both the forms, determinants and implications of ingratiating self-presentations. A body of research in this area has already accumulated and we shall certainly draw upon its findings in the development of the present programme of study. However, the work done so far is largely exploratory and is requiring of modification from a number of standpoints:

1) The existing data from a range of studies needs to be brought together and systematised so that general principles of self-presentation in ingratiation contexts may be isolated.

2) There is a need for replication of some of the findings produced so far. Jones himself has recognised this need.

3) We must seek to expand further our knowledge of the determinants and subtleties of ingratiation self-presentation.

4) Both replication and expansion of our knowledge should proceed by attempting to improve the methodologies of previous studies, where this is possible.

III. Self-presentational Positiveness

In his analysis of ingratiation behaviours Jones suggests three main categories of such behaviour:

1) complimentary other-enhancement, i.e. flattery
2) conformity with another's opinions or values
3) self-presentation, i.e. presenting oneself in such a way as to appear attractive or worthy of reward.

This definition of self-presentation clearly includes all forms of ingratiation behaviour apart from conformity and flattery. In the present research we have chosen to concentrate solely on this last mode of ingratiation. We recognise that many ingratiation performances may include a subtle mix of all three strategies. However, the study of them all is, we feel, beyond the scope of one enquiry. Our decision to concentrate on self-presentation is to a certain extent arbitrary. However, we feel also that this area of behaviour highlights some of the subtleties and problems in ingratiation. What one says about oneself, how one behaves towards another person is in some way the essence of interaction. It is more personal than either conformity or flattery and as such must require both greater refinement and greater justification.

Having settled on self-presentational behaviour it is necessary to restrict our area of research still further. Clearly self-presentation may vary along a great number of dimensions. How one stands, the degree of smiling and eye contact, the tone of voice

and how revealing one is about oneself are all possibly relevant indices of self-presentation. Again it is beyond the scope of a single enquiry to encompass all of these. One dimension which is particularly important, and consequently has received a degree of research interest, is the degree of favourability of one's self-presentation. How positively one describes oneself is clearly highly relevant to an ingratiating self-presentation and we have therefore concentrated attention on this dimension.

To summarise, therefore, we are concentrating on those factors which determine the degree of favourability of self-presentations within ingratiation-motivated encounters. In very broad terms, there are two basic strategies open to the subject, p. He may self-enhance, i.e. present himself more favourably than in a situation where he was not motivated to ingratiate and was concerned about presenting his honest, authentic self. Alternatively, he may be modest and present himself less favourably than in an authentic situation. In so doing he would be attempting to impress o, the target, by his candour or even flattering o indirectly by implying that o possessed those qualities which he was disclaiming. We recognise that these two strategies may not be discrete alternatives and any self-presentation may involve combinations of both. Indeed our experimentation aims to reflect this fact. However, in general terms, our first experiment will concern itself with those factors which make for self-enhancement and in our second experiment we shall examine the determinants of modesty.

Intuitively, and by natural observation, it would appear that self-enhancement is the natural and usual response to ingratiation motivation. In theoretical terms such a tactic may be expressed in terms of Homan's model as emphasising or falsifying one's "investments".

In other words, for example, emphasising one's beauty, intelligence or expertise. Equally, in terms of Simmons and McCall's role-identity model the process involves the performance of a more favourable role identity. The selection of such a role identity would be determined by its perceived likelihood of making the individual actor appear more worthy of certain rewards controlled by the target person. This presentation of a more favourable, positive self in ingratiation encounters has received considerable experimental validation. Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962), in a complex investigation, instructed female subjects either to be completely honest about themselves (accuracy set) or to try to impress (ingratiation set) in an interaction with a previously unknown male graduate student interviewer. It was found that subjects described themselves more favourably under ingratiation than under accuracy instructions. Gergen (1965) instructed subjects either to be accurate about themselves or to create a good impression during a 30-minute interview. Subjects instructed to make a good impression demonstrated a greater increase in self-presentational positiveness relative to a pre-experimental measure than did accuracy subjects. Such findings have been confirmed more recently by Schneider and Eustis (1972).

However, this is only the base-line as far as ingratiation behaviour is concerned. It is possible to discern a variety of factors, relevant to the evoking situation, which have been identified as making more complex the whole question of ingratiation tactics and inhibiting this global self-enhancement response. The most important of these are:

1) the presentation of information as to the nature of the target person.

2) the degree of awareness of the target person's relative power.

3) the extent to which the subject anticipates further interaction with the target person.

We shall look at the empirical evidence for each of these in turn.

1) Target Person Information

Several studies have shown that, to some extent, when information is presented to the subject about the target person, his values or relative status, for example, then this leads to more complex forms of self-presentation than merely self-enhancement. Jones, Gergen and Jones (1963) investigated the kinds of ingratiation tactics used in a status hierarchy, a Naval training programme. They found that low status personnel, when instructed to ingratiate themselves with a target described as being of higher relative status than them, actually presented themselves less favourably than control subjects. This effect was confined to presentational items designated by the subject as important, that is items probably relevant to the structure of the hierarchy. Such a tactic was interpreted by Jones and his co-workers as emphasising the positive aspects of the target by implication. On the other hand, in the same study, Jones, Gergen and Jones found that when high status subjects were instructed to establish a compatible relationship with a lower status target they responded by becoming more modest. This effect, conversely, was strongest on presentational items which were considered unimportant by the subject and therefore probably irrelevant to the power structure of the hierarchy. Blau (1964) has described such behaviour as a demonstration of "approachability" by a high status person while,

at the same time, being a maintenance of the power differential. Gergen and Taylor (1965), in another study in a Naval training hierarchy, found that under instructions emphasising compatability low status personnel became significantly more self-devaluing in their presentation towards a target of higher status. It was also shown that overall, both high and low status subjects' self-descriptions to each other in an interaction emphasising compatability, were more self-devaluing than in a productivity based interaction.

In the above studies the information concerning the target person has been of an external nature. That is the subject has been given information about the target's status from an external and presumably valid source. The exchange of self-descriptions was arranged in such a way that each subject described himself to the other without the benefit of having seen the other's self-presentation to him. Two studies have examined those interactions where this does not apply and where the information on the target person is produced by the target's own self-presentation to the subject. In such studies the subject's self-presentation to the target is contingent upon his already having been exposed to the target's self-presentation to him, e.g. Gergen and Wishnov (1965) (cf. p. 5). It should be emphasised that an ingratiation "set" was not explicitly created in this experiment but nevertheless its effects may be pertinent at this point in the discussion. Schneider and Eustis (1972) confirm this by producing similar results in an experiment where an ingratiation motivation was deliberately created. Again subjects

rated themselves for either a bragging or a modest target person. It was found that ingratiation subjects presented themselves more positively to the boastful than to the modest target. There were, however, no significant differences between ingratiators and controls on these measures. This would tend to confirm the fact that a sizeable degree of attraction seeking is present in most interactions even where ingratiation is not an explicitly salient motive.

2) Degree of Awareness

Another study has shown that when the target person is aware of his power relative to the subject, and more pertinently when the subject is aware of his awareness, then this tends to inhibit the self-enhancement response. Stires and Jones (1969) placed subjects in a dependent relation to an interviewer/supervisor. The interviewer had to select the subjects for one of two positions, either that of highly paid assistant or lowly-paid clerical helper. In one dependence condition (interviewer-unaware) the subjects were told that the interviewer actually made the selection by a simple statement of preference, but that he thought that the job assignments were determined by someone tossing a coin. In the other dependence condition (interviewer-aware) the subjects believed that the interviewer was aware of his role in the selection of subordinates. It was found, as predicted, that subjects in the interviewer-aware condition were more modest than subjects in the interviewer-unaware condition.

As described above, Jones postulates that one factor determining whether or not the individual will engage in ingratiating behaviour is his "subjective probability of success". In this case

with an aware interviewer the subject perceives his probability of success as lower. Since the target person is aware of his relative power over the subject he will be more suspicious of the subject's performance towards him and therefore less likely to administer the desired rewards. It is this greater danger of detection, of the target seeing through the mask, that leads the ingratiator to adopt more oblique and subtle forms of self-presentation. Hence, in this case a greater degree of self-devaluation results.

3) The Anticipation of Further Interaction with the Target Person

Harre and Secord (1972) in criticising traditional experiments in social psychology, have drawn attention to the failure of experimenters to take account of the fact that the usual interaction of experimental subjects is one between strangers and of limited duration. They maintain that this fact is implicit to an understanding of the results of such experiments but is never explicitly made. However, in the research under discussion, which Harre and Secord ignore, not only has the duration of the relationship under study been made explicit but also it has been manipulated within the experiment to ascertain its effect on behaviour. It has been shown that the prospect of future interaction with the target person, beyond the initial ingratiation encounter, leads to more self-devaluing descriptions. Gergen and Wishnov (1965) (cf. p.5) placed subjects in a situation where they had to describe themselves to an average partner, similar to themselves. While a motivation to ingratiate was not specifically created in this experiment it seems reasonable to suggest that a degree of attraction seeking is operational under such circumstances. This is supported by the similarity of the results of this experiment and that of Schneider and Eustis (1972) where

an explicit ingratiation motive was established. Contrary to the investigators prediction which was that anticipation subjects would have a greater need to maintain their power position and therefore could not afford to permit weakness, it was found that subjects who had been informed that they would experience further interaction with the target person beyond the initial encounter were more self-devaluing than subjects who had been led to believe that no further interaction would take place.

Gergen and Wishnov's hypothesis was based on a power-maintenance rationale derived from Thibaut and Kelley (1959). However, a more likely mechanism, and one which explains the result, is that in the anticipation condition our self-enhancing claims will be found out as being incapable of validation. This again may be perceived in terms of Simmons and McCall's perceived opportunity structure, or Jones's subjective probability of success. The anticipation of future interaction with the target person, with the attendant requirement of living up to earlier claims, reduces the perceived opportunity of enacting a self-enhancing role-identity. This phenomenon is in accord with Haraguchi (1967) who has also shown that the possibility of revealing consequences produces more modest self-presentations.

If we draw together the findings of the above studies we may be in a position to formulate a general principle of self-presentation in ingratiation-motivated situations:

Principle:

When a subject, p, is placed in an ingratiation encounter with a target person, o, then in the absence of:

a) information concerning o's values or status

b) anticipation of future interaction with o, and

c) o's awareness of the ingratiation attempt, and

p's knowledge of this,

then he will present himself more favourably and positively than in a situation where he is motivated only to be accurate and authentic about himself.

We do not refer to the above principle as a hypothesis since it is well enough established in the literary to be assumed. Nevertheless our first experiment shall seek to verify it. Further we will attempt to replicate this principle using a different method than has been traditionally employed.

Such studies as Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962), Gergen (1965), Jones, Gergen and Jones (1963) and Schneider and Eustis (1972) have all investigated ingratiation behaviour by instructing one group of subjects to ingratiate and another to be honest and accurate about themselves within a limited interaction with another person. For several reasons we feel that it is preferable at this stage to employ subjects as their own controls. By sampling subjects' self-descriptions on two separate occasions, one in which they are motivated to ingratiate and one in which they are motivated only to present themselves honestly, and on different but matched material, we feel that certain advantages will accrue. Firstly, it will show ingratiation behaviour in sharper relief. Such studies as Gergen and Wishnov's (1965) have suggested that a degree of attraction-seeking may occur within the confines of a neutral interaction between strangers. If this is so then the use of such neutral interactions as control comparisons in ingratiation studies may be inappropriate in that some degree of ingratiating behaviour may be occurring within them.

Secondly, such a strategy points up the relevance of our study to the variability of self-presentation. By sampling the same subject's behaviour at different times the variability of his presentations can be assessed and more importantly the impact of such variability, on the individual can be examined. Thirdly, having an individual control measure for every subject allows us to make statements about how particular, individual subjects presented themselves. Harre and Secord (1972) criticise much of social psychological experimentation for ignoring person variables and accumulating conclusions of the form: "In general, subjects assigned to treatment A performed differently from subjects assigned to treatment B." The strategy we have outlined will allow not only such conclusions to be reached but also statements concerning how many, and what kinds of subjects to whom the conclusion applies. We shall take up this topic further in the following section.

IV. Person Variables

At least since the work of Lewin (1935) there has been an implicit assumption within psychology that behaviour is a joint function of the situation and the person. However, in much of social psychological research this postulate is not recognisable in practice.

Harre and Secord compare experimentation in psychology with that of the natural sciences. They point out that in experiments in the natural sciences a straight relation between independent and dependent variables is seldom sought or found. For every such relation investigated there will be a number of outside factors controlled, measured and specified. For example, in an investigation of the relation of pressure and volume of a gas outside variables like temperature will be held constant. They make the point that the

most abundant source of such variables in psychology experimentation is the person himself and criticise social psychologists for not taking sufficient interest in such person variables by controlling or measuring them. They see the assignment of subjects at random to different treatments as a barrier to the advancement of knowledge. They make the important point also that if person parameters are not identified or measured then when relatively small mean treatment differences are produced those people in the treatment groups responsible for the positive outcome of the findings cannot be identified, other than nominally. This results in a failure to identify the precise causal mechanisms at work and instead yields evidence of broad relationships only.

This reassertion of the importance of person variables has also found expression in the work of Alker (1972) and Bem (1972). Bem emphasises the importance of predicting on a priori grounds which variables are likely to divide a population into equivalence classes for a particular behavioural measure.

When we return to examine self-presentational research, and ingratiation studies in particular, we find that there has been practically no attention paid to person variables. There is an implicit assumption operating that knowledge of the situation is sufficient. Only the Jones, Gergen and Davis study has attempted to examine a person variable. The variable they chose was Machiavellianism (Christie and Merton, 1958). However, as the authors point out the scale devised to measure this variable was of dubious validity and possibly in consequence no effects on self-presentation of this measure were identified. This early setback seems to have discouraged subsequent researchers from restoring other person variables into this

area of research.

If we now concentrate on the particular area we have selected for study we feel it is important to attempt to identify certain possible person variables which may moderate the degree of self-enhancement demonstrated by subjects in the defined experimental situation. At this stage two variables are considered potentially relevant and we shall consider the implications of each in turn.

(1) The sex-pairing of the dyad

None of the research so far done in this area has systematically investigated different sex pairings in the ingratiation encounter and their effects on self-presentational positiveness. Jones, Gergen and Jones (1963), Jones, Gergen, Gumpert and Thibaut (1965), Gergen and Taylor (1969) and Schneider and Eustis (1972) all use male only dyads, i.e. both subject, p, and target, o, were male. Gergen (1965), and Gergen and Wishnov (1965) both used all female dyads. Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962) used females as subjects and had male interviewer targets. The only study which may have used mixed pairings was that of Stires and Jones (1969). However, this is only supposition since the authors make no specific reference to the sex of their subjects and therefore presumably made no attempt at experimental control and investigation of the sex variable.

This failure is particularly surprising. The question of the sex pairing in an ingratiation motivated encounter would appear to have strong possibilities as a moderator variable. Jones, although never investigating the possibility directly, suggests from his observations that males are generally more prepared to indulge in a distorted self-presentation in order to achieve a particular goal. In terms of the theoretical schema outlined earlier this would be a

product of the males experiencing fewer ethical doubts and hence smaller costs in deciding to implement an ingratiating self-presentation. However, this is to examine only one side of the dyad. There may be different implications for a male in an ingratiation encounter with another male than for a female subject meeting a male target. Given the importance of being attractive to the opposite sex in our culture it may be argued that subjects confronted with a target of the opposite sex will be more motivated to ingratiate than a like-sex subject. The value of y may be the greater to opposite sex ingratiators and they may therefore indulge in greater self-enhancement. On the other hand, it may equally be held that the cultural demands of such a situation with a female subject placed in an ingratiating position vis-a-vis a male target may produce self-effacing modesty rather than self-enhancement. For example, Komarovsky (1952), in a study of cultural contradictions and sex roles, described how American college girls deliberately play down their own abilities and intelligence when in the presence of eligible males.

These speculations are clearly not the stuff of which firm hypotheses are made. It is therefore not our intention to advance specific hypotheses regarding the effect of the sex-pairing on self-presentational behaviour. At the present time this would be clearly premature. It is manifestly possible to make out a case for quite conflicting predictions. Ideally we should like to investigate all possible sex pairings of p and o; male subject with male target, male subject with female target, female subject with male target and female subject with female target. However, owing to the numbers of subjects required for such a totally symmetrical investigation and the difficulty of recruitment, it was decided to concentrate, as a first

step, on an empirical investigation of the differential effects of both male and female subjects in an ingratiation motivated encounter with a male target.

(2) Self-esteem

In terms of the theoretical scheme outlined earlier (cf. p. 11) the extent of an individual's motivation to ingratiate should be related to the importance of the reward, y, controlled by o, to the ingratiator p. In the interactions on which we shall be concentrating the desired reward is being found attractive by o. In the exploration of possible moderator variables this question of the importance of increased attraction to p assumes considerable significance. What personality variables may be related to the importance of such attraction?

Jones suggests that self-esteem may be a particularly important variable in this context. Such studies as Jones, Hester, Farina and Davis (1959), de Charms and Rosenbaum (1960), Rosenbaum and de Charms (1960) and Cohen (1959) all demonstrate that persons low in self-esteem become more desperately involved in situations involving some form of social or personal evaluation. This would suggest that persons low in self-esteem are more rewarded by approval than high self-esteem persons. Research supporting this prediction has been carried out by Potter (1970). In a study of accuracy and interpersonal attraction he experimentally manipulated whether subjects were liked by their partners. It was found that the tendency to be attracted to a liking partner was greater for those subjects who were low self-evaluators. The general conclusion from the above studies would appear to be, therefore, that low self-esteem persons are more rewarded by approval in social situations. Low

self-esteem persons should therefore be more motivated to ingratiate and should therefore show greater self-enhancement in an ingratiation encounter than persons high in self-esteem.

The above prediction of greater motivation in low esteem subjects derives essentially from self-esteem theory which assumes a general desire to enhance one's evaluation by others. On the other hand self-consistency theories as propounded by such theorists as Secord and Backman (1961, 1964, 1965) produce quite differing predictions. The assumption in this case is that a person seeks to validate his own self-conception by behaving in a manner consistent with it, and by reacting positively to those who evaluate him in an appropriate manner. Thus, from the standpoint of this approach low self-esteem subjects should seek to validate their low self-evaluations and should therefore not be motivated to enhance their self-presentation at all. Nor indeed should subjects of any esteem level, if self-concept validation is the aim. This is clearly contrary to the evidence and would suggest that self-consistency models are not appropriate, at least in this context. Indeed the bulk of the current evidence would appear to favour self-esteem theory in the kind of situations that we are investigating. In a review of the evidence for the relative merits of both approaches, S.C. Jones (1973) finds considerable support for the self-esteem position. Of 16 studies reviewed, 10 supported self-esteem theory and several of the remaining studies had serious problems of replication or interpretation. Also, if studies are restricted to those in which the evaluation of the subject is controlled by the experimenter, rather than by the subject's own estimation, then the evidence is even more heavily in favour of the self-esteem position.

Are we therefore in a position now to propose that low esteem subjects will have a greater incentive to ingratiate than high esteem and will therefore show more self-enhancement in the ingratiation encounter? To do so is to ignore some of the further factors which may be involved in a decision to ingratiate. Firstly, while it may be true that low esteem p's will be more rewarded by y it is equally true that they will be more threatened by disapproving z's. For example, Rosenberg (1975) asked a sample of high school juniors and seniors, "How much does it bother you to find that someone has a poor opinion of you?" He correlated the answers to this question with a range of self-esteem scores and, in support of the prediction, found that the lower a person's self-esteem the more he was concerned by a poor evaluation from another person. This is particularly relevant here because, as we discussed earlier, an ingratiating performance which fails tends not to leave p back where he started but instead may well produce negative z's from o which will leave p in a deteriorated position. The low self-esteem subject is therefore tempted by greater rewards, but also threatened with greater punishment should his ingratiation self-presentation fail. The crucial factor for the individual is therefore to decide his "subjective probability of success", or in the terms of Simmons and McCall his "perceived opportunity structure". He must decide on the relative probability of achieving the desired reward y of attraction or the negative z of disapproval. Just as self-esteem may be a relevant variable in assessing the incentive value of approval and disapproval, so also it may be relevant to the individual's subjective probability of achieving either.

Such classical self-theorists as Mead (1925) and Cooley (1902)

have drawn attention to how the self-concept is the aggregation of the reflected evaluations of other persons over the period of socialisation. If the individual who is low in self-esteem is so, precisely due to the accummulation of negative, failing interactions over a period of time then it is likely that he will have a lower subjective probability of success in an ingratiation encounter than a high self-esteem subject. It may be therefore that low esteem subjects, while motivated to ingratiate and gain approval, may be so threatened by disapproval and convinced of its likelihood that they will shrink from an ingratiating self-presentation. It is also conceivable that such a situation may lead them to a different kind of ingratiation self-presentation; they may become modestly self-effacing before the target and thus appeal to his qualities of succourance and sympathy to avoid disapproval.

The preceding discussion has been largely tentative and therefore we do not propose any specific hypothesis at this stage. Rather we feel that it is important to undertake a preliminary examination of how subjects of different levels of self-esteem respond to a motivation to ingratiate.

V. Conflict in Changing Self-Presentations

A subsidiary aim of our present research is to examine the problems created for the individual when he manipulates his self-presentation in such a way as to deviate from his authentic, core concept of self. In particular we would seek to cast light on two questions:

1) Under what circumstances does such a state of conflict arise?
2) How is such conflict coped with when it does arise?

1) Conflict situations

Intuitively the assumption of a relatively stable, core concept of self is widely accepted in everyday existence. There are few other beliefs about human behaviour which are as compellingly self-evident. Within psychology Mead (1925), Parsons (1968) and Alker (1972) have all emphasised the individual's enduring, stable sense of himself and indeed a great deal of personality and self theory is based on this preconception.

How does the existence of a relatively stable, unique sense of one's basic, core self square with the clear evidence of self-presentational variability? We feel that this is an important question for workers in this area and one which has frequently been ignored. For example, it is particularly difficult when looking at Goffman's work to discern any attention to the individual's sense of an enduring self. Everywhere there are actors and performances but there is little emphasis on the "face behind the mask". Such are the limitations of a totally dramaturgical approach to social behaviour. Goffman's fault would appear to be simply one of over-emphasis on the performances of social interaction, to the neglect of the enduring sense of self of the actor off-stage.

From a preliminary examination it might appear that, given a stable sense of self and the multiple behavioural demands of society, the instances of conflict arousal might be considerable. However, there is good reason for doubting that this is so. It may be that frequently the conflict between the self-presentation and the authentic self-concept is more apparent than real. Turner (1968), in a discussion of the role of the self-concept in social interaction, maintains that individuals possess both a "self-conception", which is

relatively stable and permanent, and a succession of "self images", which may vary from social encounter to social encounter. These "self-images" are therefore the equivalents of our changing forms of self-presentation. However, he further suggests that a great majority of interactions take place without any real attention being paid to the self-conception. Only when the self-image threatens the self-conception, when the interaction is "identity-directed", is there any possibility of conflict between the two, and consequently a need for some resolution of the situation. It would appear that Turner here is saying that the "problem" of self-presentational variability and the enduring sense of self is really only a problem under quite limited circumstances. For much of the time the individual is unaware of the incompatability, and there is a consequent detente between the two aspects of self. Turner seems to suggest that two main conditions must be fulfilled for this detente to break down:

> a) the interaction must be identity-directed, i.e. it must be directed to an evaluative end; the individual actor is concerned about how the other person feels towards him, and
>
> b) the self-image or self-presentation must be in conflict with the self-conception, implying that it (the self-conception) should be either lowered or raised from its previous level.

Thus conflict arises when the self-presentation is at variance with the self-concept and is so designed in order to raise or lower the evaluation of the self-concept by the other person or persons in the interaction. Clearly, the ingratiation encounter which we are studying may well fulfil both of these conditions. It is an evaluatively salient situation designed to create approval and

attraction and further, the self-image presented may well vary from the individual's core concept of self. Therefore, in seeking to answer the second of our questions as to how conflict, once arisen, is coped with, the ingratiation motivated encounter may be a particularly suitable situation for study.

2) Conflict Coping Strategies

The conflict created when an individual presents an exaggeratedly enhanced picture of himself to a target person in an ingratiation-motivated encounter may be conceptualised as an example of dissonance arousal (cf. Festinger, 1957) where the varied self-presentation is seen as being in a dissonant relation with the self-concept. The individual's method of coping with the conflict then becomes a means of dissonance reduction. Dissonance theory is, of course, not the only consistency theory which is applicable in this situation. However, in terms of a preliminary investigation, Jones has suggested that it may be a relevant model and it does suggest fairly concrete methods by which the individual may cope with the conflict.

The subject who has presented himself in an exaggeratedly enhanced fashion during an ingratiation interaction is, in a sense, in an analogous position to the man who has finally bought one car after swaying between two alternative choices for some time. The car purchased may be viewed as the chosen self-presentation, and the rejected car the self-concept. Furthermore, when the ingratiator receives feedback as to the target's reaction to his self-presentation, then this is parallel to the car buyer's reading a review of his chosen car in a consumer magazine. Both parties may be said to have behaved in a manner likely to arouse dissonance. The

ingratiator by behaving in a manner dissonant with his authentic sense of self and the car buyer by rejecting a car which had a number of positive qualities for him.

One method of dissonance reduction which Festinger has identified is re-evaluation of the behaviour involved. The precise form of this re-evaluation will depend on the content of the feedback received as to the success or otherwise of the chosen behaviour. For example, if the consumer report on the chosen car should extol its virtues endlessly (and particularly in comparison with its rival) then the buyer will tend to argue that this car was always his real choice and that he had never considered its rival as a viable alternative. Alternatively, if the consumer report is unreservedly damning of the chosen car (and provided it is sufficiently authoritative not to be ignored or distorted) then the buyer may argue that he had always wanted to buy the other car, that was his real choice, but his wife had persuaded him otherwise. Applying this analogy to the ingratiation situation we find that the subject given approval for a manipulated self-presentation should be tempted to perceive that self-presentation as his real self and not as a distorted picture. On the other hand, the subject who experiences disapproval from the target after his ingratiating self-presentation will reject that self-presentation as being an invalid representation of how he really is.

Such a hypothesis has received some empirical support in studies by Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962) and Gergen (1965). Gergen (1965) instructed one group of subjects to be honest and accurate about themselves and another to try to create a good impression when in an interview with an attractive female stranger. By means of

a carefully worked out programme, subjects in each case were consistently reinforced for saying positive things about themselves. Reinforcement was in the form of verbal agreements and encouragements from the interviewer. On a post-interview generalisation test it was found that subjects in the ingratiation condition showed as much gain in self-evaluation as accuracy subjects, that is although their reinforcement was based on a false picture of themselves. Gergen deduces this as evidence of how ingratiators can be convinced by their own performance if it produces approval. However, the methodology of this study does not fully warrant such a conclusion. Since the ingratiation subjects presented a more positive self than the accuracy subjects to begin with they would have been given more reinforcement as a result and hence any final comparison of their level of self-evaluation would be invalid. However, the finding does remain indicative of the possibilities of this approach.

In the Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962) study (cf. p.16) half the ingratiation subjects and half the accuracy subjects were informed that they had created a favourable impression on the target. Half were told that their self-presentation had resulted in an unfavourable impression. All the subjects were then asked to rate on a percentage scale how accurate and honest about themselves they had been in the interview. It was found, in confirmation of the above, that subjects given approving feedback estimated their self-presentations as being significantly more accurate and honest than subjects given a disapproving feedback. Indeed this effect was so strong that ingratiation-approval subjects rated their interview self-presentation as more honest than accuracy disapproval subjects.

Again, however, the experimental method employed in this

study was not wholly satisfactory. The procedure of having the interview followed by positive or negative feedback followed by a request for a rating of how honest one had been, would seem to make the demand characteristics of the experimental situation much too manifest (Orne, 1965). There is a considerable possibility that subjects will perceive the experimenter's expectations, and, since only a rating of accuracy is required, it should prove relatively simple to fulfil them. A preferable method would require the subjects to describe themselves once during the ingratiation interview, and then once more after the feedback in private. The second self-presentation or description would be under instructions to be honest and accurate about themselves. Such a strategy allows the experimenter to examine the subject's actual mode of response to the situation directly, rather than his verbal statement of what his response is. A second problem with Jones's method is that the subject's accuracy rating may be confounded with his actual interview self-presentation. If, for example, one wished to examine the differing accuracy ratings of two subgroups of subjects after the feedback, then the comparison of their ratings would only be valid if it could be shown that there were no significant differences between their change of self-presentation when in the ingratiation interview. Thus, if one group self-enhanced much more than the other during the interview, any comparison of their ratings of how accurate they had been would be unsound. If a pre- and post-interview self-presentation was derived for each subject under accuracy instructions and in private, then a comparison between two such measures would yield a more valid and reliable indication of the subject's mode of resolution. One could compare both self-descriptions in order to examine whether the subject was denying the validity of his interview self-presentation by

returning to his original self-conception, or whether he was incorporating aspects of his interview self-presentation into a modified description of his real self, that is disowning or claiming the ingratiating self-presentation. With such a method we may now set out to investigate this first hypothesis which we will put forward.

Hypothesis (1)

When a subject, p, is placed in an ingratiation encounter with a target person, o, he will deny the validity of his self-presentation, and show a consequent greater return to his original self-conception after disapproval of his ingratiating self-presentation than after approval.

As discussed above we feel it is important to investigate person parameters in this research and we have selected two possible variables for investigation - sex and self-esteem. It is quite conceivable that both of these variables may moderate the principle embodied in the above hypothesis to some degree.

Taking the sex variable first, our Western culture clearly places considerable emphasis on the importance of being found attractive by members of the opposite sex. This is particularly true in the case of individuals who are predominantly young and single, as in a student population. Daniels and Berkowitz (1963) have shown that subjects are more responsive to being liked by opposite sex partners. Given this fact, it is arguable that approval and disapproval within heterogeneous sex dyads will have a greater impact than in homogeneous dyads. In other words, approval or disapproval from a male target will have a greater impact on female

subjects than on males. Females will be more rewarded by approval and more threatened by disapproval from males, than other males would be. If this is the case then female subjects will be placed in a greater state of conflict by approval or disapproval of an ingratiating self-presentation than males, given a male target, and should therefore indulge in greater degrees of self-justificatory coping to resolve their dilemma, i.e. females will show a greater return to their original self-conception after disapproval and a greater departure from it after approval. This then becomes a tentative second hypothesis subsidiary to our first.

Hypothesis (2)

The effect embodied in hypothesis (1) will be stronger for female subjects faced with a male target than for male subjects faced with a male target.

We again recognise of course that in stipulating the hypothesis in this way we are really not covering all the possible permutations of sex pairings. A total picture would also involve female targets faced with male and female ingratiators. However, at the present time such a totally symmetrical design is difficult to achieve, given the number of subjects required, and we are therefore concentrating on a preliminary investigation of this phenomenon from a limited perspective on the sex pairings.

In turning to the self-esteem variable it is possible that low self-esteem may operate in a similar way to having a target of the opposite sex. According to self-esteem theory low esteem subjects are less satisfied in terms of their need for esteem than high esteem subjects and consequently have a greater need for

approval. (cf. Cohen, 1959) Low esteem subjects should therefore find approval more rewarding and disapproval more threatening than high-esteem subjects (cf. p.27ff). It is of course true that self-consistency theory would make quite different predictions. In these terms low esteem subjects should be rewarded by disapproval and threatened by approval. However, as we have argued above there is evidence for the greater applicability of self-esteem theory in this context. On this basis a hypothesis concerning the esteem level of the subjects may be advanced, similar to that put forward for the effect of the sex pairing, and equally tentatively. Since low esteem subjects should be more responsive to approval and disapproval, they should show more denial of their self-presentation after disapproval and more acceptance of their self-presentation as a valid reflection of their self-concept after approval. This then becomes our third hypothesis.

Hypothesis (3)

The effect embodied in hypothesis (1) will be stronger the lower the esteem of the subjects involved.

Thus far we have looked at re-evaluation of the dissonant behaviour as the means of coping with the conflict. However, as Festinger has made clear, this is not the only strategy open to the subject. Another strategy may be re-evaluation of the source of the evaluative communication. For example, the car buyer, when faced with a consumer report highly favourable to his chosen car may give the report greater impact by convincing himself that the reviewer is highly knowledgeable and authoritative on such matters. When faced with a negative report he may call into question the competence of the reviewer and in so doing reject his opinion. In the same way,

after disapproval of his ingratiation self-presentation, the subject may devalue the target, thus reducing the impact of his communication. Equally, in an attempt to justify the validity of an approved self-presentation the subject may re-evaluate the target upwards, thus establishing greater credibility for his communication.

Such a postulate has received some empirical support from Jones, Gergen and Davis's study (1962). After meeting with the target the subject was asked to give his impression of the target on a rating scale. Subsequently he was given the target's impression of him (favourable or unfavourable) and finally he was asked to make a second rating of his impression of his interviewer on the same scale as before. The use of the same scale twice is unsatisfactory since it really invites the subject to fulfil the experimenter's expectations. However, it was found that across all subjects (accuracy and ingratiation) approving targets were re-evaluated upwards whereas disapproving targets were re-evaluated downwards. This is not surprising. However, the prediction was that this difference would be greater for accuracy than ingratiation subjects, the reasoning being that since these subjects were presenting their real selves they would be more grateful of approval and threatened by disapproval. This prediction was not supported and indeed inspection of the cell means would indicate that the trend was in the opposite direction. Ingratiation subjects became markedly more approving of the approving target than accuracy subjects, whereas there was little difference between their re-evaluations of the disapproving target. One possible explanation of such results is that the greater response to approval of the ingratiating subjects was a means of reducing dissonance. By increasing their admiration for the target they lent

greater credibility and impact to his assessment of them.

A problem of dissonance theory is that it fails to make clear whether the various strategies of dissonance reduction are discrete alternatives and, if they are alternatives, which strategy will be preferred in what circumstances. The Jones, Gergen and Davis results would suggest that both revaluation of behaviour and the target may take place and indeed they may well be adjuncts to each other. In the case of the ingratiator who experiences approval from his target it may well be that he reduces the dissonance by firstly claiming that his self-presentation was a valid reflection of his self and that a perceptive and admirable target has perceived it as such. On the other hand the disapproved ingratiator may assert that his self-presentation was totally unrelated to his real self and that a foolish and unadmirable target has failed to see this. In the disapproval situation there may be less need for derogation of the target since the clear evidence of having presented a false front is available for the subject as an explanation for the disapproval. This may explain the milder response of the ingratiating subjects to the disapproving target in the Jones, Gergen and Davis study.

The above discussion is deliberately speculative. We are not in a position to state whether, or in what way, re-evaluation of both behaviour and target will be related. Rather it is necessary to examine empirically the nature of this relationship given that our fourth hypothesis concerning the re-evaluation of the target is at least as likely a response to the experimental situation as re-evaluation of behaviour, and indeed may well be an adjunct to it.

Hypothesis (4)

When a subject, p, is placed in an ingratiation encounter with a target person, o, then o will be re-evaluated more positively after approval of p's ingratiating self-presentation than after disapproval.

We are again interested in the effects of person variables on this prediction. The reasoning that low self-esteem and female subjects should be more responsive to approval and disapproval is again relevant here. Such subjects may therefore experience more conflict in response to approval and disapproval and may therefore display a greater degree of dissonance reduction, in this case by re-evaluating the source of the feedback, the target. Therefore, in parallel to hypotheses (2) and (3) we have hypotheses (5) and (6).

Hypothesis (5)

The effect embodied in hypothesis (4) will be stronger for female subjects faced with a male target than for male subjects faced with a male target.

Hypothesis (6)

The effect embodied in hypothesis (4) will be stronger the lower the esteem of the subjects involved.

VI. Summary

The present chapter has looked at the issue of the variability of self-presentation. We have argued that the main determinant of the form of a self-presentation is the motivation the individual brings to the situation. One aspect of motivated

behaviour which has received some attention in psychological research is that in the service of ingratiation. We have discussed the nature of this concept and the current problems and future requirements of research in this area. In particular, on the basis of previous research a basic principle of self-presentational behaviour in ingratiation interactions has been isolated. Further, it is felt that future research in this area must pay greater attention to person variables and we have suggested two, sex and self-esteem, which may be relevant in the present context. Finally, as a subsidiary aim, we have looked at the circumstances which create conflict between a varied self-presentation and the individual's basic self-concept. Possible mechanisms of handling such conflict have been suggested and related to our previous person variables.

CHAPTER II: EXPERIMENT I

Subjects:

A self-esteem questionnaire, which will be described below, was sent to the whole of the first year intake of the University. The total number of subjects thus approached amounted to 430. The questionnaire itself was embedded within several other personality questionnaires, which together formed a general personality battery. 225 Students returned the completed questionnaire. Of these 130 were female and 95 male.

The overall mean esteem score of the 225 responders on the Berger scale (see p.45 & Appendix 1) was 109.10 (σ = 17.14). The mean score of the female responders was 106.55 (σ = 17.4) and of the males 112.58 (σ = 16.21). The higher scores of male subjects on self-esteem is a fairly consistent finding in this area of research. Coopersmith (1969) has attributed it to socialisation practices, with particular reference to the greater emphasis on independence training in male socialisation. From the population of 225 questionnaire responders a total of 141 experimental volunteers was recruited.[1] These consisted of 83 females and 58 males. The final selection of 84 subjects for the experiment was made from this pool of volunteers. 28 High, 28 medium and 28 low esteem subjects were chosen to participate in the experiment. Of these 84 subjects, 42 were male and 42 female. Three were mature students and the mean age of the remainder was approximately 18 years. The selection was made in order to achieve 14 male and 14 female subjects in each of the three esteem strata. Details of the experimental sub-groups are shown in Table I.

[1] See Technical Note 1, p.213.

TABLE I

Means, Variances, Standard Deviations of Experimental Sub-Groups: Self-Esteem Scores.

	MALES			FEMALES		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Means	91.71	112.42	128.10	91.35	109.21	129.57
Variance	86.83	19.18	44.22	44.40	10.18	45.64
S.D.	9.31	4.38	6.65	6.66	3.19	6.75
N	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00

Experimental Measures

(1) Self-Esteem Scale: The self-esteem scale used was taken from a measure developed by Berger (1952). The original Berger scale consisted of 36 items to which the respondent gave one of five possible ratings, ranging from "true of myself" to "not true of myself". Sample items were "I don't question my worth as a person, even if I think others do", and "When I'm in a group I usually don't say much for fear of saying the wrong thing". In order to shorten the scale for purposes of inserting it in a large postal battery six of the items were randomly dropped.

In scoring the test protocols, if the response "true of myself" indicated high self-esteem then it was scored 5, while "not true of myself" would be scored 1 for that item. The intermediate responses would be scored 2, 3 and 4 respectively. If the item was negatively worded such that the response "true of myself" indicated low self-esteem then it would be scored 1. An individual's score on the scale was his total score for all the items on the scale.

Reliability data on the scale is reported in Appendix 1. A copy of the scale used is also included.

(2) Self-Presentation Scales: It was decided that the subjects' degree of positiveness of self-presentation would be best measured by means of an objective self-presentation scale. The advantages of precision and reliability of measurement so achieved were felt to outweigh the obvious dangers of distorting the experimental situation from a "natural" one. The self-presentation scales used were derived from a Self-Valuation Triads test used by Gergen (1962). This in turn was based upon the original Triads test developed by Dickoff (1961). The previous use of the scale items in self-presentational research was felt to be an advantage. The statements in Gergen's test covered a wide range of attributes including abilities, appearance, attitudes and interests. Each item consisted of a triad of three statements which might be descriptive of the subject. One statement was positive, one negative and one neutral in tone. The favourability of each item statement had previously been established by the method of successive intervals (Saffir, 1937; Mosier, 1940 modification). Approximately half of the statements were rated by 30 judges, the remainder by 30 other judges, in terms of a 9-point scale reflecting how much they would like to have each of the statements attributed to them. By this method, scale values for each of the statements, reflecting its degree of favourability, were computed. The instructions for the test required the subject to distribute ten points between the three statements in each triad, giving more points to those statements he considered highly self-descriptive and fewer points to those he considered to be less self-descriptive. The subject could award zero points to a statement if he decided that it was totally inapplicable to him, provided that at all times the sum of the points assigned to all three statements in the triad was ten.

As described in Chapter I it was decided that for our

experimental purposes two matched self-presentation scales were required. It was considered further that 25 items would be a suitable and convenient length for each scale. Therefore, taking Gergen's scale as a starting-off point we discarded 5 of its 72 items because they were particularly American in context or language, and therefore unsuitable for British subjects. From the remaining pool of 67 items two sets of 25 triads were randomly drawn out. These two sets of items thus became Self-Presentation scales A and B, (SP_A and SP_B). Sample items from the scales are:

1. Very orderly and meticulous in work
2. Independent thinker
3. A disturbing influence in groups

and

1. Gives up quickly when things go wrong
2. Bothered by unpleasant events
3. Tries to be frank with others.

A check on the degree of parallelism of the two scales was made by taking the sum of the scale values of the items on each form. This gives an independent measure of the degree of favourability or unfavourability of the items contained in each form as rated by independent judges. Form A had a total favourability scale rating of 138.45 while for form B the equivalent total was 137.45. Further evidence on the equivalence of the two measures was gathered by administering both scales to a group of subjects (N = 30) and correlating their scores on each scale. This process yielded a correlation coefficient of 0.94 which was considered satisfactory for our purposes.[1]

The two forms of the self-presentation measures, A and B, are included in Appendix 2. An individual's score on each item statement is the product of the points assigned to that statement and

[1] See Technical Note 2, p.213.

the item's scale value. His overall score for favourability of self-presentation is the total of all these products. Since in the original scale values high scores denote unfavourable ratings, this also applies to total self-presentation scores. The higher the score the more unfavourable is the self-presentation. Previous uses of these self-presentation items have made no use of the scale values assigned to each statement and have utilised simpler point counting systems of scoring. However, it was felt that the incorporation of the scale values into the total favourability index would yield a greater sensitivity of measurement.

(3) Interviewer Rating Scales: The two rating scales used in the experiment for the subject to record his impressions of his interviewer were of the Likert-type and developed by the experimenter. They each consisted of 25 statements which could be the description of the personality of a person one had recently met. Sample items were:

1. Generally speaking, he gives the impression of being an unfriendly person
2. I think he sounds like a very genuine and honest person

Subjects had to select one of five possible responses to each attitude statement:

1. I strongly agree
2. I agree
3. Uncertain
4. I disagree
5. I strongly disagree.

In each scale approximately half of the items were negatively worded. Scoring was done by deducting the points assigned to negatively worded

items from those assigned to positively worded items. The response "I strongly disagree" would score 1 point and the response "I strongly agree" 5 points. In this way the higher the algebraic total for the scale the more favourable the impression.

Since we required two matched rating scales in order to measure the change in interviewer rating, a check on the degree of parallelism of the two forms was carried out. Both forms of the scales were administered to the same group of subjects (N = 29). Using the scales they rated a stimulus person known to all of them. The correlation between the two sets of scores was 0.86 which was considered satisfactory for our purposes.[1]

Details of the construction of the two interviewer rating scales (IR_1 and IR_2) are included in Appendix 3. Both forms of the scale are also included.

Method

Synopsis

On arrival at the experimental room all subjects completed a self-presentation scale (SP_A). This served as a control base-line measure for each subject, each acting as his own control. All subjects were then instructed to try to create as good an impression as possible on an interviewer whom they would meet. Each subject was then interviewed by a stranger, during which interview he answered orally the second version of the self-presentation scale, SP_{B1}. After each interview each subject received a standardised communication from his or her interviewer, which made it clear that the impression they had made on the interviewer was either positive or negative. Half the subjects received positive and half negative feedback, according to a predetermined schedule. The subjects were required to give their impression of the interviewer both before (IR_1) and after (IR_2),

[1] See Technical Note 3, p.213.

receiving the feedback from him. Finally, all subjects re-answered SP_B in private (SP_{B2}). This time their instructions were to respond to the items in the way they would "normally". A third of the subjects were high esteem, a third medium esteem and a third low esteem, based on the results of the Berger scale. Half the subjects were male and half female.

Therefore, the experimental design was 3 (level of esteem) x 2 (positive or negative feedback) x 2 (male or female). The dependent variables were:

1. The subjects' responses in the interview situation compared with his pre-interview self-presentation, i.e. $SP_{B1} - SP_A$.
2. The subjects' ratings of the interviewers both before and after learning the interviewer's impression of them, i.e. $IR_2 - IR_1$.
3. The subjects' responses to the final post-interview self-presentation measure compared with his pre-interview self-presentation, i.e. $SP_{B2} - SP_A$.

Procedure

The experiment was carried out in 14 sessions. Up to seven subjects were present at the beginning of each session. Each subject was then interviewed individually by an interviewer. The same seven interviewers were used throughout all the sessions. The interviewers were male graduate students of the University. All of the interviewers had previously undergone a training programme during which they had received instructions on how to conduct themselves in the interview and had carried out practice interviews under supervision. The aim of this training programme was to ensure that

all interviewers behaved in as consistent a manner as possible. During the interviews the interviewers were relatively neutral in their conduct. They displayed neither undue hostility nor sympathy towards the interviewees. Also, they avoided discussion on topics outwith the scope of the interview programme. The use of a relatively structured interview programme also facilitated these aims. Furthermore, prior to the experiment, all the interviewers were given lists of the subjects they were going to interview. This was done to ensure that the interviewer and interviewee were unknown to each other. However, the use of new students as subjects in the experiment minimised this problem.

Subjects were carefully assigned so that each interviewer spoke with four high, four medium and four low in self-esteem during his 12 interview sessions. Within each of these sub-groups, half received feedback from the interviewer indicating that they had made a positive impression on him, and half received negative feedback. Also these six sub-groups of two subjects were each made up of one male and one female. The interviewers were completely unaware of the nature of the experiment, of the experimental instructions or the nature of the subjects. Also, care was taken to ensure that they did not know the nature of the feedback they had to communicate until after the interview was over.

The experimental design was therefore one of 12 treatment cells with each interviewer appearing once in each cell, and each subject appearing only once in one of the 12 cells. The design is summarised in Table II.

TABLE II

Experimental Design

Self Esteem	High				Medium				Low			
Sex	Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female	
Feedback	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−
n	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

The experiment began with an assembly of up to seven subjects and the experimenter. Upon arrival at the experimental area the subjects were asked without any preliminary explanation to complete the first form of the self-presentation questionnaire (SP_A). When this was completed the subjects were told that they were going to participate in an experiment on impression formation. They were then given the following information:

> "Briefly, what is going to happen today is that each of you is going to be interviewed by a male, postgraduate psychology student. We are primarily interested in studying what variables affect an interviewer's perceptions and evaluations of the person he is interviewing, and - just as important - what the person being interviewed thinks of the interviewer. For this reason we are going to be breaking in at various points and asking for your impressions of each other. The general order of events will be as follows:
>
> (1) Each of you will go to a preassigned cubicle where your interview will be conducted.

(2) On completion of the interview you will go to a second preassigned cubicle, and carry out the instructions that await you there.

(3) Finally, you will all return to this original experimental room."

These instructions are similar to those used by Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962) in a similar situation. Since there were no problems arising from their use in the previous experiment it was decided to adapt them for use in the current situation.

After this general introduction had been given to the subjects they were told that after the interview, while they were in the second cubicle, their interviewer's impression of them would be passed to them. It was admitted that it was somewhat unusual to ask interviewers to evaluate someone and then to show that evaluation to the person in question. However, this procedure was justified by pointing out to the subjects that people did find out such information, albeit indirectly, and that such evaluations were extremely important in looking at any kind of impression formation.

The experimenter then went on to discuss the importance of the interview as a means of gathering information and knowledge about people. Its use as a technique of assessment was discussed with reference to employee selection, clinical diagnosis, and related areas. The subjects were told that all the interviewers had received, as part of their postgraduate training, some instruction in methods of interviewing. The results of this experiment were to be used as a basis for further discussion and training in the graduate class. It was hoped that they would show up the variables which were of major importance in determining an interviewer's impression of the person he is interviewing. At this point the experimenter introduced

an important experimental manipulation. Subjects were given the following instructions:

> "One of the difficulties we are faced with in the use of the interview is dealing with people who aren't so much concerned about being honest when answering the questions, but are primarily trying to make a good impression on the interviewer. There are two things we don't know about in such instances:
>
> (a) what kind of picture such a person presents of himself during the interview, that is, how would his answers differ from those of a person who was being totally honest, and
>
> (b) how skillful our interviewers are in picking up this kind of thing.
>
> So, what I would like to ask you to do while he is interviewing you is to concentrate on only one thing: trying to make the best possible impression on him that you can. I can't tell you how to go about this; this is really what we would like to know. You can say anything you like about yourself, be anybody you would like to be, just as long as you think your answers will impress him." (Gergen, 1962, p. 117)

These instructions to ingratiate had been used previously by Gergen (1962) and had proved successful in motivating subjects to ingratiate. It was therefore decided that they should be used in this experiment. It was stressed to the subjects that the interviewers were completely unaware of these instructions to the subjects. In this case this was in fact true. Finally, the subjects were given the

opportunity to ask any questions they wished, and when these had been dealt with satisfactorily they were given the numbers of the two experimental cubicles assigned to each of them. They were then led to the first of these cubicles where the interview began.

Interview Procedure

Each interview was almost totally structured and standardised. While this inevitably resulted in some loss of spontaneity and naturalness it was hoped that the gain in comparability and accuracy of measurement would more than compensate. The interview began with 5 standard questions:

(1) Could I have your name please?
(2) What would you say are your major interests outside of your university work?
(3) What would you say you liked most and least about being at university?
(4) If you could change your personality overnight, what habits or traits would you most like to change?
(5) What do you think are your major strong points as a person?

The purpose of these questions was simply to validate the interview proceedings and they were not used for data gathering purposes. The important data from the interview were the subjects' responses to the second form of the self-presentation scale (SP_{B1}). This scale was administered in a standard way. The interviewer read out aloud each statement making up the triad to the subject. Each set of statements was read out at least twice to ensure that the subject was fully aware of the three statements. The subject was told to distribute 10 points among the three statements in the triad, such that the statement which was most characteristic of him received the greatest number of

points, and the statement which was least characteristic of him received the least number of points. The subjects were of course already familiar with this kind of procedure, having completed SP_A prior to the beginning of the experiment. The only difference in this case was that the scale was administered orally by the interviewer and it was the interviewer who noted down the subject's verbal responses.[1] Upon the completion of the triads test the interview was concluded and the subject proceeded to the second of his preassigned cubicles where fresh instructions awaited him.

Post-Interview Procedure

In the second experimental cubicle the subject found 4 envelopes, clearly numbered 1 to 4 and a set of typewritten instructions. These instructed the subject to open the envelopes in strict numerical order, and not to go on to envelope 2, until after receiving his interviewer's impression of him.

The first envelope contained the first form of the interviewer rating scale (IR_1). At the top of the scale appeared the following:

> This is a study of your first impression of your interviewer. You are to respond to each statement according to the following scheme. Write the appropriate number (1-5) beside each statement.
>
> 1. I strongly agree
> 2. I agree
> 3. Uncertain
> 4. I disagree
> 5. I strongly disagree.

There then followed a list of 25 descriptive statements with a space

[1] See Technical Note 4, p.213.

for a response beside each of them.

While the subject completed this rating scale his interviewer prepared his "impression" of the subject. This was written by the interviewer himself at the time, and copied from one of two typewritten example forms, either containing a positive or a negative impression. The impression was handwritten on a typewritten sheet, headed "Interviewer's Appraisal Sheet". There was then a space for the subject's name, followed by 8 sets of bipolar adjectives with 7 spaces between them, e.g.

pleasant	___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___	unpleasant
intelligent	___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___	unintelligent
sincere	___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___	insincere

In the positive feedback condition the ratings checked were all towards the favourable end of the scales, whereas in the negative condition they tended towards the unfavourable end. The precise ratings were the same for every subject in each feedback condition. Finally, under the heading "Overall Impression", the interviewer wrote one of two paragraphs. In the positive feedback condition the following paragraph appeared:

> I suppose the ratings above speak very much for themselves. In my honest opinion, Mr./Miss (subject's name) creates a very favourable impression. I don't think I'm just saying this because I know he/she is going to read this. He/she is the kind of person I enjoy talking with. He/she seemed a little ill at ease, but no more than one would expect. On the self-concept test, I paid close attention to the things he/she said about himself/herself. He/she

> shows a healthy pattern of attributes. I'm a little embarrassed that there's nothing really to say on the negative side, but that's the way I honestly feel.

The following comments were made in the negative feedback condition.

> It is not easy to tell most people what you think of them, but I have been asked to give my honest evaluation, so here goes. Frankly, I would have to say that my impression is not a particularly positive one. By and large I think Mr/Miss (subject's actual name) handles himself/herself quite well and he/she is generally pleasant and cooperative. But he/she seems rather nervous and unsure of himself/herself and the picture he/she presents on the choice test is quite different from other reactions to this test that we have all seen and discussed in training. From the way he/she describes himself/herself on the attitude study, I honestly don't think I'd care to have him/her as a friend. I know this sounds blunt, especially since I know he/she is going to read this. But this is my honest opinion, even though I may be wrong.

Both of these forms of feedback are slightly modified versions of those used by Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962, p.7) in a similar situation. On that occasion they proved effective and were reliably discriminated by subjects. It was therefore decided to use them again in this experiment rather than develop completely new reports. The two forms of the Interviewer's Appraisal Sheet can be seen in

Appendix 4.

When both the interviewer and the subject had completed their respective tasks, the experimenter collected the Appraisal Sheet from the interviewer and took it to the subject, exchanging it for IR_1 in the process. Having read their interviewer's impression of them the subjects then opened envelope 2. This envelope contained the second form of the self-presentation scale (SP_B), that is it consisted of the same items to which the subject had responded in the interview itself. The items were preceded by the following typewritten instructions:

> This is a repetition of the kind of test you did at the beginning. The items in it are the same as the ones used in the interview. In the interview perhaps you weren't being completely true to yourself. This time please answer the questions in the way you really would normally.

Upon the completion of this private performance of SP_{B2} the subjects opened envelope 3. This contained a brief paragraph ostensibly describing their interviewer and his background. The statements contained in the description were deliberately as uninformative as possible in any evaluative sense. Their purpose was merely to provide the subject with a rationale for changing his impression of his interviewer if he so desired. The interviewer description was the same in all cases, and was as follows:

> Your interview was conducted by (interviewer's real name). He is a postgraduate student in the university and this is his second year here. Before coming to Stirling he attended Leeds University. He has one

brother and one sister, both younger than him. He is interested in reading, music and sport. When he finishes university he would like to work in industry or an academic field. He is not married.

Finally, the subjects opened envelope 4 which contained the second form of the interviewer rating scale (IR_2). As in IR_1 it consisted of 25 items, statements which might be descriptive of the interviewer. In this case, however, it was preceded by the following:

> This is a study of your final, overall impression of your interviewer.

The completion of IR_2 ended the post-interview procedure and the subjects then returned to the original experimental room.

Debriefing

Subjects were questioned by the experimenter about their attitude to the experiment. In particular they were checked for suspicion about the experimental procedures, and for the success of the experimental manipulations. Finally, they were told the true nature and purpose of the experiment, thanked for their cooperation and requested not to say anything about the experiment for several days.

The complete sequence of experimental procedures is summarised in Table III.

TABLE III: Experimental Summary

Sequence	Location	Activity	Measure
1.	Central Area	Neutral Self-Presentation	SP_A
2.	Central Area	Experimental Instructions	
3.	Cubicle 1	Interview Self-Presentation	SP_{B1}
4.	Cubicle 2	Initial Interviewer Rating	IR_1
5.	Cubicle 2	Presentation of Interviewer's Impression	
6.	Cubicle 2	Final Self-Presentation	SP_{B2}
7.	Cubicle 2	Neutral Information on Interviewer Presented	
8.	Cubicle 2	Final Interviewer Rating	IR_2
9.	Central Area	Debriefing	

CHAPTER III: Results and Discussion

(1) Validation of Experimental Manipulations

It is firstly important to establish, before looking further at the data, that the subjects perceived the experimental manipulations in the way intended by the experimenter. The major question here is whether the subjects perceived the positive feedback as more approving than the negative feedback. In the post-experimental session each subject was asked to rate his impression of the degree of favourability of his interviewer's judgment of him. This was done on a 9-point scale with the poles labelled "extremely unfavourable" and "extremely favourable". The positive feedback was rated as significantly more favourable than the negative feedback ($t = 3.7$, $df = 82$; $p < .001$). The rest of the experimental results also emphasise the success of this manipulation, since they can only be explained on the basis of a discriminating perception of the two versions of the feedback.

As discussed in the previous chapter, it was also intended that the seven interviewers would behave in as uniform a manner as possible, and would therefore not be a significant variable in the experiment. In order to investigate whether this had in fact been achieved the initial ratings of each interviewer (IR_1) by all the subjects were placed in a one-way analysis of variance with seven samples each of 12 observations. There were no significant differences among the subject's initial impressions of their interviewers ($F = 1.27$; $df = 6, 77$; N.S.).

(2) Experimental Results

Principle: When a subject, p, is placed in an ingratiation

encounter with a target person o, in the absence of:

a) information concerning o's values or status,

b) anticipation of future interaction with o, and

c) o's awareness of the ingratiation attempt,

then he will present himself more favourably and positively than in a situation where ingratiation motivation is less salient (see p.21).

The checking of this rule involved the comparison of subjects' scores on the pre-interview measure (SP_A) with their scores during the interview itself (SP_{B1}). The results of this comparison are presented in Table IV.

Table IV: Comparison of SP_A and SP_{B1}

	N	Mean	S.D.	S.E.	Mean Diff.	S.E. Diff.
SP_A	84	414.7 [1]	33.4	3.6	12.6	3.1
SP_{B1}	84	402.1 [1]	37.5	4.1		

$t = 4.12$; $df = 83$; $p < .001$

[1] Lower scores signify more favourable self-presentations.

Subjects systematically presented themselves more favourably in the interview (SP_{B1}) than in the neutral pre-interview situation (SP_A). ($t = 4.12$; $df = 83$; $p < .001$). The basic principle of self-presentation is therefore confirmed.

It should be noted that while this self-enhancement effect is very strong when averaged across all subjects, it is by no means true of <u>each</u> subject. 29 Out of the 84 subjects did not self-enhance in the interview but rather presented themselves modestly . Their tendency to self-derogate was less strong than that of the remaining 55 subjects to self-enhance. The mean changes in self-presentation

were +14.0 as against -26.5, negative changes being favourable. This finding has implications for other aspects of the results and will be taken up again later.

The effects of the two moderator variables, esteem and sex, were investigated. No hypotheses were advanced concerning these variables as conflicting predictions were tenable. Changes in subjects' self-presentation scores were subjected to a 3 (high-medium-low esteem) x 2 (male-female) x 7 (interviewers) analysis of variance, a mixed model factorial design with two observations in each cell. The analysis is summarised in Table V.

Table V: Analysis of Variance Summary

Changes in Subjects' Self-Presentation Scores, $SP_{B1} - SP_A$

Source	df	Mean Square	F	
A. Self-Esteem	2	71.0	<1	
B. Sex	1	513.8	<1	
C. Interviewers	6	695.2	<1	
AB	2	1143.3	1.35	N.S.
AC	12	488.8	<1	
BC	6	661.8	<1	
ABC	12	843.4	<1	
Remainder	42	906.2		
Total	83			

It should be noted that the feedback variable is excluded at this stage since it is not introduced into the experimental procedure until after SP_{B1} and therefore would have no effect on the results. Its exclusion also permits us to retain a within-cell error term. As can be seen in the summary table none of the main effects or interactions approach significance. Thus while across all subjects self-enhancement takes place within the interview, there are no systematic

differences among high, medium and low self-esteem subjects and between males and females in the degree to which they self-enhance. This is clearer if one examines the mean change in subjects' self-presentation scores for each subgroup as presented in Table VI.

Table VI: Mean Change in Self-Presentation: $SP_{B1} - SP_A$

Esteem and Sex

	Mean Change $SP_{B1}-SP_A$		Mean Change $SP_{B1}-SP_A$
Low Esteem	-12.8	Males	-10.1
Medium Esteem	-10.9	Females	-15.1
High Esteem	-14.1		

It should also be noted that again there are no significant effects attributable to "interviewers" either singly, or in interaction with the other variables. This gives further validity to the experimental efforts to minimise the differences between the seven interviewers.

Hypotheses (1), (2) and (3)

(1) When a subject, P, is placed in an ingratiation encounter with a target person, o, he will deny the accuracy of his self-presentation and show a consequent greater return to his original self-conception after disapproval of his ingratiating self-presentation than after approval.

(2) The effect embodied in hypothesis (1) will be stronger for female subjects faced with a male target than for male subjects faced with a male target.

(3) The effect embodied in hypothesis (1) will be stronger the lower the esteem of the subjects involved (see pp. 37ff.)

The testing of these three hypotheses involved the

comparison of subjects' scores on the pre-interview measure (SP_A) with their scores on the post-interview measure (SP_{B2}). Subjects change in self-conception scores ($SP_{B2}-SP_A$) were placed in a 3(high, medium, low esteem) x 2 (positive-negative feedback) x 2 (male-female) x 7 (interviewers) analysis of variance, a mixed-model factorial design with one observation in each cell. It is not possible to examine the effects of interviewers in this situation since there is no within-cell error term. However, there is evidence already reported that the interviewers did not have a significant effect on the results. The analysis of variance is summarised in Table VII.

Table VII: Analysis of Variance Summary

Changes in Subjects' Self-Conception Scores: $SP_{B2}-SP_A$

Source	df	Mean Square	F	
A. Esteem	2	370.4	< 1	
B. Feedback	1	3676.9	5.78	N.S.
C. Sex	1	24.7	< 1	
D. Interviewers	6	834.6		
AB	2	751.3	< 1	
AC	2	3445.6	2.93	N.S.
AD	12	922.2		
BC	1	82.5	< 1	
BD	6	636.0		
CD	6	1019.6	< 1	
ABC	2	698.1	1.3	N.S.
ABD	12	884.4		
BCD	6	1237.8		
ACD	12	1177.5		
ABCD	12	540.3		
Total	83			

Hypothesis (1) is substantiated by the main effect of feedback ($F = 5.78$; $df = 1, 6$; N.S.). This effect falls just short of significance at the .05 level. An F value of 5.89 would be required for such significance. However, this is a two-tailed test and a prediction of direction of difference was made in this case. If the F value is converted to t ($F = t^2$) then the difference between the two groups is a significant one when a one-tailed test is employed ($t = 2.4$; $df = 40$; $p < .025$). The mean change in self-conception after approving feedback was -11.5, whereas the mean change after disapproving feedback was +1.8. After approval subjects maintained that their interview self-presentation (SP_{B1}) was accurate, while after disapproval they maintained that it was inaccurate and not a true reflection of themselves.

This treatment is to an extent dependent upon our general principle of self-presentation. It is based upon the assumption that self-enhancement would be the prevailing strategy during the interview. However, the implications of positive or negative feedback on a <u>self-derogatory</u> presentation in the interview are quite different from those for the assumed self-enhancement. Approval of a modest self-presentation may, at least partially, reinforce such behaviour and lead to an extent, to its assimilation into the self-conception. At the same time approval may also lead to an enhanced view of self. Clearly these two mechanisms have different implications in the case of self-derogation and may lead to an intermediate, resultant position between the retention of the reinforced modesty and the more favourable view of self based on approval. Similarly, disapproval of a modest self-presentation may be shown to have two conflicting implications and again may result in an intermediate, resultant

effect. This distinction between the implications of self-enhancement and self-derogation is made more than academic by the fact that, as described below, some of the subjects did in fact present themselves less favourably in the interview than they had done in the pre-interview self-presentation (SP_A). The comparison between these two groups and all subjects combined is presented in Table VIII.

Table VIII: Mean Changes in Self-Conception (SP_{B2}-SP_A)

	Approval	Disapproval
Self-Derogators	+2.4 (n = 17)	+7.0 (n = 12)
Self-Enhancers	-20.9 (n = 25)	-0.3 (n = 30)
All Subjects	-11.5 (n = 42)	+1.8 (n = 42)

Examination of the means in Table VIII demonstrate that our general principle is more strongly confirmed when attention is directed to the self-enhancing subjects only. The inclusion of the self-derogating subjects in the analysis has the effect of camouflaging, although not completely hiding, the strength of the prediction. This is made more clear if one looks at the two groups of subjects' patterns of self-presentations graphically as presented in Figure 1. For purposes of comparison all SP_A scores have been taken as the base line and the graphs represent departures from that position. If attention is directed solely at the self-enhancing subjects then their pattern of self-presentations conform closely to the predicted one. Disapproved subjects deny the validity of SP_{B1} and return to their original self-conception. Approved subjects, on the other hand, maintain that SP_{B1} was accurate and incorporate

FIGURE 1: Patterns of Self-Presentation



aspects of it in a new self-conception. The pattern of self-derogating subjects' self-presentations is the opposite of this. There is a greater return to original self-conception after approval than after disapproval.

Hypothesis (2) concerning the sex difference is tested by the BC interaction, sex of subject X feedback. As can be seen from Table VII this interaction is not confirmed ($F, < 1$).

Hypothesis (3) concerning the effects of the self-esteem level of the subjects is embodied in the AB interaction, self-esteem level X feedback. Examination of the analysis of variance summary table shows that this interaction did not reach significance ($F, < 1$). There is no evidence of any systematic differences in the three esteem groups' responses to feedback. Hypotheses (2) and (3) are not confirmed.

It was decided to examine the results of the self-enhancing subjects separately in order to investigate the extent, if any, to which the presence of self-derogating subjects was masking significant effects. Subjects' change in self-conception scores ($SP_{B2}-SP_A$) were placed in a 3 (high-medium-low self esteem) x 2 (positive-negative feedback) x 2 (male-female) analysis of variance table. Since the 55 subjects who self-enhanced were not equally distributed among the 12 cells an unweighted means analysis was performed. It was not possible to include the interviewer variable at this stage since clearly each interviewer was not represented in each of the 12 cells. The analysis of variance is summarised in Table IX.

Table IX: Analysis of Variance Summary

Changes in Self-Enhancing Subjects' Self-Conception Scores: $SP_{B2}-SP_A$

Source	df	Mean Square	F	
A. Self-Esteem	2	1249.1	1.27	N.S.
B. Feedback	1	5444.3	5.55	**
C. Sex	1	185.3	< 1	
AB	2	1035.5	1.06	N.S.
AC	2	1605.8	1.64	N.S.
BC	1	645.1	< 1	
ABC	2	3335.2	3.4	*
Remainder	43	979.8		

* $p < .05$

** $p < .025$

The general effect of this reanalysis is to increase the F ratios confirming that the self-derogating subjects tended to mask some effects. Particularly, the effect of feedback is increased ($F = 5.55$; $df = 1, 43$; $p < .025$). Neither of the two interactions AB and BC reach significance, however.

There is one other consequence of the reanalysis of self-enhancing subjects which should be mentioned. The third order interaction ABC is now significant ($F = 3.4$; $df = 2, 43$; $p < .05$). The cell means of the ABC interaction are summarised in Table X.

It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from higher order interactions, especially with relatively small numbers of observations per cell. However, it would appear that the present interaction is

Table X: Mean Change in Self-Conception (SP_{2B}-SP_A)[1]

Self-Esteem X Feedback X Sex: Self-Enhancing Subjects

	Approved Male	Approved Female	Disapproved Male	Disapproved Female
Low	$-8.8^{(n=4)}$	$-13.0^{(n=4)}$	$-17.3^{(n=5)}$	$+1.2^{(n=5)}$
Medium	$-20.1^{(n=5)}$	$-45.4^{(n=2)}$	$-25.6^{(n=5)}$	$+15.5^{(n=6)}$
High	$-15.9^{(n=3)}$	$-19.5^{(n=7)}$	$+39.3^{(n=4)}$	$-10.3^{(n=5)}$

produced by the reversal of the pattern between disapproved males and females at low and medium levels of esteem at the high esteem level.

Hypotheses (4), (5) and (6)

(4) When a subject, p, is placed in an ingratiation encounter with a target person, o, then o will be re-evaluated more positively after approval of p's ingratiating self-presentation than after disapproval.

(5) The effect embodied in hypothesis (4) will be stronger for female subjects faced with a male target than for male subjects faced with a male target.

(6) The effect embodied in hypothesis (4) will be stronger the lower the esteem level of the subjects involved.

The testing of these three hypotheses involved the comparison of subjects' scores on the initial Interviewer Rating (IR_1) with their scores on the final Interviewer Rating (IR_2), performed after the feedback message had been received. Subjects' changes in interviewer-rating scores (IR_2-IR_1) were placed in a 3 (high-medium-low esteem) x 2 (positive-negative feedback) x 2 (male-female) x 7

[1]N.B. Negative changes are favourable.

(interviewers) analysis of variance, a mixed-model factorial design with one subject in each of the 12 cells. The analysis of variance is summarised in Table XI.

Table XI: Analysis of Variance Summary

Changes in Subjects' Interviewer Rating Scores: $IR_2 - IR_1$

Source	df	Mean Square	F	
A. Esteem	2	24.8	< 1	
B. Feedback	1	1838.7	56.4	***
C. Sex	1	301.0	11.8	**
D. Interviewer	6	103.6		
AB	2	239.0	5.7	*
AC	2	49.3	1.0	
AD	12	74.2		
BC	1	136.3	1.0	
BD	6	32.6		
CD	6	25.6		
ABC	2	72.6	< 1	
ABD	12	42.2		
BCD	6	130.1		
ACD	12	47.2		
ABCD	12	109.9		
Total	83			

* $p < .05$

** $p < .025$

*** $p < .001$

Hypothesis (4) is substantiated by the significant main effect of feedback ($F = 56.4$; $df = 1, 6$; $p < .001$). The mean change

in interviewer rating after approving feedback was +5.33[1], whereas the mean change after disapproving feedback was -3.69. After approval subjects re-rate their interviewer more positively than after disapproval.

Hypothesis (5) concerning the sex difference in response to feedback was not confirmed ($F = 1.0$, $df = 1, 6$, N.S.). The cell means of the sex and feedback interaction are summarised in Table XII.

Table XII: Mean Change in Interviewer Rating ($IR_2 - IR_1$)

Feedback X Sex

	Male	Female
Approved	5.95	4.70
Disapproved	-0.19	-7.20

Female subjects respond more negatively to disapproval than male subjects but do not differ in their reaction to approval.

Hypothesis (6) is tested by the AB interaction. This interaction was found to be significant ($F = 5.7$, $df = 2, 12$; $p < .05$). The cell means of the interaction are summarised in Table XIII.

Table XIII: Mean Change in Interviewer Rating ($IR_2 - IR_1$)

Feedback X Self-Esteem

	Low	Medium	High
Approved	7.6	4.1	4.2
Disapproved	-8.4	-2.8	-2.3

The low esteem subjects are more reactive to the feedback than the medium or high esteem subjects, who are about equal in response.

[1] With interviewer ratings the higher the score the more favourable the rating or rating change.

Hypothesis (6) is confirmed.

There was also an unpredicted significant main effect of sex ($F = 11.8$; $df = 1, 6$; $p < .025$). The actual means were +2.88 for men and -1.24 for women. That is, regardless of feedback received, women re-rate their interviewer more negatively than men. This effect may be produced by the particularly negative response of female subjects to disapproval from a male interviewer (-7.20, cf. Table XII). This may have been sufficiently large to produce an overall effect for women against men.

In summary therefore, the results of the present experiment are as follows:

1) The basic principle of self-enhancement in the interview was substantiated ($t = 4.12$; $df = 83$; $p < .001$).

2) The sex pairing of the dyad was not related to the self-presentational strategy employed in the interview ($F < 1$).

3) The self-esteem level of the subjects was not related to the self-presentational strategy employed in the interview ($F < 1$).

4) Subjects denied the accuracy of their interview self-presentation more after disapproval than after approval ($t = 2.4$; $df = 40$; $p < .05$).

5) The sex of the subjects was unrelated to the degree of this denial of accuracy ($F < 1$).

6) The self-esteem level of the subjects was unrelated to the degree of denial of accuracy ($F < 1$).

7) The presence of self-derogating subjects in the analysis had the result of camouflaging some of the anticipated effects.

8) Subjects re-evaluated their target more favourably after approval of their interview self-presentation than after disapproval ($F = 56.4$; $df = 1, 6$; $p < .001$).

9) Female subjects responded more negatively to disapproval than males but did not differ in their reaction to approval - as measured by change in interviewer rating scores.

10) Low esteem subjects responded more negatively to disapproval and more positively to approval than medium and high self-esteem subjects - as measured by change in interviewer rating scores ($F = 5.7$; $df = 2, 12$; $p < .05$).

CHAPTER IV: Self-Presentational Modesty

I. Introduction

In the previous chapters we have given attention to those situational factors which lead to self-enhancement in ingratiation-motivated encounters. We now wish to turn our attention to those factors which tend to create the opposite response, namely self-devaluation or modesty. In deducing the conditions for self-enhancement we isolated factors whose absence from the situation facilitated such a self-presentational strategy (cf.p.16ff.). May we now assume that the presence of those same factors should lead to self-presentational modesty? In other words do subjects devalue themselves in situations where the target, o, is aware of his relative power and therefore of the ingratiation attempt, where the subject, p, anticipates further interaction with o beyond the ingratiation encounter, and where p has access to information concerning o's values, status and abilities? There are several reasons for doubting that such a simple corollary hypothesis is tenable.

Firstly, while the absence of information about o may be a realistic factor in itself, the presence of such information immediately raises the question of what the information is. The idea of simply having information about the target is far too diffuse a concept for study. Also, self-derogation cannot really be seen as simply another form of ingratiating presentation, the mirror-image of self-enhancement. While it is

true that excessive self-enhancement entails risks for the ingratiator in terms of being thought arrogant or being found wanting (which doesn't apply anyway if no anticipation of further interaction exists), the dangers involved in excessive self-derogation are, one contends, of a quite different order. The actor who persistently presents himself in a demeaning, derogating fashion runs the genuine risk of forcing the withdrawal of the other from the interaction, a process labelled "succourance avoidance" by Gergen and Wishnov (1965). Also, if the self-derogation were extreme, such a self-presentational strategy would have strong parallels with several pathological mental states such as chronic depression and may lead to the perception of the actor as being "ill" rather than worthy of reward or admiration. Further, a persistent denial of abilities and attributes in the absence of any disconfirming or balancing evidence of talents is unlikely to produce the desired rewards, particularly in areas where some form of competence is being assessed. In summary, one would contend, on a purely theoretical basis, that self-derogation would be a more complex, subtle self-presentational strategy than self-enhancement, and not simply one which occurs globally in the presence of the factors whose absence encourages self-enhancement. However, a second factor based to an extent on the results of experiment 1 raises questions as to the veridicality of our proposed corollary hypothesis. This relates to the minority of subjects in that experiment who presented themselves less favourably in the interview than they had previously done in a neutral context (cf. p. 63). Therefore, we have here a situation in which there is no awareness on the part of o,

there is no anticipation of future interaction and there is little information concerning the target person available, and still a sizeable minority of subjects become modest. The question arises as to why this response occurred. It may be that one or more of the three self-enhancement factors did not have the anticipated effect. However, it would appear that the absence of awareness and anticipation of future interaction were unequivocal in this case. Both of these factors were made quite clear in the experimental instructions and there is little reason to doubt that they were believed by the subjects. On the other hand, the third factor, information concerning the target person, is more problematic. To a certain extent if one tells experimental subjects that there will be no further interaction beyond the experimental encounter then it is reasonable to assume that they will accept this. There is little alternative for them unless they decide that the experimenter is deliberately deceiving them, which one would hope they would not. However, although one may give virtually no information concerning an individual to a number of subjects, one cannot assume from this that they will all perceive him in the same way. There is a far greater subjective element involved in this situation than in a more controlled one, and different subjects may still perceive the individual in quite different ways. It is possible therefore that such a phenomenon occurred in our experimental situation. The subjects may have "filled in" the gaps in their knowledge subjectively during their meeting with their interviewer. This may have resulted in systematic differences in the subjects' "perceptions" of their interviewers. There is some preliminary evidence in support of this proposal. The difference between the self-derogating and self-enhancing subjects was not related to self-esteem or sex. However, in a comparison of each group's initial rating of their interviewer (IR_1 - prior to receiving feedback) there

was a mean rating of 15.75 for the modest subjects and 11.63 for the self-enhancing subjects. The mean difference falls just short of significance on a 2-tailed t-test ($t = 1.66$, $df = 82$, $p < .1$) but would be significant at the .05 level on a 1-tailed test. This finding may be viewed as a possible factor in the explanation of the results.

Such a finding suggests a reformulation of the three factors we have so far isolated and their relative importance (cf. p.16). If admiration for the target person even in conjunction with no anticipation or awareness is capable of producing a self-derogating response then this would indicate that admiration is a crucial variable; that it is not so much merely information about the target that matters but rather information which leads to the target being admired. In the following section we will re-examine some experimental findings in the light of this proposed reformulation.

II. Research Review

Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962), in a similar experimental situation to our own, involving no anticipation, awareness or information about the target found that a general self-enhancement response was obtained. The authors do not report any significant number of subjects self-derogating. If this is in fact the case then the question arises as to why, in their experiment, no substantial minority of subjects perceived their interviewer in a particularly favourable way, as occurred in our experiment. One strong possibility is that in the Jones experiment the interviewers and experimental subjects all gathered together to meet the experimenter in the first instance to receive the instructions. The subjects would therefore have less justification for perceiving the interviewer as different from themselves, and hence there would be less likelihood of particularly favourable impressions being created, at least as regards expertise. In our experiment the subjects' first encounter with the

interviewer was when they entered the interview cubicle, which to some extent may have given the interviewers an aura of expertise, of being "in on" the experiment.

Stires and Jones (1969) found that ingratiating subjects faced with an aware target presented themselves less favourably than ingratiating subjects with an unaware target. Anticipation of further interaction was common to both groups but there was little if any information provided about the target person. It is important to note that although, as stated, the "aware" subjects were less self-enhancing than the "unaware" they were still generally self-enhancing in the ingratiation interview relative to a neutral pre-interview measure. Thus it would appear that while awareness and anticipation depress the normal self-enhancement response they are insufficient in themselves to produce self-derogation.

Jones, Gergen, Gumpert and Thibaut (1965) created a job selection experiment in which the ingratiating subjects anticipated further interaction and had an aware target. They found that self-enhancement was the dominant response but in this case the information provided about the target person was in the form of his expressed values. This, therefore, may be seen as essentially an exercise in conformity behaviour rather than self-enhancement, and thus is not really contrary to our proposed formulation. Subjects in this case were describing themselves positively on qualities highly valued by the target, which is not the same as on qualities for which the target is highly valued by the subjects. A similar situation arises in Schneider and Eustis's (1972) experiment. In this investigation ingratiation subjects self-enhanced relative to control subjects when faced with a target who had previously presented himself in a highly positive way. Anticipation of future interaction was again present here, but the awareness of the target of the ingratiation attempt is uncertain from the experimental report. The important point once more in this experiment is that admiration

for the target person was not controlled for. The presentation of a highly positive self by the target is in no way a guarantee of being so perceived by the subjects, and indeed may be counter-productive.

In review, therefore, our proposed reformulation of the crucial variables in this area is that ingratiating subjects with anticipation, an aware target and admiration for that target will tend to self-derogate. While it is true that none of the experiments so far discussed produce evidence contrary to this reformulation, at the same time none of them could be said to test the prediction directly. However, Jones, Gergen and Jones (1963) come much closer to a direct analysis of this area. In their investigation of ingratiation tactics in a status hierarchy, low status subjects were encouraged to ingratiate themselves with senior officers of a Naval ROTC unit. The subjects expected further interaction with their targets and knew that the targets were aware of the ingratiation attempt. Also, while it cannot be guaranteed that the low status subjects admired their higher status targets since no direct measure of such was obtained, it is reasonable to assume that such admiration existed, particularly in such areas as respect for their superior knowledge of naval skills and leadership qualities. It was found that such low status subjects tended to present themselves less favourably than a control group of subjects, <u>but only on those items which they had denoted as particularly important personal characteristics</u>. It is arguable that such characteristics, given the nature of the hierarchy in which they were involved, would be similar to those for which they admired their targets.

We have begun with the proposition that given anticipation and awareness, ingratiating subjects will self-derogate to an admired target. However, as stated above, global self-derogation is an unlikely and dangerous self-presentational strategy and the true response must be more complex and subtle than general self-derogation.

The evidence reviewed above, and in particular the Jones, Gergen and Jones experiment, suggest such an adaptation of the original formulation: given anticipation and awareness, ingratiating subjects will self-derogate on those qualities for which they admire the target. This proposal clearly allows greater flexibility of self-presentation and avoids the general self-derogation which we have suggested is unlikely. Hbwever, from first principles it may be argued that such a hypothesis is also unsatisfactory and does not take account of the subtleties of the ingratiating self-presentation. One might suggest that to present oneself as lazy to a target whose industry you admire or as never seeing a joke to someone admired for his sense of humour, is not to maximise one's chances of being approved. Equally, as has been previously described, self-enhancement in this situation has correspondingly attendant risks. It may be perceived as obvious, it tends to challenge the position of the target and the claimed qualities may be found to be lacking in future interaction with the target. Again the actual strategy would appear to be somewhere between the two extremes, a more subtle and complex compromise than either. Stires and Jones (1969) have suggested one dimension which may prove useful in further investigation of this problem. In their study of the deteminants of modesty and self-enhancement they distinguished between two types of personal qualities - those that are <u>reputational</u> and those that are <u>intentional</u>. Reputational qualities were defined as those which could best be gauged by other people observing the individual in question. Into this category would come such qualities as "popular-unpopular" and "intelligent-unintelligent". Intentional qualities, on the other hand, are more within the individual's area of control. The individual may exhibit more or less of such qualities by <u>trying</u>. Such qualities would be "persevering - gives up easily" or "friendly - distant". Very

tentatively Stires and Jones suggested that it is more immodest to claim reputational than intentional qualities and therefore when depression of the self-enhancement response first occurs it should occur on the reputational items. In their experiment there was some preliminary evidence to suggest that this may indeed be so. Subjects in the interviewer-aware condition showed a particular tendency towards modesty on reputational items.

III. Hypotheses

We may now suggest that this distinction between reputational and intentional qualities is a factor relevant to the self-presentational strategy employed in ingratiation encounters. We have suggested that under conditions of anticipation, awareness and admiration there will be a tendency towards self-derogation but that it will not be global. The possibility would therefore become that the self-derogation would take place on the reputational qualities and that there would be a balancing self-enhancement on the intentional qualities. More formally stated our general hypothesis becomes:

> When a subject, p, is placed in an ingratiation encounter with a target person, o, in the presence of: a) anticipation of future interaction with o,
> b) o's awareness of the ingratiation attempt, and
> c) admiration of particular qualities within o,
> then he will present himself less positively on reputational aspects of such qualities, and more positively on intentional aspects of such qualities, than in a situation where ingratiation motivation is less salient.

In order to investigate this hypothesis experimentally it is clearly necessary to decide which qualities in particular we wish to examine. It was decided that the context in which we were going

to examine ingratiation behaviour in our second experiment was that of a realistic job-selection interview where the interviewer would be selecting possible recruits for his own work-team. Since the interviewer-targets were therefore being placed in quasi-leadership roles we turned to that area of research to provide the dimensions required. Bales and Slater (1955) have reported that in studies of problem-solving, leaderless groups there almost always appears a differentiation between a person who presses for efficiency and task accomplishment and a person who satisfies the social and emotional needs of members. Also, Grusky (1957) has described the emergence of two similar kinds of roles in a psychological clinic. In a sense the traditional orientation of Western families has been the father as the task-specialist and the mother as social-emotional specialist. Factor analysis studies of large organisations reported by Halpin and Winer (1952) and by Fleishmann, Harris and Burtt (1955) have shown that these two factors represent 83% of the accountable common variance in leader behaviour. We therefore decided to incorporate these two areas of quality which we have labelled "personality" and "competence", into our experimental set-up. They have the advantage of seeming to represent realistic dimensions as well as having an already established position in the research literature. The use of both dimensions in the experiment also allowed the possibility of comparing self-presentational strategies in both areas. Is the strategy employed when faced with a highly competent target essentially the same as that employed before a highly personable one?

When these two target factors are incorporated into our general hypothesis we have four basic hypotheses to investigate:

(1) When a subject, p, is placed in an ingratiation encounter with a target person, o, given:

a) admiration of o's competence qualities

b) anticipation of future interaction with o, and

c) o's awareness of the ingratiation attempt,

then he will present himself less favourably on "competence-reputational" qualities than in a situation where ingratiation motivation is less salient.

(2) In the same situation he will present himself more favourably on "competence-intentional" qualities than in a situation where ingratiation motivation is less salient.

(3) When a subject, p, is placed in an ingratiation encounter with a target person, o, given:

a) admiration of o's personality qualities

b) anticipation of future interaction with o, and

c) o's awareness of the ingratiation attempt,

then he will present himself less favourably on "personality-reputational" qualities than in a situation where ingratiation motivation is less salient.

(4) In the same situation he will present himself more favourably on "personality-intentional" qualities than in a situation where ingratiation motivation is less salient.

Finally, there are three other aspects of the design of experiment 2 which should be made clear.

(a) In order to maximise the information derived from the experiment, subjects described themselves on both competence and personality qualities to their particular target. Furthermore, the target interviewers were described not only as highly competent or highly personable but also as somewhat deficient in the other area.

That is the competence target was described as being rather awkward in social situations etc. In this way it was possible to establish some preliminary data on how subjects present themselves on qualities in which the target is deficient.

(b) In the previous experiment the method used to establish a motivation to ingratiate was simply by giving the subjects instructions to do so. This has in fact been the standard technique in the majority of studies in the area. However, it is by no means clear that such motivation is sufficient nor that the behaviour it produces is the same as that produced under circumstances of self-motivated ingratiation. In the present experiment, therefore, the subjects were placed in a situation which was likely to lead them to ingratiate. This allows us to compare the self-presentations so produced with those produced in externally-induced ingratiation situations. As part of this aim it was decided to use a control group of subjects in this experiment as against having each subject act as his own control as was done in experiment 1. This was done for essentially pragmatic reasons. In order to create self-motivated ingratiation there had clearly to be a strongly realistic experimental situation. It was felt that the taking of a measure of self-presentation prior to an interview would have reduced the realistic content of the situation and therefore a control group of interviewee subjects was used in whom no particular motivation to ingratiate was created.

(c) Finally, although the moderator variables investigated in the previous experiment did not have any significant effect on the self-presentational strategies employed, it was decided to retain the male-female subjects distinction in the present experiment. This was done basically for two reasons. Firstly, there was a tendency in the

previous experiment for the females to present more positively than the males which merits further investigation. Secondly, it is possible that the use in this case of a self-motivated ingratiation context may yield some differences which the previous experiment did not. This may be argued in the case of self-esteem also. However, the retention of the self-esteem variable would have necessitated a prohibitively high number of subjects and it was therefore omitted from the experiment.

The full experiment is described in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V: EXPERIMENT II

Subjects: The sample consisted of 66 first year psychology undergraduates. They were all volunteers recruited early in their first term at the University. Two subjects were dropped from the final analysis for suspicion of the experimental procedures. Another subject upon arrival at the experiment turned out to be French-speaking and failed to understand much of the experimental material. She was therefore excluded from the analysis. Finally, in order to equalize cell frequencies seven more subjects were randomly discarded. The final experimental subject sample therefore consisted of 56 subjects, of whom 28 were male and 28 female.

Experimental Measures

(1) Interview Questionnaire: As in experiment I it was decided that the best method of assessing the pattern of the subjects' self-presentations was by means of an objective self-presentation scale answered orally to the interviewer. There were four attribute clusters which were to be included - personality/intentional, personality/reputational, competence/intentional and competence/reputational. Clearly there was no established scale which tapped these four areas of functioning. The most suitable material available was Stires and Jones' four sets of antonym pairs corresponding to the four kinds of attributes. However, Stires and Jones' material was derived on a purely a priori basis and no attempt had been made either to produce the antonyms in a scientifically derived manner or to check the validity of the antonyms once they had been selected for use.

It was therefore decided that an attempt should be made to produce a scale which had a more reliable and valid basis than that

used by Stires and Jones. To this end a study of the perceived qualities of a large number of adjectival pairs was carried out. A large number of antonym pairs, 73 in all, were gathered on an a priori basis. This list of adjectival pairs was then administered to 31 Open University students attending a summer school at the University. They were asked to consider each characteristic or quality and decide to what extent they perceived it to belong to each of four scales. The four scales were defined as follows:

(1) Competence (C): this scale reflects the degree to which an adjectival pair deals with the ability of an individual to do a task.

(2) Personality (P): this scale reflects the degree to which an adjectival pair deals with socially relevant personal qualities, that is qualities which are concerned with our manner or ability in getting on with other people.

(3) Intention (I): this scale reflects the degree to which an adjectival pair deals with a characteristic or quality which is under the personal control of a person himself; that is, a characteristic is intentional to the extent that an individual can change his degree of exhibiting it by trying.

(4) Reputation (R): this scale reflects the degree to which an adjectival pair deals with a characteristic or quality of someone which is best estimated by other people's opinions, that is a quality more dependent on other people's assessment than on personal control.

Each subject rated each antonym pair on each criterion on a four-point scale:

0 = not at all

1 = slightly

2 = fairly

3 = highly.

In this way for each adjectival pair there were derived four scores being the aggregated ratings on personality, competence, reputation and intention. Further, for each pair a personality-competence score was derived by subtracting the competence rating from the personality rating. Also a reputational-intentional score was achieved by subtracting the intentional score from the reputational score. On the basis of the patterning of these two composite scores adjective pairs were allocated to one of four sectors as shown in Table XIV.

Table XIV: Reputational-Intentional and Personality Competence Division

	Reputational	Intentional
Personality	P-C Score High +ve R-I Score High +ve	P-C Score High +ve R-I Score High -ve
Competence	P-C Score High -ve R-I Score High +ve	P-C Score High -ve R-I Score High -ve

From the original list of 73 pairs the seven most clearly belonging to each sector were thus selected and these 28 items formed the basis of the self-presentation scale used in the experimental interview. This final scale used only the positive end of the particular bipolar

trait. For example, where the adjective pair was "friendly-unfriendly" the quality upon which the subject had to rate himself was "friendliness". The attributes finally included in each of the four sectors are tabulated in Table XV.

TABLE XV
Attribute Sectors

	Personality	Competence
Reputational	likeability social alertness popularity sophistication ability to be interesting sense of humour modesty	inventiveness creativity successfulness ability to think clearly rationality intelligence informedness
Intentional	helpfulness honesty candidness geniality cheerfulness friendliness tolerance	perseverance meticulousness ability to accept direction orderliness motivation attentiveness conscientiousness

The rating had to be done on a 9-point scale as follows:

1. extremely above average
2. well above average
3. fairly above average

4. slightly above average
5. average
6. slightly below average
7. fairly below average
8. well below average
9. extremely below average.

Both the original adjective rating scale and the final version of the self-presentation scale are reproduced in Appendix 5.

(2) Interviewer Rating Scale: The interviewer rating scale used was identical to that used by Davis and Jones (1960). The scale consisted of five clusters of traits each measured by four descriptive statements producing 20 items in all. The five clusters were likeability, warmth, intelligence, conceit and adjustment. Half of the statements in each cluster were worded negatively and half positively. For example the warmth cluster was:

a) He seems to be a very warm and affectionate person.
b) I think he may be an antagonistic person who is easily irritated.
c) To me he seems extremely kind and sympathetic as a person.
d) He strikes me as a rather hostile and unsympathetic person.

Each statement had to be rated as to how accurately it described the subject's perception of the interviewer. The possible responses were as follows:

1. I disagree very much
2. I disagree pretty much
3. I disagree a little

4. I agree a little
5. I agree pretty much
6. I agree very much.

The scale was adapted for use in this situation by using the conceit and adjustment items as fillers. The ratings on the likeability and warmth clusters were algebraically summed to provide an overall measure of "personality", i.e. manner and ability in getting along with people.[1] The four intelligence items were algebraically summed to provide a measure of "competence".

Method

Synopsis

Upon arrival at the laboratory area the subjects of the experimental group were informed that they were going to go through a selection interview with a male interviewer who would be their team leader if they succeeded in being selected. Half of these 28 subjects were presented with information about their interviewer which depicted him as being particularly gifted in "personality", in getting along with people. The other 14 subjects received information which led them to believe that their interviewer was more gifted in terms of intelligence, efficiency and competence. Half of each group were male and half female.

Subjects were then interviewed during which they had to rate themselves orally on the 28 attributes comprising the self-presentation scale.

The 28 control subjects, 14 male and 14 female, were simply told that they were participating in an experiment on interaction.

1. This score was then halved since it is based on twice the number of items of the competence cluster.

They were given identical information on the nature of their interviewers but no ingratiation motivation was specifically aroused. All control subjects were then interviewed by the same interviewers.

After the interview all subjects went to another cubicle where they completed the interviewer rating scale.

Therefore, the experimental design was 2 (experimental or control) x 2 (personality or competence interviewer) x 2 (male or female) with 7 subjects in each cell. The dependent variables were the subjects' responses on the self-presentation scale which itself yielded four sets of scores:

1) competence - reputational (CR)
2) competence - intentional (CI)
3) personality - reputational (PR)
4) personality - intentional (PI)

Procedure

(a) Pre-Interview

The experiment was carried out in 12 sessions. Up to six subjects were present at the beginning of each session, prior to being interviewed individually. The same six interviewers were employed throughout all the sessions. The interviewers were all male graduate students of the University. All of the interviewers had previously undergone a training programme during which they had received instructions as to how to conduct themselves in the course of the interview and had carried out practice interviews under supervision. The aim of this training programme was to ensure that all the interviewers behaved in as consistent a manner as possible. During the interviews the interviewers were instructed to be relatively

neutral in their conduct. They were to display neither undue hostility nor undue sympathy towards the interviewees. Also, they were to avoid discussion on topics outwith the scope of the interview programme. The basic purpose of these provisions was to ensure that the dominant influence shaping the subjects' perceptions of their interviewers was the information supplied about him prior to the interview. The use of a relatively structured interview programme also facilitated this purpose.

Prior to the experiment all the interviewers were given lists of the subjects they might be asked to interview. If any of the subjects were known precautions would be taken so that such subjects should not encounter the known interviewer. However, the use of new undergraduate students as subjects in the experiment minimised this particular problem.

Due to difficulties in the recruitment of subjects and more particularly the non-appearance of expected subjects it was necessary to allocate subjects to interviewers on a random basis. This procedure was felt to be justifiable since not only had the interviewers been trained to conduct themselves uniformly but also the extensive information provided about the interviewers prior to the interview was felt to be strong enough to overpower minor differences between the individual interviewers. Nevertheless it remains true that the use of such a procedure precludes the possibility of testing for any systematic interviewer effect.

The experimental design was therefore one of eight treatment cells with seven subjects appearing in each cell, as represented in Table XVI.

The experiment began with a group of up to six subjects and

TABLE XVI

Experimental Design: Experiment II

	EXPERIMENTAL		CONTROL	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Personality	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7
Competence	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7

the experimenter. Experimental subjects were told that the experiment was being run jointly by the psychology and the industrial science departments of the University. It was explained that we were going to set up a selection and employment procedure. All subjects were going to be interviewed and on the basis of their interview performance selected or not selected for a job, and finally the actual job would be performed. In actuality the job performance aspect of the experiment was totally fictitious.

Subjects were told that we were going to set up 6 work teams comprising a leader and two assistants. The leader of each group was to be a postgraduate student from the Industrial Science Department who had worked in industry and was now doing research work at the University. It was explained that his function was not only to lead the work team but also to select his team members and that this was the process with which we would be concerned at that moment. The subjects were told that each leader/interviewer would interview 12 subjects in all, from whom he would select two to be members of his particular work team. When the two team members had been finally selected they would be notified and at a mutually convenient time in the future they would get together with the team leader to perform the actual task.

The experimenter explained that each selected subject would be paid £4.00 for the task performance which would take approximately two hours. In addition they were told that a local business had

sponsored the experiment to a total of £15.00, and that this sum would be divided equally among the three members of the best of the six work teams. It was emphasised that money was clearly an integral part of such an experiment since people would clearly not do their best to be selected for something unless there was some reward in it for them. It should be understood that there were in fact no financial rewards, but since there had been no mention of such rewards in order to recruit volunteers for the experiment and since no individual subject was promised such rewards this was felt to be a justifiable procedure.

Subjects were then told that the industrial science department was primarily interested in the work output of the teams whereas we in the psychology department were more concerned with the selection process and the interaction between the various people working together, whether for example compatability would affect the actual work performance. It was explained that to this end the normal interview was not a great deal of use because although the interviewer might learn a great deal about the applicant, the applicant did not learn much about the interviewer - and such knowledge should be doubly important when the interviewer was also going to be the team leader. Therefore, each subject was informed that he or she was to be given a dossier containing a variety of information about their particular interviewer. This dossier contained four sources of information:

(1) biographical material provided by the interviewer himself;

(2) a reference letter from his previous employer to the University recommending him for postgraduate work;

(3) his University supervisor's report on his progress at the University so far;

(4) a profile of his scores on a personality test.

It was stressed to the subjects that these materials were only released for the purposes of this experiment on the basis that they remained totally confidential, and that it was therefore completely essential that they should not discuss the contents of the dossier with people outside. It was also explained that each interviewer had given his permission for the various materials to be used but, with the obvious exception of the biographical information, he had not seen them himself.

A separate dossier was then given to each subject. On the front was the (fictitious) name of their interviewer and his cubicle number. Half of the subjects received a dossier which stressed the intelligence, ability and general competence of their interviewer target and played down his personal qualities. The other half received a dossier which emphasised the sociability, personality and ability of their interviewer to get on with people, at the expense of his general ability and competence. Considerable care went into the construction of these dossiers to ensure that they were authentic in appearance. For example, official notepaper of the industrial companies involved and official supervisor's report forms were employed. Both forms of the dossier are reproduced in Appendix 6.

The control subjects, upon arrival at the laboratory, were informed that they were going to participate in an experiment on human interaction. It was explained that each subject was to be interviewed by a postgraduate student from the industrial science department who had worked in industry and was now doing research work at the University.

It was also emphasised that this interview was the first of a number of interactions between the interviewer and subject which we would be examining. Also, since we were interested in the interaction taking place, the subjects were informed that they would receive some information concerning their interviewer before they actually met him. It was stressed that since the interviewer would find out information about them in the course of the interview, and since we were interested in interaction as a 2-way process, it was important that they should have access to information about their interviewer. Again, the subjects were given dossiers identical to those administered to the experimental subjects with the same emphasis on confidentiality. Half of the control subjects received personality dossiers and half competence dossiers.

When all the subjects (experimental or control) had completed reading their individual dossiers they then proceeded to the cubicle numbered on the front of their own dossier where the actual interview took place.

(b) Interview

All the interviews conformed to a prescribed programme. The interviewers were completely unaware of the experimental instructions to the subjects and hence they were also unaware of what category of subject they were interviewing (except male and female). Further, they did not know of the existence of the bogus dossiers nor, consequently, of which category of target they were presented as in any one case.

The interview began with the interviewer introducing himself (by his fictitious name) and inviting the interviewee to have a seat. Next the interviewer took the subject's name and explained

that he was going to read out a number of personal qualities to him one by one. The subject was to rate himself on each of the qualities according to the 9-point scale described above. The interview then proceeded with the interviewer noting down the subject's rating of himself on each of the 28 items. When this process was completed there were several further standard questions to be asked. These were:

(1) What subjects, other than psychology, they had chosen to study in the first semester.

(2) What subject they wished to specialise in.

(3) What aspect of that particular subject they found most interesting.

The answers to these questions were not included as part of the experimental data. The questions themselves were included only to give the interview added face validity. When these questions were completed the interviewer thanked the interviewee and asked him to return to the main experimental room.

(c) Post-Interview

On the return to the experimental room all subjects were asked to complete in another cubicle the interviewer rating scale, giving their impression of their interviewer. This 20 item scale measured the two dimensions - personality and competence, and was included essentially as a check on the success of the experimental manipulations.

Finally, each subject was asked individually for his comments on the experiment and carefully questioned for any suspicions of the various manipulations. The true purpose of the experiment was then explained to each subject with particular emphasis on the

necessity for the deception involved. Their cooperation was enlisted in maintaining a discrete silence on the nature of the experiment for the next few days and finally they were thanked for their help.

CHAPTER VI: Results - Experiment II

(1) Validation of Experimental Manipulations

It is of prime importance, before proceeding further, to establish whether the experimental manipulations were successful with the subjects. More particularly, the major question here is whether the subjects perceived the competence target as more competent than the personality target, and the personality target as more personable than the competence target.

In order to establish this, firstly subjects' competence ratings of their target interviewer were placed in a 2 (experimental-control) x 2 (personality - competence target) x 2 (male - female) analysis of variance, a factorial design with 7 observations in each cell. The analysis is summarised in Table XVII.

Table XVII: Analysis of Variance Summary

Subjects' Competence Ratings of their Target Interviewers

Source	df	Mean Square	F	
A. Experimental-Control	1	23.1	1.76	N.S.
B. Personality-Competence	1	350.0	26.6	**
C. Male-Female	1	41.1	3.1	N.S.
AB	1	0.28	< 1	
AC	1	48.3	3.67	N.S.
BC	1	7.1	< 1	
ABC	1	0	< 1	
Remainder	48	13.1		
Total	55			

(** $p < .01$)

Examination of the table shows that there is only one significant effect, that of target quality ($F = 26.6$; $df = 1, 48$; $p < .01$). This is produced by the competence target being rated as significantly more competent than the personality target. The respective mean ratings were 18.04 and 15.07.

Subsequently, subjects' personality ratings of their target interviewers were placed in a 2 (experimental - control) x 2 (personality - competence) x 2 (male - female) analysis of variance, a factorial design with 7 observations in each cell. This analysis is summarised in Table XVIII.

Table XVIII: Analysis of Variance Summary.

Subjects' Personality Ratings of their Target Interviewer

Source	df	Mean Square	F	
A. Experimental - Control	1	11.6	1.0	
B. Personality - Competence	1	206.4	17.7	**
C. Male - Female	1	40.3	3.5	N.S.
AB	1	10.7	< 1	
AC	1	42.9	3.7	N.S.
BC	1	9.0	< 1	
ABC	1	1.6	< 1	
Remainder	48	11.6		
Total	55			

(** $p < .01$)

Again, examination of the table shows that there is only one significant effect, that of target quality ($F = 17.7$; $df = 1, 48$; $p < .01$). This effect is such that the personality target is rated significantly more favourably on personality than the competence target. The respective mean ratings were 17.1 and 13.2.

(2) Experimental Results

Hypothesis (1):

When particularly applied to the present experiment this hypothesis predicts that experimental subjects faced with a competent target will present themselves less favourably than control subjects faced with a competent target, on competence-reputational items (cf. p. 85).

The subjects' personal ratings on the competence-reputational items were placed in a 2 (experimental - control) x 2 (personality target - competence target) x 2 (male - female) analysis of variance, a factorial design with 7 observations in each cell. This analysis is summarised in Table XIX.

Hypothesis (1) is substantiated by the significant difference between the experimental-competence and the control-competence subjects' self-ratings. The mean scores for each group were 32.86 and 24.43 respectively. It should be noted that the higher the score the more unfavourable the self-presentation. This difference is a significant one ($t = 3.79$, $df = 13$, $p < .01$). There is, in fact, a significant interaction between experimental - control and target quality ($F = 27.24$, $df = 1, 48$; $p < .01$). The cell means are summarised in Table XX.

Table XIX: Analysis of Variance Summary

Subjects' Self-ratings on Competence-Reputational Items

Source	df	Mean Square	F	
A. Experimental-Control	1	4.57	< 1	
B. Target Quality	1	350.00	11.03	**
C. Sex	1	56.00	1.77	N.S.
AB	1	864.29	27.24	**
AC	1	48.29	1.52	
BC	1	2.57	< 1	
ABC	1	10.29	< 1	
Within	48	31.73		
Total	55			

** $p < .01$

Table XX: Mean Self-Ratings on Comp-Rep.[1]

Experimental-Control x Target Quality

	Personality T	Competence T
Experimental	30.00	32.86
Control ,	37.29	24.43

This interaction is produced by the reversal of the experimental prediction when the subjects were faced with a "personality" target. Under such circumstances the experimental subjects presented themselves significantly more favourably than the control subjects ($t = 3.62$; $df = 13$; $p < .01$).

[1] N.B. Low ratings = favourable self-presentation.

There is also a significant main effect of target quality ($F = 11.03$; $df = 1, 48$; $p < .01$). Over all conditions the subjects faced with a competence target present themselves more favourably than subjects faced with a personality target on competence-reputational items. The means for the two groups respectively are 28.64 and 33.64.

Hypothesis (2):

When particularly applied to the present situation this hypothesis predicts that the experimental subjects faced with a competent target will present themselves more favourably than control subjects faced with a competent target, on competence-intentional items (cf. p.86).

The subjects' self-presentation ratings on the competence-intentional items were placed in a 2 (experimental-control) x 2 (personality - competence target) x 2 (male - female) analysis of variance, a factorial design with 7 observations in each cell. This analysis is summarised in Table XXI.

There was a significant difference between the self-ratings of the experimental-competence subjects and the control-competence ratings ($t = 3.11$, $df = 13$, $p < .01$). The actual mean ratings for the

two groups were 24.14 and 32.64 respectively, thus substantiating the hypothesis.

Table XXI: Analysis of Variance Summary

Subjects' Self-Ratings on Competence-Intentional Items

Source	df	Mean Square	F	
A. Experimental-Control	1	345.02	11.64	**
B. Target Quality	1	4.02	< 1	
C. Sex	1	385.87	13.02	**
AB	1	175.02	5.91	*
AC	1	407.16	13.74	**
BC	1	0.88	< 1	
ABC	1	168.02	5.67	*
Within	48	29.64		
Total	55			

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

There was again a significant interaction between experimental-control and target quality ($F = 5.91$; $df = 1,48$; $p < .05$). The cell means are summarised in Table XXII.

Table XXII: Mean Self-Ratings on Comp-Intentional[1]

Experimental-Control X Target Quality

	Personality T	Competence T
Experimental	28.21	24.14
Control	29.64	32.64

This interaction is produced by the difference between the experimental and control groups when faced with a competence target as against

[1] N.B. Low ratings = favourable self-presentation.

their similarity when faced with a personality target (t = 0.47, df = 13, N.S.).

This analysis also produced a number of other significant results. Firstly, there is a significant main effect of experimental-control. Over all conditions experimental subjects presented themselves more favourably than control subjects on competence-intentional items (F = 11.64; df = 1,48; $p < .01$). The respective mean ratings for the two groups were 26.18 and 31.14 respectively. There was also a main effect of sex. Over all conditions female subjects presented themselves more favourably than male (F = 13.02; df = 1, 48; $p < .01$). The mean rating of the male subjects was 31.29 as against 26.04 for the female subjects.

In addition to these main effects there were two other significant interactions in this area of the results. Firstly, there was a significant interaction between subjects' sex and experimental-control group (F = 13.74; df = 1, 48; $p < .01$). The cell means are summarised in Table XXIII.

Table XXIII: Mean Self-Ratings on Comp-Intentional[1]

Experimental-Control X Sex

	Male	Female
Experimental	31.5	20.86
Control	31.07	31.21

This interaction would appear to be produced by the female experimental group who presented themselves more favourably than any other on competence-intentional items.

Finally, there was a significant higher order interaction

[1]N.B. Low ratings = favourable self-presentation.

between all three factors - target quality, sex and experimental group ($F = 5.67$; $df = 1, 48$; $p < .05$). The cell means are summarised in Table XXIV.

Table XXIV: Mean Self-Ratings on Comp-Intentional[1]

Experimental-Control X Target Quality X Sex

		Male	Female
Experimental	Personality	35.14	21.29
	Competence	27.86	20.43
Control	Personality	27.71	31.57
	Competence	34.43	30.86

This interaction was brought about by the fact that while both male and female subjects, when faced with a competence target, conformed to the experimental prediction their responses were opposite when rating themselves to a personality target. In these circumstances female experimental subjects continued to present themselves more favourably than female control subjects but male experimental subjects presented themselves less favourably than male control subjects.

[1] N.B. Low ratings = favourable self-presentation.

Hypothesis (3):

In terms of this experiment this hypothesis predicts that experimental subjects faced with a highly personable target will present themselves less favourably than control subjects on personality-reputational items. There was a significant difference between the mean self-ratings of these two groups ($t = 5.12$; $df = 13$; $p < .01$). The actual means were 34.0 and 24.29 respectively, thus substantiating the hypothesis.

The subjects self-ratings were placed in a 2(experimental-control) x 2 (target quality) x 2 (sex) analysis of variance, a factorial design with 7 observations in each cell. This analysis is summarised in Table XXV.

Table XXV: Analysis of Variance Summary

Subjects' Self-Ratings on Personality-Reputational Items

Source	df	Mean Square	F	
A. Experimental-Control	1	320.64	13.83	**
B. Target Quality	1	1.79	< 1	
C. Sex	1	10.29	< 1	
AB	1	340.07	14.66	**
AC	1	4.57	< 1	
BC	1	164.57	7.10	*
ABC	1	1.14	< 1	
Within	48	23.19		
Total	55			

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Again there is a significant interaction between target quality and experimental-control group ($F = 14.66$; $df = 1, 48$; $p < .01$). The cell means are summarised in Table XXVI.

Table XXVI: Mean Self-Ratings on Person-Reputational Experimental-Control X Target Quality

	Personality T	Competence T
Experimental	34.00	29.43
Control	24.29	29.57

Once more this interaction was produced by the strong predicted effect - the difference between the experimental-personality and control-personality subjects. There was no corresponding difference between experimental and control subjects when presenting themselves to a competence target.

Experimental-control was itself a significant main effect in this instance. ($F = 13.83$; $df = 1, 48$; $p < .01$). Over all conditions there was a general tendency for experimental subjects to present themselves less favourably than control subjects on personality-reputational items. However, as can be seen from Table XXVI this effect was almost completely produced by those experimental subjects faced with a personality target. This effect was therefore also largely produced by the main experimental effect.

Finally, there was a significant interaction between target quality and the subject's sex ($F = 7.10$; $df = 1, 48$; $p < .05$). The cell means of this interaction are summarised in Table XXVII.

Table XXVII: Mean Self-Ratings on Personal-Reputational Target Quality X Subject's Sex

	Male	Female
Personality T	27.00	31.29
Competence T	30.79	28.21

When faced with a personality target female subjects were generally more modest than male subjects on personality-reputational items. On the other hand, when faced with a competence target female subjects were less modest than males.

Hypothesis (4):

In this instance this hypothesis predicts that experimental subjects faced with a personality target will present themselves more favourably than control subjects on personality-intentional items. The mean self-ratings of the two groups were 25.36 and 34.57 respectively. The difference between these two means is significant in the predicted direction ($t = 3.64$; $df = 13$; $p < .01$).

The subjects' self-ratings were placed in a 2 (experimental - control) x 2 (target quality) x 2 (sex) analysis of variance design with 7 observations in each cell. The analysis is summarised in Table XXVIII.

Table XXVIII: Analysis of Variance Summary

Subjects' Self-Ratings on Personality-Intentional Items

Source	df	Mean Square	F	
A. Experimental-Control	1	19.45	< 1	
B. Target Quality	1	182.16	5.89	*
C. Sex	1	17.16	< 1	
AB	1	904.02	29.24	**
AC	1	19.45	< 1	
BC	1	70.88	2.29	N.S.
ABC	1	24.45	< 1	
Within	48	30.92		
Total	55			

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

As before there was a significant interaction between target quality and experimental-control ($F = 29.24$; $df = 1, 48$; $p < .01$). The cell means are summarised in Table XXIX.

Table XXIX: Mean Self-Ratings on Pers.-Intentional

Experimental-Control X Target Quality

	Personality T	Competence T
Experimental	25.36	29.79
Control	34.57	22.93

This time the effect was similar to that observed in the hypothesis (1) results. The experimental hypothesis was validated by the difference between the experimental-personality and the control-personality subjects. However, when faced with a competence target the prediction was reversed. Experimental subjects now presented themselves less

favourably than control subjects on the personality-intentional items. This difference was a significant one ($t = 3.7$; $df = 13$; $p < .01$).

There was a significant main effect of target quality ($F = 5.89$; $df = 1, 48$; $p < .05$). In general subjects faced with a competence target presented themselves more favourably than subjects faced with a personality target on personality-intentional items. The respective means were 26.36 and 29.96. With reference to the previous Table this effect would appear to be largely due to the highly unfavourable self-presentation of the control-personality subjects.

As further confirmation of the results of this experiment it should be noted that, overall, 53 of the 56 experimental self-presentations (1 reputational and 1 intentional for each experimental subject) conformed to the predictions when compared with the mean self-presentation scores of their control groups.

CHAPTER VII: Discussion and Conclusions

I. Introduction

In Chapter I we addressed ourselves to a variety of problems within the area of self-presentational change in ingratiation motivated encounters.

a) The importance of the establishment and further investigation of the principles of social self-presentation, with particular regard to self-enhancement and modesty, on the basis of both existing data and further research.

b) The need to restore person variables to this area of investigation.

c) The importance of examining, in a preliminary way, the origins of and modes of coping with any conflict created for the individual by a modified self-presentation which varies from his intuitive, authentic sense of self.

In this concluding chapter we shall attempt to look at each of these areas in the light of the research reported here. Further we shall set out to examine some of the problems and implications of this field of investigation and suggest how future research may proceed in attempting to investigate some of the unanswered questions in this area of study.

II. Principles of Self-Presentation

(a) Self-enhancement and modesty:

In experiment I we set out to delineate those factors

which made for a generally self-enhancing performance in an ingratiation motivated encounter. On the basis of previous research we formulated a general principle of self-presentation in such circumstances. Our own findings strongly confirmed this principle and confirmed the importance of the various factors in determining the form of self-presentation.

To a certain extent this result has achieved the level of a truism in the literature since it has been demonstrated repeatedly in a variety of experiments. However, all of the studies mentioned above (cf. Ch.I) may in fact be oversimplifying the truth of this postulate. Firstly, in every case these experiments employ a control group as a basis of comparison with the "ingratiation" condition. The standard experimental method involves the instruction or encouragement of one group of subjects to indulge in an ingratiating performance while the control subjects are given neutral, non-motivating instructions or actually instructed to be accurate about themselves. The problem about such a method is that it does not allow any statements to be made about the behaviour of a particular individual in the course of the experiment. Since each subject's behaviour is sampled only once it becomes impossible to say, for example, that a particular individual is self-enhancing, only that, generally, self-enhancement takes place. The problem relates to our earlier discussion as to the importance of person variables. As Harre and Secord point out this kind of conclusion - that self-enhancement takes place - is an actuarial one rather than a causal one. The statement yields no information on which persons self-enhance, who self-enhances most or why they do so. This means that we cannot make individual statements about behaviour and are denied access to the causal mechanism at work. However, this is precisely the kind of knowledge that the psychologist aspires to and frequently

fails to achieve. One might suggest that the use of control group research has contributed to this failure. The distinction is between the achieving of highly significant results and formulating behavioural rules which will provide predictive material for the individual actor. For example, in the above studies comparisons of the experimental and control groups' self-presentations yield uniformly high F values in the analysis of variance. However, we cannot predict with any degree of certainty that a particular subject will self-enhance in ingratiation-motivating circumstances. The fault is partially inherent in the use of control groups themselves, since there is no individual base line referent for each individual subject's experimental behaviour, and partially in the method of reporting the research results. One might contend that it is as important to know what percentage of the subjects followed the prediction as well as whether the overall effect was significant when averaged across all subjects. In this way it would be possible at least to report the percentage of experimental ingratiating subjects whose self-presentation was above the mean self-presentation score of the control subjects. However, in no case has this been done.

Returning to our own results it becomes clear how important such a statistic may be. The means of the subjects' self-presentation scores in the neutral pre-testing session and in the ingratiation interview were respectively 414.7 and 402.1, the difference being highly significant ($p < .001$). We are thus in a position to state with considerable certainty that given the experimental situation self-enhancement will be the self-presentational strategy utilised. However, over 1 in 3 of the subjects did not self-enhance when compared with his own pre-interview measure. It

is of course true that some of the self-derogating subjects will be so classified only by chance errors of measurement. However, equally a number of the self-enhancing subjects may also be wrongly classified. The point remains that a sizable minority of the subjects did not self-enhance in the interview. It is this finding which is important when one comes to attempt to make predictive statements about how an individual person will present himself in the given situation. We are not 99.9% certain that he will self-enhance. Rather we are only 66% certain.

A re-examination of the Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962) experiment gives further emphasis to the distinction between using control subjects and having the experimental subjects provide their own control measurements. In this study 40 subjects were instructed to be accurate and honest about themselves during the interview and another 40 were given ingratiation instructions. The self-presentation means of the two groups were respectively 48.9 and 52.4. This difference was a significant one ($F = 9.59$; $df = 1, 72$; $p < .01$). In the course of the experiment, however, the accuracy subjects presented themselves a second time to a different interviewer on a matched scale and this time under ingratiation instructions. This procedure was not carried out to furnish a control accuracy criterion score for each subject but rather as part of a quite different intention. Indeed the conditions did not fulfil classical control requirements - a different interviewer was used on each occasion and subjects were given approval or disapproval after their first interview. However, for our purposes it is arguable that the accuracy interview presentation might serve as a possible control comparison for the subsequent ingratiation self-presentation. The means for these two groups were respectively 48.9 and 49.7 which is

clearly not significant. It is therefore evident that the choice of different control subjects or experimental subjects acting as their own controls is not an academic one.

If we now return to our own results we are faced with explaining why, despite the general tendency towards self-enhancement in the ingratiation encounter, a minority of the subjects became self-derogating in the interview. As was discussed in Chapter IV one possibility, corroborated to an extent by the subject's interviewer impression ratings, was that the self-derogating subjects had a more favourable impression of their interviewer than the self-enhancing subjects. The experimental design was intended to minimize such interviewer effects. Nevertheless there remains the distinct possibility that a sizeable minority of the experimental subjects perceived their interviewers significantly more favourably than the remaining subjects. The question that arises is how, given the experimental manipulations, could this have occurred? One possibility is that it may be methodologically unsound to give subjects minimal information on their interviewer and permit a face-to-face interaction with him. Such a situation may encourage some subjects to fill in the missing area of information on the target person from their own resources. Asch (1946) demonstrated how quite minimal verbal labels could be used by experimental subjects to create full, well-rounded, impressions of an imaginary individual. Kastenbaum (1951) has demonstrated similar results using recorded statements supposedly directed toward another person in a conversation as stimulus material. Perhaps more pertinently still, Kelley (1950) and Veness and Brierly (1963) have produced similar results using live stimulus persons.

The processes by which such "impression development" beyond

the stimulus information presented takes place are many, ranging from the use of non-verbal cues like physical appearance to the use of implicit personality theories. The important point is that subjects have been shown regularly to have this capacity and it may be that this phenomenon could explain the unforeseen enhanced view of the interviewer exhibited by our group of subjects. Viewed in retrospect it may have minimised this problem, if not eliminating it completely, to have the interviewer and subject interact impersonally without any face-to-face encounter. This would at least have minimised the effects of the interviewer's appearance on the subject's impression of him. However, it may equally be true that the reason for the enhanced view of the interviewers was due to the simple fact of their being interviewers. The status created by the role alone may have been sufficient in some cases to create a degree of admiration. It should also be remembered that all of the interviewers were described as postgraduate students. This role too may be impressive for new undergraduates. Insofar as the enhanced view of the interviewers was a product of their having the general position of postgraduate interviewer, then indeed impersonal interaction would not necessarily eliminate the effect, and might actually enhance it.

However, the unexpected finding of the self-derogating subjects' enhanced views of their interviewer targets led us to the formulation of the conditions under which self-derogation in ingratiation encounters takes place. It was hypothesised that in the experimental situation created, self-derogation would take place on those "reputational" aspects of the qualities for which the target is admired. In balance it was further suggested that self-enhancement would take place on "intentional" aspects of the qualities for which the target is admired.

These two predictions, whether applied to a highly personable target or a highly competent one, were markedly substantiated by the results of experiment II. Subjects consistently presented themselves more favourably on intentional qualities and less favourably on reputational qualities when compared with their controls. Since it was decided, as discussed in Chapter IV, to use a control group in this experiment it is not possible to state the percentage of subjects who followed the experimental hypotheses when compared with their own self-presentations in less ingratiation-salient situations. However, it was possible to compare each experimental subject's self-presentation score with the mean self-presentation score of his control group. By this standard 53 of the 56 experimental self-presentations (1 reputational and 1 intentional for each experimental subject) conformed to the predictions. This represents a 94.6% accuracy rate.

Regardless of the statistical perspective from which they are viewed these results would appear to give uniformly strong and consistent support to the predicted self-presentational strategies. It would appear that these results suggest two main conclusions. Firstly, the distinction between reputational and intentional qualities as measured and defined here is meaningful and important. It has also been largely ignored in the literature. It is clear that subjects genuinely distinguish between such qualities and use this distinction when presenting themselves in an ingratiation situation. It is also relevant to mention that this dichotomy may have significance in other areas of psychological research apart from this one. One can suggest that it may be applied to such fields as person perception, attribution theory and impression formation. Secondly, the importance of admiration of the target in formulating self-presentations is heavily emphasised. This tends to confirm the speculation regarding the explanation of the modest subjects in our first experiment. It is clear from the results of experiment II that the

qualities for which the target is admired by the subject are highly salient to his eventual self-presentation. Future research in this area should devote attention to this factor if a proper understanding of the variables relevant to self-presentational strategies is to be achieved. The question arises as to why experiment II yielded more significant results, on what were somewhat tentative hypotheses, than experiment I on the oft-demonstrated self-enhancement strategy. It should also be noted that these results were achieved using a relatively conservative control condition. The control subjects could have been expected to display a considerable amount of attraction-seeking behaviour in their interaction with the interviewer. Also, they had equal information on the target person's qualities to the experimental subjects, and they anticipated future interaction with him. Set against this closely similar situational backdrop the marked difference in the self-presentations of the experimental subjects becomes even more striking. One possible explanation lies in the degree of definition of the experimental situation employed in this second study. As distinct from experiment I where the subjects' impressions of their interviewers were largely uncontrolled, in experiment II a method of maximising experimenter effects and minimising chance subjective factors was employed. In this case subjects were presented with a considerable amount of information about their targets. Primarily this procedure was carried out simply to create particular impressions of the targets to the subjects. However, it would appear that such a technique also creates a greater unity of impression than one which gives equal minimal information to all the subjects. By defining the experimental situation more completely less scope is given to the personal constructions of the subjects.

Another factor which may account for these markedly significant

results, and which also differentiates experiment II from experiment I, is the creation in experiment II of an ingratiation-salient situation for the experimental subjects rather than simple instructions to ingratiate. This is an aspect of the research in this area which has been given inadequate attention. In practically all of the experimental studies in this area subjects have been induced to ingratiate simply on the basis of experimental instructions to do so. Such studies as Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962), Jones, Gergen and Jones (1963), Gergen (1965), Gergen and Taylor (1969), Schneider and Eustis (1972), Lefebvre (1973) and Kahn and Young (1973) have all used this technique to motivate subjects to ingratiate. However, it is no way clear that such a technique is motivating, and also whether the behaviour elicited under such instructions is similar to the behaviour of subjects who are self-motivated. This is particularly surprising when one considers that Jones (1964) devotes considerable attention to the motivational determinants of ingratiation behaviour (cf. p.11). Having thus paid due attention to the motivational complexities involved in ingratiation it is striking how many of the studies in the area simply ignore this aspect and assume that the voice of the experimenter will be motivation enough. It would be of particular benefit to compare two identical experimental set-ups which only differed in the origin of the incentive to ingratiate - in one case experimental instructions and in the other a self-motivating situation. Examination of subjects' self-presentations in both cases would allow not only the establishment of whether such factors make a difference to subjects' behaviour but also, if such a difference occurs, what form it takes. Until such studies are done one cannot assume with any certainty that the two situations are comparable. One might contend, for example, that in the situation where the subject is simply faced with instructions to ingratiate the demand characteristics are highly salient. Subjects may strive to fulfil their expectations of how the experimenter anticipates their behaviour, and this may bear little or no relation

to the actual behaviours they might exhibit in a situation where they were more inwardly-directed.

Experiment II also permits us to examine the self-presentational strategies employed when subjects are rating themselves on qualities in which the target is weak or deficient. However, in this area the results are considerably less clear. Each subject, whether faced with a competence or personality target, had to describe himself on qualities which the target person did not possess. The crucial measures in this area are therefore the subjects' self-ratings on competence to the personality target and on personality to the competence target. The results described in the previous chapter may be summarised as follows:

(1) On competence-reputational items the experimental subjects presented themselves more favourably than the control subjects to a personality target. The respective means were 30.0 and 37.3 ($t=3.79$; $df = 13$; $p < .01$).

(2) On competence-intentional items the experimental subjects presented themselves more favourably than the control subjects to a personality target. The respective means were 28.21 and 29.64 $t = 0.468$; $df = 13$; NS).

(3) On personality-reputational items the experimental subjects presented themselves equally favourably to the control subjects to a competence target. The respective means were 29.43 and 29.57 ($t = 0.118$; $df = 13$; NS).

(4) On personality-intentional items the experimental subjects presented themselves less favourably than the control subjects to a competence target. The respective means were 29.79 and 22.93 ($t = 3.7$;

df = 13; $p < .01$).

At first glance these results would appear to be somewhat perplexing. It is difficult to see any clear-cut pattern emerging. However, it can be seen that the general trend is one of self-enhancement on competence to the personality T against self-derogation on personality to the competence T. In basic terms the subjects are saying that they are not very gifted socially to the non-personable target, and that they are competent to the non-competent target. One reason for this reversal may be that the subjects are told that they are going to be selected for a work team. Although no details of the actual task involved are given it may very well be that subjects will assume that competence will be a highly salient virtue in any work situation and therefore tend to emphasise their abilities in that area. As to why this enhancement effect is confined largely to competence-reputational qualities one can only speculate. It may be that subjects are simply indulging in social comparison and therefore describe themselves as creative and intelligent relative to the target. However, if this were true then one would expect similar self-enhancement on the competence-intentional items also, which is not really manifest in the results. Perhaps a more likely explanation is simply that subjects perceive reputational qualities as more important and therefore self-enhance on them in particular, where they feel that there is little chance of being found out later, which is the case where the target is seen as not being particularly competent or intelligent himself.

On the other hand subjects faced with the non-personable target are modest when describing their own personal qualities. This is closer to the kind of effect that may have been expected from first

principles. Here subjects indulge in a matching strategy, presenting themselves as similar to the target. This is in line with Jones, Gergen and Jones (1963) finding that high status subjects when presenting themselves to low status subjects under ingratiation instructions, are modest about those qualities which are unrelated to the status hierarchy. For example, an educational psychologist faced with an adolescent girl client who is describing her inability to do P.E. in the school may empathise by saying that he or she could never do it either. Blau (1948) has described such behaviour as being designed to demonstrate approachability. To a certain extent our experimental subjects' behaviour may be seen in a similar light, in that they are empathically playing down their abilities to the target. A similar effect may have been expected on the competence ratings if subjects had been seeking selection for an activity which they perceived as laying less stress on competence per se. As with the competence enhancement the personality modesty effect is confined to half of the items, although this time the intentional rather than the reputational sector. The reason for this remains puzzling. One possibility is that subjects faced with a non-personable target are prepared to be modest only to an extent. The intentional items are considerably less impressive than the reputational ones and therefore the self-derogating strategy will be confined to them. However, this finding in the absence of further research, remains enigmatic and any explanation can only be regarded as tentative.

Finally, there are two general points which may be raised in the area of the rules of self-presentation in ingratiation encounters. Firstly, there is a very clear need in experimentation in this field to pay particularly close attention to the total situation in

which the behaviour is examined. Examination of our own and other research stresses the quite substantial changes in behaviour produced by what might be considered relatively minor alterations in the experimental setting. Mischel (1968) has drawn attention to the imbalance between the extensive vocabulary existing to describe traits and the very limited number of terms available to categorise situations. The research in the field of ingratiation demonstrates that this conceptual poverty has been mirrored by a degree of methodological slackness. Such factors as the sex pairing of the dyad, the origin of the motivation to ingratiate, the kind of quality claimed, whether the meeting is anonymous or face-to-face and the nature and origin of information about the target may all be relevant to behaviour in this area. However, as yet the systematic, step by step approach of isolating the effect of each on the subjects' self-presentations has not been done. Rather investigators in the field have examined the impact of a new variable and in so doing have minimally altered the basic experimental situation. Such a procedure makes it particularly difficult to assimilate the various research findings into a cohesive whole.

The second point concerns the whole conceptualisation of what ingratiation behaviour is. In our earlier discussion we paid attention to the extensive use of control groups in ingratiation research. To some extent this methodological splitting up of subjects into those who are given ingratiation, or "hypocrisy" instructions, as Jones refers to them, and those who are instructed to be "accurate" or "honest" about themselves mirrors the conceptualisation of ingratiation behaviour as something qualitatively different from other kinds of social interaction. This stems largely from Jones' view of ingratiation as "an <u>illicit</u> attempt to win favour"

and as "an illegitimate member of the social exchange family". It is not our contention that this view is fundamentally untrue. Certainly it is true that there is a marked degree of hypocrisy and consequent illegitimacy about blatant flattery or massive opinion conformity. However, if Jones's view is not untrue it may be overstressed. There is little evidence to suggest that individuals are conscious of the change in their behaviour in an ingratiation-salient situation, particularly in the areas of self-presentation and non-verbal behaviour. If subjects are not indulging in a conscious, calculated set of behaviours to achieve an ulterior end, but are in many cases simply following unconscious, socialised rules of situational behaviour, then the view of ingratiation as qualitatively instead of quantitatively distinct from other forms of behaviour becomes less true. In this way it may be better to conceptualise ingratiation behaviour as simply the extreme end of a continuum with aversion-seeking behaviour at the opposite pole and more neutral encounters in the middle. There is evidence to support the view that behaviour in highly ingratiation-salient conditions is not all that different from behaviour in more "normal" social encounters, the explanation proffered being that much of social interaction incorporates a degree of attraction seeking. Kahn and Young (1973), in a free social situation, instructed subjects to get another individual to like them and compared a content analysis of their behaviour with that of a control group who were given no instructions as to the purpose of their meeting with the other person. They found no discernible difference between the two groups' behaviours. Indeed sometimes the assumption of the qualitative difference of ingratiation behaviours can lead to some rather forced analysis. Mehrabian and Ksionzky (1972), for example, in a discussion of the determinants of social interaction distinguish

between "ingratiation" behaviours and "affiliative" behaviours. Their analysis leads them to categorise certain forms of behaviour as falling into each classification. Under the ingratiation heading they list such behaviours as:

1) pleasantness of vocal expression
2) lack of negative verbal content
3) number of questions asked.

On the other hand, some affiliative behaviours are described as:

1) pleasantness of facial expression
2) presence of positive verbal content
3) number of head nods.

It is in no way clear how such distinctions can be made. Why should smiling be affiliative, and having a pleasant tone of voice ingratiating?

The unfortunate consequences of this emphasis on ingratiation behaviour as a thing apart are not only that it produces such strained argument as that illustrated above but also that it tends to lead the research into a cul-de-sac. If we restrict ourselves to studying how people ingratiate then we are limiting the importance of the data. The real interest in ingratiation behaviour lies in the analysis of how it is related to the whole question of the variability of people's behaviour and how that variability is resolved with a constant sense of self. Gergen (1968) has illustrated how ingratiation research can be brought into this much larger, and ultimately more important, framework.

b) Person Variables and the Rules of Self-Presentation

As was discussed in chapter I it was decided to examine

the impact of two possible moderator variables on the rules of social self-presentation. The two variables selected were the sex of the subjects and their level of self-esteem. Bem (1973) has suggested that instead of searching for illusory general rules of behaviour, encapsulated in the "trait" approach, we should be seeking only to predict "(1) certain behaviours, (2) across certain situations, (3) for certain people". The results of the present study area may be seen as a contribution to this. The behaviour under consideration is self-presentational positiveness, the situation is ingratiation-salient encounters and the people are males and females of varying levels of self-esteem.

If we look at the self-esteem variable first, which was confined to experiment I, we find that it was completely unrelated to the self-presentational strategy adopted in the ingratiation interview. All three esteem groups adopted the self-enhancement strategy and to the equivalent degree. The respective mean change in positiveness of the low, medium and high esteem groups in the interview were 12.75, 10.92 and 14.1 ($F = < 1$; df = 2, 42; NS). The 29 self-derogating subjects were randomly distributed among the three esteem groups. In Chapter I we discussed some of the theories which could lead to conflicting predictions as regards the effects of self-esteem in this situation. The two main protagonists in this

area are self-esteem and self-consistency theories. However, Jones (1973) having conducted an extensive review of the research in this area concludes that the bulk of the evidence rests heavily in favour of self-esteem theory. Furthermore, the results of experiment I, in the area of the subject's reactions to approval and disapproval, to be discussed below, also lend support to esteem theory. However, esteem theory would have predicted that since the low esteem subjects have a greater need for approval they would have indulged in greater self-enhancement than the other esteem groups. This is clearly not the case. It may be that the previously discussed "probability of success" or "perceived opportunity structure" of Simmons and McCall is operating here. That is that the low esteem subjects do indeed have a greater need for approval and a greater motivation to enhance, but that also they perceive the situation in the context of their previous experiences as being less likely to produce approval and they therefore temper their enhancement strategy. The other possible explanation of the lack of a self-esteem effect is that the instructional set to ingratiate is really not motivating enough to tap the differential esteem levels of the subjects. An experimental situation which examined the changes in self-presentation of differing esteem groups under conditions inducing a self-motivated desire to ingratiate would help to ascertain whether this is in fact the case. It is of course also possible that self-esteem is <u>not</u> a moderator variable in this context at all, that change in self-presentational positiveness in ingratiation encounters is unrelated to subjects' esteem levels. However, we are not in a position to state this categorically as yet. More generally, the whole area of personality differences in this area is considerably under-researched. Only the present experiment and Jones, Gergen and Davis's (1962) study on Machiavellianism have directed attention to this area and in

neither case has any differential effect been demonstrated. Bem (1973) has suggested that "need for approval" (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964) may be a relevant variable but no evidence has as yet appeared to validate this. The problem with moderator variable research is that one can always suggest more and more possibilities in the face of insignificant results. The current research has clearly not gone beyond examining a few of the likely variables so no definite conclusion can be made at the present time. However, it must be said that so far no personality variables have been found which modify the basic self-enhancement response in the ingratiation context as defined.

When we turn our attention to the sex variable we find a different pattern emerging. As with esteem the sex of the subjects was unrelated to the self-presentation in the interview in experiment I. The respective mean change in self-presentation for males and females were 10.12 and 15.1 ($F = < 1$; df = 1, 42; NS). Also the 29 self-derogating subjects were almost equally distributed between males and females. However, in experiment II a genuine sex effect was apparent. The general pattern emerging was that females conformed more to the experimental hypotheses than the males. They were more self-enhancing on intentional items and more self-derogating on reputational items than the male subjects. This becomes clearer if one examines Table XXX which summarises the mean self-presentation scores of the males and females on qualities for which they admire the target. It is clear from this table that in every case, relative to the male subjects, the females indulged in greater ingratiating self-presentations. It may well be of course that females do this anyway, even in the control group situation, and that therefore relative to their control group they are no

TABLE XXX: Mean Self-Presentation Scores on Qualities Admired in the Target.[1]

Experimental Males X Experimental Females.

		Experimental Males	Experimental Females
Reputational	Competence T	30.2	35.4
	Personality T	32.3	35.7
Intentional	Competence T	27.9	20.4
	Personality T	28.3	22.4

different from the male subjects. Table XXXI summarises the mean differences in the self-presentations of the experimental against the control groups.

TABLE XXXI: Mean Differences Between Experimental and Control Groups' Self-Presentations on Qualities Admired in the Target.[2]

Experimental Males X Experimental Females

		E-C (Males)	E-C (Females)
Reputational	Competence T	+5.7	+9.1
	Personality T	+10.6	+8.8
Intentional	Competence T	-6.5	-10.43
	Personality T	-6.7	-11.7

Again the pattern is retained. The females self-enhance more than the males on the intentional items and self-derogate more on the reputational items. Our investigation of the sex variable is of course not complete. We have not been able to examine all the

1. High scores = self-derogating presentations.
2. Positive differences = self-derogating presentations.

permutations involved. There is no condition where female subjects face a female target, or males face a female target. In the absence of such conditions we cannot answer the sex pairing question definitively. The reason for the greater self-enhancement and self-derogation in the mixed dyad may be due to the fact that females ingratiate more per se, or that heterogeneous dyads produce greater degrees of ingratiation behaviour. However, our feeling is that it is the heterogeneity of the dyad which is the crucial factor. This finding is consistent with Lefebvre's (1973). He suggested that females will ingratiate more with males than males with males. He bases this on two factors. Firstly the natural tendency to promote attraction in a heterogeneous dyad and secondly the fact that "the salience for the partner of being attracted by a person of the opposite sex probably lowers in the subject's perception the partner's probability of detecting their ingratiation motivation." Thus the combination of a high incentive to ingratiate and a favourable perceived opportunity structure lead to more ingratiating self-presentations. Furthermore, Lefebvre reports data in support of this reasoning with female subjects presenting themselves more positively than males relative to their control groups. Bickman (1974) reports further evidence on this topic in a review of the literature on sex and helping behaviour. He finds that in 75% of the studies there is a greater helping effect in heterogeneous dyads. This may clearly be related to the increased ingratiation motivation in such circumstances.

However, the trend of the results is not completely supportive of this sex effect. As stated above, experiment I revealed no systematic differences between the sexes in terms of ingratiation self-presentations. Also, Kahn and Young (1973) found no sex difference in ingratiation behaviour in a free social situation. To a

certain extent Kahn and Young's findings may be treated with some caution. The authors failed to find any ingratiation effect far less a stronger one in mixed pairs. They themselves question the reliability of their observers. Nevertheless we are still left with the contrary finding of experiment I. The possibility is that again the general motivation to ingratiate was not strong enough across all the subjects to reveal inter-group differences. The fact that stronger overall ingratiation effects and sex differences occurred in experiment II when the ingratiation behaviour was self-motivated cannot be overlooked. It is fair to say that the means in experiment I are in the right direction in that females improve their self-presentation by 15.06 points against the males 10.11. However, this difference is well short of significance. The results of experiment I do lend some support to the importance of the sex pairing and the perceived opportunity structure as factors in determining the form of an ingratiation self-presentation. Low esteem male subjects in our experiment should have the lowest probability of success in the ingratiation encounter in that: (1) they have a history of failing in evaluative encounters, and (2) they do not have the camouflage of an opposite-sex pairing to disguise their ingratiation attempt. This reasoning is in fact borne out by the results. The mean change in self-presentation of this group of subjects is 4.7 points against a mean of 14.16 points for the remainder of the subjects. They have in fact the lowest change score of any sex-esteem group. On the other hand the low-esteem females have the highest mean change score of 20.8 points. The only advantage that the low esteem female subjects have over their male counterparts is that of being in a mixed-sex dyad which may increase their motivation and their probability of avoiding detection in their ingratiation performance.

In conclusion it may be said that the bulk of what evidence there is on sex differences in this area lends support to the view that greater ingratiation-induced change in self-presentation occurs in heterogeneous than in homogeneous dyads. However, the number of studies which have systematically investigated this variable is very small and it would be premature to form any definite conclusion.

III. The Conflict between the Sense of Self and Variable Self-Presentations

(a) Modes of Resolution

In Chapter I we suggested that the conflict between the enduring sense of self and the capacity for variation in self-presentational behaviour was more illusory than real; that, in Turner's terms, the self-conception and the self-image may be at considerable variance before any conflict arises. However, in experiment I, we created just such a conflict situation which conformed to Turner's two requirements. Firstly, the subjects were placed in an identity-directed interaction having a strongly evaluative context. Secondly, the self-image or self-presentation was in conflict with the self-conception implying that it should be raised. The method of resolving the conflict involved in this situation, predicted in hypothesis (1) was largely confirmed. Subjects denied the representativeness of their interview self-presentation and showed a marked return to their original self-conception after disapproval of their interview performance. Whereas after approval they largely maintained their new level of self-presentation.

This result confirms Jones, Gergen and Davis' (1962) and Gergen's (1962) similar findings. Jones describes these results as being evidence for the individual's "willingness to believe the best about himself". However, this may be an oversimplification of the process involved. Our experimental hypothesis was based on the assumption that self-enhancement was the self-presentational strategy employed in the interview and indeed both of the above studies involved only self-enhancing presentations.

When analysis of our own results is confined to the 55 self-enhancing subjects a strongly similar pattern to that of Jones and Gergen emerges (see Table IX, Chapter III, p.71). The borderline significant effect of feedback now becomes highly significant ($F = 5.55$; $df = 1, 43$; $p < .025$). This effect is depicted in Figure 1 in Chapter III (cf. p.69). If we confine our attention to the upper half of the diagram concerning the self-enhancing subjects it is apparent that after disapproval the change in self-presentation between SP_A and SP_{B1} (the ingratiation interview self-presentation) is completely admitted and subjects return to their original level of SP_A. On the other hand after approval the change in self-presentation is denied. Subjects assert that SP_{B1} is them as they really are. However, the coping problems set by approval and disapproval of a <u>self-derogating</u> presentation may be quite different. Jones (1964) himself recognises this problem and touches on it in a discussion of Gergen's (1962) experiment. He suggests that an interesting follow-up to that study would involve the

reinforcement by approval of modesty and self-devaluation but does not really develop the point further. Examination of the bottom section of Figure II indicates the difference that self-devaluation produces. Here, approval does not lead to the simple denial of the existence of any change in self-presentation represented in SP_{B1} - rather the subjects then return to their original level of self-conception. Also, disapproval does not lead to a straight admission that SP_{B1} was not an accurate picture of themselves. The disapproved subjects return only partially to their original level of SP_A. If it were simply a matter of a subject's "willingness to believe the best about himself" then one might expect that approved subjects would assert the honesty of their interview self-presentations and those disapproved deny the honesty of theirs, regardless of the particular self-presentational strategy they employed. This is clearly not the case. The point in this case may be that approval or disapproval of the self-devaluing presentation has two simultaneous effects. They act in the way described above to create either the assertion that SP_{B1} was honest or dishonest depending upon whether it was approved or disapproved. Also, the approval or disapproval acts directly upon SP_A either to boost or diminish the self-conception. Approval of the modest SP_{B1} increases the likelihood of its acceptance as a valid representation of the self. Also, the approval acts directly on the self-conception leading to an enhanced view of self. The resultant position of SP_{B2} is between these two extremes at approximately the original level of self-description. Similar reasoning may be applied to the disapproval context where the final positions on SP_{B2} may be seen as the resultants of the forces involved. For example, in the self-devaluation quadrant the resultant position on SP_{B2} may be seen as between the complete return to SP_A engendered by the disapproval of

SP_{B1} and the diminished view of self produced by the negative reinforcement of the self-conception (SP_A). It would appear that these reinforcement effects on SP_A are largely confined to the self-devaluing subjects. It is clear, for example, that disapproval of the self-enhancing subjects does not result in a diminished view of self. SP_{B2} is not lower than SP_A. This difference may be partially explained by the previously discussed fact that the self-devaluing subjects had a more favourable view of their interviewers than the other subjects. It may be, therefore, that the interviewer's approval or disapproval for those subjects will have had more impact.

However, the mode of conflict resolution preferred by the experimental sample was re-evaluation of the interviewer rather than re-evaluation of self. Given the fact that the interviewer was not a significant figure in the subjects' social milieu it may have been expected that his approval or disapproval would result in re-evaluation of him rather than the re-evaluation of self. The effect of feedback was much stronger on the change in interviewer ratings than on the change in self-description. ($F = 56.4$; $df = 1, 6$; $p < .001$). That is, in confirmation of hypothesis (4), approved subjects revalue their interviewer more favourably than disapproved subjects. These results strongly suggest that the less significant the source of approval or disapproval, the more likely that the produced mode of "dissonance resolution" will be revaluation of that source rather than revaluation of one's behaviour. Such a proposal should be capable of empirical testing.

b) Person Variables

We also set out to examine the impact of our moderator

variables of sex and esteem level on the coping solutions produced by the experimental subjects. Neither of these variables proved to be significantly related to the self-revaluation coping strategies. Neither esteem level nor sex had a significant interaction with feedback. With hindsight perhaps this result is not surprising. It would appear that the general effect of self-revaluation after feedback was not sufficiently strong in itself to reveal such inter-group differences.

The moderator variable effects uncovered in this study were confined to the change in interviewer rating scores. Hypothesis (5) concerning the greater response of female subjects than males was not confirmed ($F = 1.0$; $df = 2, 12$; NS). However, examination of the cell means of the interaction in Table XII (cf. p.74) shows that female subjects responded much more negatively to disapproval than the males. They devalued their interviewer by 7.2 points against 0.2 by the males. This was as predicted. However, the reason the interaction did not reach significance was that there was no difference between male and female subjects' reactions to approval. The mean changes in interviewer rating of the two groups were respectively +5.95 and +4.70. It would appear therefore that although female subjects are more responsive to disapproval by a male target than males they are no more responsive to approval. A likely explanation of such a pattern of results may be that behaviour is seen as approving or disapproving to the extent that it departs from cultural expectations. Female subjects may generally expect to be approved by males and therefore not be unduly rewarded when they receive it. In a sense they take it for granted. On the other hand, by the same reasoning, disapproval from a male is a gross violation of normal cultural expectations and is therefore perceived as a greater

threat by females than by males. Again it must be borne in mind that these results are not definitive in so far as they do not distinguish between the effects of having female subjects per se and the effects of having a heterogeneous dyad. However, as was discussed above (cf. p.135) we feel that the more probable factor is the heterogeneity of the dyad. A further experiment exploring all the possible sex pairings would provide a more conclusive answer.

Hypothesis (6) of experiment I concerning the interaction of esteem level and feedback was confirmed ($F = 5.7$; $df = 2, 12$; $p < .05$). Examination of the cell means of the interaction in Table XIII (cf. p.74) shows that the effect is essentially confined to the low esteem subjects. Low esteem subjects respond more negatively to disapproval and more positively to approval than either the medium or high groups, who do not differ in their responses. This finding confirms other work in the area of self-esteem suggesting that the low-esteem group represent a separate group distinct in behaviour and reactions from both the medium and high esteem groups.

In summary it may be said that the preferred coping strategy was that of revaluation of the interviewer source and that the moderator variable effects identified were confined to this area of the results. The significant effect of feedback on revaluation of behaviour (hypothesis (4)) may be seen as indicative of how important this strategy may be in more realistic, important interactions. If such effects can be demonstrated in a situation involving an unimportant person how much stronger will they be in the context of interactions with significant others? In such situations it may be that the moderator variables will come to have an effect.

IV. Implications

In the present research we have argued that a task of social psychology is to study the forms, determinants and consequences of the variability of self-presentational behaviour. We have suggested that this may best be done by considering the different kinds of motivation that an individual may bring to an interaction and how both situational and personal variables will effect this eventual self-presentation. Our own concentration has been on ingratiation-motivated interactions.

We would contend that the implications of this kind of study may lie in a number of different areas. As regards the study of ingratiation-induced change in behaviour per se, Jones has drawn attention to some of the areas where the findings may be applied. For example, the study of ingratiation behaviour may be relevant to the investigation of group cohesiveness and effectiveness. The efficiency of a group may depend upon the leader having the trust, loyalty and compliance of the group members and, more importantly, knowing that he has them. In this context ingratiation overtures from the followers to the leader may have the effect of creating an atmosphere of harmony and cohesiveness which will facilitate group action. Also, the study of the problems of self-presentation posed by an incentive to ingratiate may also cast light on how the target person perceives the ingratiator. The whole area of attribution theory is therefore relevant at this point. Since ingratiation behaviour is designed to create a particular impression, its study may profitably be related to how the target perceives the ingratiator. Are the general rules of self-presentation which we have isolated in the present study actually effective? Does the target perceive the ingratiator in the desired light?

Such questions also point up an application of ingratiation research which has hitherto been largely ignored. If it is possible to isolate general principles of self-presentation in such circumstances, it is likely that such principles will have evolved in an adaptive way. That is, it is likely that the survival and generality of such principles will be due to their efficacy in producing the desired result. This may have implications within the field of social skills training. If basic tenets of effective social behaviour may be isolated in this kind of research then there is no reason why they may not be passed on in training programmes to those who have not mastered appropriate or effective social behaviour.

However, this kind of research may also have ramifications beyond the particular area of behaviour chosen for study - in this case ingratiation. The accumulation of a mass of empirical evidence on the variability of behaviour represents a problem for social psychologists. This body of data may be seen as an aggregate of observations of behavioural phenomena which it is the task of psychology to explain. The situation is analogous to that of the physical sciences in their comparative infancy. The physicist is faced with a number of phenomena (e.g. an apple when dropped falls towards the earth) which he must seek to explain. However, as Harre (1970) has pointed out the first stage of the process of explanation in science is the stage of critical description, that is the establishing of the non-random aspects of observed phenomena. By a process of observation and experimentation, the scientist seeks to establish pattern and order in what are originally random data. At the same time, or later, he attempts to isolate principles which will explain that patterning. Thus the physicist having observed

that an apple falls to the ground may advance by establishing that apples always fall to the ground and then that all solid objects fall to the ground. He may also conduct experiments to refine these observations further.

Social psychologists faced with evidence of the variability of social behaviour are in a similar situation. There is an accumulation of discrete data on how social behaviour varies in different situations but what is required before any explanatory principles can be extracted, is that the findings so far, and future research, should be directed to organising these phenomena, of making them ordered and patterned, in fact non-random. The isolation of general non-random patterns of social behaviour is a prerequisite of any attempt at explanation. Harre and Secord (1972) have recognised this need. In suggesting a way forward for social psychology in the present circumstances they emphasise the need to concentrate attention on how social selves are presented. "The way selves are presented and their presentation controlled then becomes a crucial factor in the understanding of social phenomena, and so the study of this feature of the performance of human beings must be a central part of a reformed social psychology." They draw attention to the work of the symbolic interactionists in addressing themselves to this problem on a conceptual level. However, Harre and Secord are correct in saying that such conceptual analysis is not enough. The symbolic interactionists have not developed their position to such a point that detailed empirical study has been generated. However, we feel that the research carried out by Jones and his followers, and indeed the present study, represents precisely this - an empirical study of how social selves are presented. Surprisingly, Harre and Secord completely ignore this whole body of

work and make no reference to it at all. This omission would appear to be based upon Harre and Secord's rejection of the traditional experimental method, a method which all of these studies follow. They feel that experimentation in psychology has been open to several criticisms. For example, they assert that the traditional experiment so distorts the situation that any extrapolation from the laboratory findings to "real life" is unsound. They also re-emphasise Orne's (1965) and Rosenthal's (1966) strictures on how subjects will attempt to fulfil the experimenter's hypotheses. Perhaps more fundamentally Harre and Secord feel that psychological experimentation is tantamount to maintaining a mechanical model of man, a model they reject. However, we do not share this attitude and would maintain that well designed experiments still have an important part to play in advancing psychological knowledge. Also we would reject the necessary equivalence of an experimental method and a mechanistic view of man. The two are not logically synonymous.

It should also be said that the fault does not lie completely with Harre and Secord. If they have been guilty of ignoring a possible source of data on social self-presentation, then equally it may be said that many of the workers in the field of ingratiation behaviour have failed to appreciate how their work may contribute to a wider context than merely ingratiation behaviour.

A subsidiary intention in our research has been to investigate the conflict between the observed variability of self-presentational behaviour and the existence of an intuitively constant sense of self. This subjective aspect of self has been given too little attention in research so far. The point here is not whether

we are totally consistent entities with a stable personality structure or simply an aggregate of distinct, multiple social selves, both of which views are incomplete, but rather the fact that we have a sense of ourselves as constant and stable. This sense may or may not be erroneous but it is a fact which research must take into account. The evidence of the present study would certainly indicate that the confronting of an individual with the implications of his own variability of behaviour in what Turner calls an "identity-directed" situation leads to a degree of behaviour which tends to be conflict-reducing. Much of the study and analysis of this area has been speculative of necessity since this again is a field which research has largely ignored. It is clear from the present study that variability of behaviour can be a problem for the individual, a problem requiring some degree of rationalisation. Future research may well devote attention to establishing more precisely the factors operating in this area. For example, in the present study a self-presentation which failed and resulted in disapproval could be rationalised simply by claiming that it was a totally invalid self-presentation, unrelated to their real self. In the present study this response was always open to the subjects since they were practically invited to dissimulate by the experimenter. It would be of particular relevance to know whether a similar coping process occurs in a more realistic interaction, as for example a selection interview like our second experiment's, where the subject has less external justification for presenting himself differently, and also where the demand characteristics of the situation are less salient. The indications of our present study are that the origin of the motivation to ingratiate may be a crucial variable in determining the form of the self-presentation. It may also be an important variable

in how the person copes with the implications of his own change of self-presentation.

The research reported here has really only begun to examine the complexities of this field of research and has by no means exhausted the possibilities. The work, generally, has been firmly laboratory based and future study could well move out into more naturalistic settings (cf. Kahn and Young, 1973). Also, it has been very restricted in the areas of behaviour it has examined - only self-presentational positiveness. Further, some of the subtleties of the process have been deliberately overlooked. For example, our definitions of modesty and self-derogation have been synonymous: the presentation of a less positive self in an ingratiation situation than in a situation where ingratiation motivation is less salient. This is clearly to overlook the distinction between positive and negative qualities. It is quite likely that the denial of having positive qualities is different in implication from the admission that one possesses certain negative qualities. This problem remains to be examined. Finally, the interview situations created in the present study have deliberately been severely restricted. The possibility of behaviour occurring within them which is outwith the control of the experimenter and hence unmeasurable has been minimised. Nevertheless we would disagree with Harre and Secord and assert that the use of a restricted, controlled experimental situation is not per se a barrier to truth. There is no logical necessity that providing a person with a limited range of behavioural opportunities will completely change his behaviour within the repertoire provided. What <u>is</u> necessary is that the restricted format should not be seen as the complete truth. The sequence should be one of moving from more to less

restricted formats, not simply rejecting the restricted.

Finally, we are in a position to set out some of the empirical conclusions drawn from the current study.

1) In the absence of:
   a) the target person's awareness of an ingratiation attempt (and the ingratiator's knowledge of this)
   b) the ingratiator's anticipation of future interaction with the target person
   c) information about the target person,

   then subjects self-enhance in such an ingratiation encounter relative to a situation where ingratiation motivation is less salient.

2) In the presence of:
   a) the target person's awareness of the ingratiation attempt (and the ingratiator's knowledge of this)
   b) the ingratiator's anticipation of future interaction with the target person
   c) admiration by the ingratiator for particular qualities of the target,

   then self-derogation takes place on those reputational aspects of the qualities for which the target is admired, and self-enhancement on intentional aspects of those same qualities.

3) As regards the basic self-enhancement strategy neither the sex nor self-esteem level of the subjects significantly moderate this relationship.

4) There is some preliminary evidence to suggest that there is

greater ingratiation-induced change in self-presentation in heterogeneous than homogeneous dyads.

5) When faced with approval or disapproval for an ingratiating self-presentation subjects are placed in a conflict or dissonance situation which they resolve in two ways:

   a) by revaluating their behaviour in the interview and their self-conception;

   b) by revaluating the source of the approval and disapproval.

   The evidence of the present study involving an interaction with a non-significant target suggests that the latter mode of resolution is preferred in such circumstances.

6) When faced with such conflict situations females show more post-interaction coping by responding more negatively to disapproval from male targets than males, but do not differ in response to approval.

7) Also, low esteem subjects show more coping and respond more negatively to disapproval and more positively to approval than medium or high esteem subjects who do not differ in their reactions.

8) The above two moderator variable effects of sex and esteem are confined to revaluation of the interviewer source, the preferred mode of conflict resolution.

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APPENDIX I: The Self-Esteem Measure

The Berger scale was selected for use as a measure of self-esteem. It was standardised on a sample of 200 first year undergraduate students, a group not unlike our experimental subjects. Split-half and test-retest reliability coefficients for the scale were generally around 0.89. The scale used is reproduced below.

This is a study of some of your attitudes. Of course, there is no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true of yourself.

You are to respond to each question on the answer sheet according to the following scheme.

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all true of myself	Slightly true of myself	About half-way true of myself	Mostly true of myself	True of myself

Remember, the best answer is the one which applies to you.

I don't question my worth as a person, even if I think others do.

When people say nice things about me, I find it difficult to believe they really mean it. I think maybe they're kidding me or just aren't being sincere.

If there is any criticism or anyone says anything about me, I just can't take it.

I don't say much at social affairs because I'm afraid that people will criticize me or laugh if I say the wrong things.

I realize that I'm not living very effectively but I just don't believe that I've got it in me to use my energies in better ways.

I look on most of the feelings and impulses I have toward people as being quite natural and acceptable.

I feel different from other people. I'd like to have the feeling of security that comes from knowing I'm not too different from others.

I'm afraid for people that I like to find out what I'm really like, for fear they'd be disappointed in me.

Because of other people, I haven't been able to achieve as much as I should have.

I am quite shy and self-conscious in social situations.

In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than anything else.

I seem to have a real inner strength in handling things. I'm on a pretty solid foundation and it makes me pretty sure of myself.

I feel self-conscious when I'm with people who have a superior position to mine in business or at school.

I think I'm neurotic or something.

Very often I don't try to be friendly with people because I think they won't like me.

I feel that I'm a person of worth, on an equal plane with others.

I can't avoid feeling guilty about the way I feel toward certain people in my life.

I sort of only half-believe in myself.

I'm very sensitive. People say things and I have a tendency to think they're criticizing me or insulting me in some way and later when I think of it, they may not have meant anything like that at all.

I think I have certain abilities and other people say so too, but I wonder if I'm not giving them an importance way beyond what they deserve.

I feel confident that I can do something about the problems that may arise in the future.

I guess I put on a show to impress people. I know I'm not the person I pretend to be.

I do not worry or condemn myself if other people pass judgment against me.

When I'm in a group I usually don't say much for fear of saying the wrong thing.

I have a tendency to sidestep my problems.

Even when people do think well of me, I feel sort of guilty because I know I must be fooling them - that if I were really to be myself, they wouldn't think well of me.

I feel that I'm on the same level as other people and that helps to establish good relations with them.

I feel that people are apt to react differently to me than they would normally react to other people.

I live too much by other people's standards.

If I didn't always have such hard luck, I'd accomplish much more than I have.

APPENDIX 2: The Self-Presentation Scales

The two forms of the self-presentation scales are reproduced below. The scale values of each item have been recorded. They did not appear on the actual experimental material.

SELF-PRESENTATION: A FORM (SPA)

Name (please print clearly): _____

INSTRUCTIONS

On the following pages you will find groups of three descriptive phrases. Each of the three phrases could conceivably be descriptive of what you're like at one time or another. However, some of the phrases within a group will usually be more descriptive of you than the others in that group. Your task will be to read one group of three phrases at a time, and to assign points to each of the phrases in that group in the following manner: First, decide how generally descriptive of you each of the phrases is in comparison to the other two in that group. Then distribute 10 points among the phrases in the group, such that the phrase which is most characteristic of you receives the greatest number of points, and the phrase which is least characteristic of you receives the least number of points. In Example 1, the distribution of the 10 points in the group of phrases, or triad, would imply that the phrase "Dislike exams" generally applies to you more than either of the other two phrases, and that it is only very occasionally that you find the Vietnam crisis boring:

Example 1:

6 a. Dislike exams

3 b. Fond of flashy clothing

1 c. Find the Vietnam crisis a bore

Example 2:

3 a. Dislike exams

5 b. Friendly and cheerful

2 c. Fond of flashy clothing

It is important that you keep in mind that each triad is to be judged separately, and independently of every other triad. Since

some of the triads contain some of the same phrases as others, this will mean that you may at times assign a different number of points to the same phrase. Examples 1 and 2, for instance, could have been filled out by the same person. In Example 1, "Dislike exams" generally applies to him more than either of the other phrases, and he therefore assigns it 6 points. In Example 2, however, "Friendly and cheerful" is even more characteristic of him than "Dislike exams". Therefore, he assigns "Friendly and cheerful" 5 points, while assigning only 3 points to "Dislike exams" because of its different relative position within that triad. Note also that if you assign two phrases within a triad, that means you feel they are equally characteristic of you. However, the fact that "Fond of flashy clothing" in Example 1 and "Dislike exams" in Example 2 were both assigned 3 points does not imply that the two are equally characteristic of the person who filled them out. Since they are in different triads, they cannot be compared with each other.

While filling out the questionnaire, do not spend a great deal of time deliberating about how many points to assign each phrase. Instead, try to put down your initial impressions of how you feel about yourself at the moment.

Finally, please keep the following points in mind:

A. Do not omit any phrases.

B. Do not use fractions.

C. Please take care to print the numbers legibly.

D. If a phrase is not at all descriptive of you, you may assign it 0 points, but be sure that the total number of points assigned to the three phrases within each group is equal to 10.

	3.00	a.	Unable to express ideas in a group
1.	.85	b.	Able to sacrifice for others
	2.45	c.	Needs to be sought
	2.45	a.	Irritable at times
2.	2.85	b.	Says the wrong things
	.60	c.	Expresses individuality
	2.10	a.	Good and bad qualities balanced
3.	.75	b.	Likely to be a success
	2.55	c.	Refuses help
	1.35	a.	Tries things even though expects failures
4.	.85	b.	Able to sacrifice for others
	2.90	c.	Sometimes rude
	2.80	a.	Usually self-conscious
5.	.60	b.	Has a bright future
	1.25	c.	Always meeting people he knows
	1.70	a.	Understands dreams
6.	.80	b.	Considerate of others' attitudes
	2.90	c.	Shrinks from crises
	1.05	a.	Very orderly and meticulous in work
7.	.50	b.	Independent thinker
	3.00	c.	A disturbing influence in groups
	3.00	a.	Uses others for his own ends
8.	2.45	b.	Not always systematic in work habits
	.85	c.	Overcomes own weaknesses
	.70	a.	Enjoys doing things for others
9.	2.55	b.	As changeable as the weather
	1.25	c.	Always meeting people he knows
	.80	a.	Has civilized ideas
10.	2.70	b.	Appeals for sympathy
	3.05	c.	Gives up easily
	3.40	a.	Careless about others' belongings
11.	2.70	b.	Must have everyone like him
	.95	c.	Can change if necessary
	2.80	a.	Distrustful of others
12.	.60	b.	Makes a good impression
	1.05	c.	Can complain if necessary
	2.85	a.	Unaggressive in the face of competition
13.	2.45	b.	Needs to be sought after
	.90	c.	Efficient worker
	.75	a.	Pretty fair minded
14.	2.75	b.	Easily influenced
	1.65	c.	Frequently obedient
	3.00	a.	Imitates others
15.	2.05	b.	Readily shows feelings
	.90	c.	Usually pleasant and agreeable

	.25	a.	Able to express ideas
16.	2.45	b.	Bothered by unpleasant events
	2.70	c.	Exaggerates failures
	3.45	a.	Resentful of others
17.	.90	b.	Can take charge of things
	2.70	c.	Absent-minded about appointments
	.70	a.	Thinks logically
18.	2.05	b.	Readily shows feelings
	3.10	c.	Lacks discriminations
	1.10	a.	Does things just for him
19.	2.85	b.	Overly apologetic
	.60	c.	Can carry out plans
	1.90	a.	Simple and uncomplicated
20.	3.00	b.	Irritates others
	.85	c.	Patient with others
	1.10	a.	Quite active and usually on the go
21.	2.90	b.	Sometimes rude
	.60	c.	Has good judgment
	2.70	a.	Stays in background in social groups
22.	1.25	b.	Can be consoled
	.75	c.	Tries to be sincere with others
	2.40	a.	Often stubborn
23.	.75	b.	Invariably easy to meet and talk to
	1.25	c.	The peacemaker in others' arguments
	3.45	a.	Resentful of others
24.	.85	b.	More emotionally mature than the average
	2.15	c.	Attracts odd people
	1.00	a.	Accommodating to strangers
25.	1.60	b.	Average childhood
	2.95	c.	Nervous and worrisome

SELF-PRESENTATION: B FORM (SP_B)

Name _____

	2.45	a.	Fussy about food
1.	1.05	b.	Eager to get along with others
	3.55	c.	Immature handling of problems
	1.15	a.	Able to enliven a dull party
2.	2.75	b.	Unrealistic aspirations
	.55	c.	Understanding of problems
	.70	a.	Uses own talents
3.	1.20	b.	Enjoys movies
	2.90	c.	Swept along by events
	1.00	a.	Very accepting and approachable
4.	3.45	b.	Resentful of others
	2.35	c.	Aloof when busy
	3.05	a.	Very easily swayed
5.	2.40	b.	Has a stern air
	1.05	c.	Usually relaxed
	3.00	a.	Must be the centre of attention
6.	.85	b.	Knows right from wrong
	1.20	c.	Very respectful to authority
	2.25	a.	Conforms to custom
7.	2.95	b.	Easily led
	.80	c.	More vigorous and enterprising than the average
	3.30	a.	Gives up quickly when things go wrong
8.	2.45	b.	Bothered by unpleasant events
	.85	c.	Tries to be frank with others
	1.10	a.	Seeks relaxation
9.	2.80	b.	Keeps distance from others
	.60	c.	Clean and neat
10.	.70	a.	Knows own abilities
	2.90	b.	Touchy and easily hurt
	2.05	c.	Occasionally sarcastic
	.90	a.	Leads an interesting life
11.	1.40	b.	Free with compliments
	2.85	c.	Unaggressive in the face of competition
	2.75	a.	Easily influenced
12.	.75	b.	Appreciative of help
	1.10	c.	Can tolerate pain
	2.95	a.	Frequently hypocritical
13.	.80	b.	Rather friendly and responsive
	2.45	c.	Ordinary looking

	2.70	a.	Resistant to changing
14.	.85	b.	More emotionally mature than the average
	1.40	c.	Free with compliments
	.80	a.	Completely truthful and aboveboard
15.	3.10	b.	Lacks discrimination
	2.05	c.	Occasionally sarcastic
	1.20	a.	Delights in competition
16.	.85	b.	Humanitarian in outlook
	3.10	c.	Will believe anyone
	2.55	a.	Refuses help
17.	.75	b.	Can display tenderness
	2.90	c.	Afraid to try new things
	2.90	a.	Distrusting of others
18.	2.30	b.	An advice giver
	.85	c.	Foresees consequences of own acts
	.55	a.	Inspires respect
19.	2.80	b.	Can be cruel
	1.05	c.	Readily accepts advice
	.70	a.	Enjoys doing things for others
20.	2.55	b.	As changeable as the weather
	1.25	c.	Always meeting people he knows
	.90	a.	Decisive and affective in relation with others
21.	1.20	b.	Very respectful to authority
	2.75	c.	Seems vulnerable
	.90	a.	More strongwilled than the average
22.	2.60	b.	Overprotective of others
	1.20	c.	Enjoys movies
	1.65	a.	Frequently obedient
23.	.65	b.	Well thought of
	2.95	c.	Dependent on the direction of others
	2.70	a.	Appeals to sympathy
24.	3.10	b.	Bears a grudge
	.90	c.	Able to give orders
	.85	a.	Can cope with disappointments
25.	2.90	b.	Emotionally distant
	1.65	c.	Frequently obedient

APPENDIX 3: The Interviewer Rating Scales

The interviewer rating scales used in the experiment were of the Likert-type and were developed by the experimenter. Approximately 100 subjects were asked to write several attitude items each. These attitude items were to be such as might be applied to a person the subject had just met. Following the standard Likert-type approach, the subjects were given a number of guidelines to the kind of items required:

1. The statements should be shorter than 20 words and comprise a single sentence, preferably simple in construction.
2. The language in the statement should be direct, clear and simple, and should be worded in the present tense.
3. The statement should contain only one complete thought.
4. Each statement should be a clear expression of a positive or negative sentiment toward the social object (in this case a person) and there should be approximately equal numbers of each kind of statement.
5. Factual or irrelevant statements should be avoided.
6. The statements, taken as a whole, should incorporate a wide variety of arguments, implications and themes.

In this way several hundred preliminary attitude items were gathered together. These were subjected to a preliminary screening in which duplicate items and those which were awkwardly worded or did not fit the laid down criteria were eliminated. By this method 100 items, approximately equally divided between positive and negative, were drawn up into a questionnaire. At a second experimental session

the same 100 subjects were asked to complete the scale as regards their attitude to a person known to all of them. The response alternatives were as follows:

1. I strongly agree
2. I agree
3. Uncertain
4. I disagree
5. I strongly disagree.

An item analysis was then carried out on the subjects' responses to the scale in which each subject's score on every item was correlated with his total score on the scale. As a result of this process the 50 items with the highest correlations were selected for the final interviewer rating scales.

Since we required two matched interviewer rating scales for the experiment these 50 items were randomly divided into two scales of 25 items each. Care was taken to ensure roughly equal numbers of positive and negative items in each scale. As a check on the parallelism of the two scales, they were administered to the same group of subjects (N=29). Subjects rated a stimulus person on both of the scales and the resulting correlation between the two sets of scores was 0.86.[1]

The two interviewer rating scales (IR_1 and IR_2) are reproduced below.

[1] See Technical Note 3, p.213.

INTERVIEWER IMPRESSION 1 (IR_1)

This is a study of your first impression of your interviewer.

You are to respond to each statement according to the following scheme. Write the appropriate No. (1-5) beside each statement.

1. I strongly agree
2. I agree
3. Uncertain
4. I disagree
5. I strongly disagree

RESPONSE

1. He seems to be even tempered and patient.
2. He strikes me as the type of person whom you wouldn't trust.
3. He seems to be the type of person who would adjust himself to any situation.
4. He appears to be a selfish person.
5. He is probably a very sound judge of things.
6. Generally speaking, he gives the impression of being an unfriendly person.
7. He does not seem to be very bright.
8. He seems the kind of person who would be happy to help people.
9. He is well adjusted and dependable.
10. He appears to be very competent.
11. He appears to be mean and ungenerous.
12. He shows concern for no-one but himself.
13. He seems to be basically an insecure person.
14. He is very modest about his capabilities.
15. He gives one the impression of not being sincere in what he says.
16. He seems to be self-assured.
17. He seems to have no real ideas of his own.
18. He seems to be very warm-hearted.
19. It seems that he has no confidence in himself.
20. He only tries to be nice to people when he wants something out of them.

21. He appears to be withdrawn and detached.
22. He seems to be a very sympathetic person.
23. He is a cold person.
24. I think he is sincere.
25. He does not appear to be conceited in any way.

INTERVIEWER IMPRESSION 2 (IR_2)

This is a study of your final, overall impression of your interviewer. You are to respond to each statement according to the following scheme. Write the appropriate No. (1-5) beside each statement.

1. I strongly agree
2. I agree
3. Uncertain
4. I disagree
5. I strongly disagree

RESPONSE

1. He probably wouldn't help anybody unless he was rewarded for the effort.
2. He is unpretentious.
3. He seems to be an affectionate type of person.
4. He likes himself too much.
5. I think he has a great deal of commonsense.
6. He is not easy to get along with.
7. He appears to be a warm person.
8. He seems very self-centred.
9. Apparently there must always be a selfish motive behind anything he does.
10. He is not a very pleasant character.
11. He is a remarkably friendly type of person.
12. I think he has an inferiority complex.
13. He would appear to take a genuine interest in the problems of others.
14. He seems to be highly at ease and certain.
15. Although he tries to give the opposite impression he does not seem too intelligent.
16. He would not put himself out in any way to help anybody.
17. He seems to be kind.
18. He is the kind of person who only speaks to you when it suits him.
19. He does not seem to be a very intelligent person.
20. He thinks, it appears, of others far more than of himself.
21. He seems to be a person whom it is very easy to get on with.
22. He seems to have a great amount of self-confidence.

23. He is conceited and arrogant.
24. He seems distant and aloof.
25. I think he sounds like a very genuine and honest person.

APPENDIX 4: Interviewer's Appraisal Forms

The two forms of the interviewer's appraisal sheets are reproduced below. In the actual experiment the "overall impression" section was handwritten by the interviewer himself and signed.

APPROVAL CONDITION

Interviewer's Appraisal Sheet

Subject's Name:

Rating scales:

modest	___:	_X_:	___:	___:	___:	___:	___:	vain
sincere	___:	___:	_X_:	___:	___:	___:	___:	insincere
good	___:	___:	_X_:	___:	___:	___:	___:	bad
pleasant	___:	_X_:	___:	___:	___:	___:	___:	unpleasant
relaxed	___:	___:	___:	_X_:	___:	___:	___:	tense
strong	___:	___:	___:	_X_:	___:	___:	___:	weak
kind	___:	___:	_X_:	___:	___:	___:	___:	unkind
intelligent	___:	_X_:	___:	___:	___:	___:	___:	unintelligent

Overall impression (HANDWRITTEN)

I suppose the ratings above speak pretty much for themselves. In my honest opinion, (Subject's name) creates a very favourable impression. I don't think I'm just saying this because I know he/she is going to read this. He/she is the kind of person I enjoy talking with. He/She seemed a little ill at ease, but no more than one would expect. On the self-concept test, I paid close attention to the things he/she said about himself/herself. He/she shows a healthy pattern of attributes. I'm a little embarrassed that there's nothing really to say on the negative side, but that's the way I honestly feel.

INTERVIEWER'S SIGNATURE

DISAPPROVAL CONDITION

Interviewer's Appraisal Sheet

Subject's Name:

Rating scales:

modest	___:	___:	___:	___:	___:	X :	___:	vain
sincere	___:	___:	___:	___:	X :	___:	___:	insincere
good	___:	___:	___:	___:	X :	___:	___:	bad
pleasant	___:	___:	___:	___:	___:	X :	___:	unpleasant
relaxed	___:	___:	___:	X :	___:	___:	___:	tense
strong	___:	___:	___:	X :	___:	___:	___:	weak
kind	___:	___:	___:	___:	X :	___:	___:	unkind
intelligent	___:	___:	___:	___:	___:	X :	___:	unintelligent

Overall impression (HANDWRITTEN)

It is not easy to tell most people what you think of them, but I have been asked to give my honest evaluation, so here goes. Frankly I would have to say that my impression is not a particularly positive one. By and large I think (Subject's name) handles himself/herself quite well and he/she is generally pleasant and co-operative. But, he/she seems rather nervous and unsure of himself/herself and the picture he/she presents on the choice test is quite different from other reactions, to this test that we have all seen and discussed in training. From the way he/she describes himself/herself in the attitude study, I honestly don't think I'd care to have him/her as a friend. I know this sounds blunt, especially since I know he/she is going to read this. But this is my honest opinion, even though I may be wrong.

INTERVIEWER'S SIGNATURE

APPENDIX 5: Original Adjective Rating Scale and Final Version of Self-Rating Scale.

ADJECTIVE RATING SCALE

On the following pages of this booklet are a number of adjectival pairs (e.g. good - bad, persevering - gives up easily). Each adjectival pair deals with some characteristic or quality which may be used to describe a person. Beside each pair there are four 4-point scales as shown below:

	Adj.-pair:	Happy - sad			
		not at all	slightly	fairly	highly
Scales	Competence (C):	0	1	2	3
	Personality (P):	0	1	2	3
	Intention (I):	0	1	2	3
	Reputation (R):	0	1	2	3

You are asked to consider each characteristic or quality and decide to what extent it belongs to each of the four scales, using the definitions of the scales shown at the end of this section. Indicate your opinion by drawing a circle around the appropriate number.

For instance, you may consider the adjectival pair happy-sad as having nothing to do with a person's competence, in which case you would draw a circle round 0 on the competence scale.

You may consider this pair as highly concerned with someone's personality, if so you would draw a circle around 3 on the personality scale.

And so on for the remaining two scales.

Remember: You may consider an adjectival pair to belong to only one scale or to two or even more scales. Whichever is the case please rate each pair on all four scales, by drawing a circle around one of the numbers.

Now read carefully the following scale definitions before proceeding to rate the actual items.

Competence (C): this scale reflects the degree to which an adjectival pair deals with the ability of an individual to do a task.

Personality (P): this scale reflects the degree to which an adjectival pair deals with socially relevant personal qualities, that is qualities which are concerned with our manner or ability in getting on with other people.

Intention (I): this scale reflects the degree to which an adjectival pair deals with a characteristic or quality which is under the personal control of a person himself, that is a characteristic is intentional to the extent that an individual can change his degree of exhibiting it by trying.

Reputation (R): this scale reflects the degree to which an adjectival pair deals with a characteristic or quality of someone which is best estimated by other people's opinions, that is a quality more dependent

on other people's assessment than on personal control.

Now go ahead and rate the items on the following pages.

ADJECTIVAL PAIRS		SCALES			
		not at all	slightly	fairly	highly
adaptable - rigid	COMPETENCE(C):	0	1	2	3
	PERSONALITY(P):	0	1	2	3
	INTENTION(I):	0	1	2	3
	REPUTATION(R):	0	1	2	3
selfish - unselfish	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
superficial in thought - profound	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
conventional - unconventional	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
sociable - unsociable	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
helpful - uncooperative	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
inventive - uninventive	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
considerate - inconsiderate	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
persevering - gives up easily	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3

ADJECTIVAL PAIRS		SCALES			
		not at all	slightly	fairly	highly
congenial - quarrelsome	COMPETENCE(C):	0	1	2	3
	PERSONALITY(P):	0	1	2	3
	INTENTION(I):	0	1	2	3
	REPUTATION(R):	0	1	2	3
meticulous - slapdash	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
soft-hearted - hard	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
skillful - bungling	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
accepts direction - resists authority	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
organised - disorganised	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
mature - immature	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
confident - unsure	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
honest - dishonest	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3

ADJECTIVAL PAIRS		SCALES			
		not at all	slightly	fairly	highly
creative - unoriginal	COMPETENCE(C):	0	1	2	3
	PERSONALITY(P):	0	1	2	3
	INTENTION(I):	0	1	2	3
	REPUTATION(R):	0	1	2	3
successful - unsuccessful	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
tactful - tactless	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
candid - deceitful	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
presents ideas clearly - inarticulate	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
talkative - quiet	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
orderly - chaotic	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
intellectual - boorish	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
genial - aloof	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3

ADJECTIVAL PAIRS		SCALES			
		not at all	slightly	fairly	highly
cheeful - grumpy	COMPETENCE(C):	0	1	2	3
	PERSONALITY(P):	0	1	2	3
	INTENTION(I):	0	1	2	3
	REPUTATION(R):	0	1	2	3
likeable - irritating	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
motivated - aimless	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
witty - dull	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
modest - vain	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
active - passive	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
logical - intuitive	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
responsible - irresponsible	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
good natured - critical	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3

ADJECTIVAL PAIRS		SCALES			
		not at all	slightly	fairly	highly
imaginative - unimaginative	COMPETENCE(C):	0	1	2	3
	PERSONALITY(P):	0	1	2	3
	INTENTION(I):	0	1	2	3
	REPUTATION(R):	0	1	2	3
socially alert - socially clumsy	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
fussy - doesn't care	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
takes criticism well - defensive	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
excitable - calm	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
clear thinking - fuzzy minded	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
broad minded - narrow minded	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
ambitious - content	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
rational - irrational	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3

ADJECTIVAL PAIRS		SCALES			
		not at all	slightly	fairly	highly
pleasant - unpleasant	COMPETENCE(C):	0	1	2	3
	PERSONALITY(P):	0	1	2	3
	INTENTION(I):	0	1	2	3
	REPUTATION(R):	0	1	2	3
very intelligent - not very intelligent	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
strong - weak	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
attentive - inattentive	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
retentive - forgetful	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
popular - unpopular	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
well informed - ignorant	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
sophisticated - naive	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
vigorous - meek	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3

ADJECTIVAL PAIRS		SCALES			
		not at all	slightly	fairly	highly
warm hearted - cold	COMPETENCE(C):	0	1	2	3
	PERSONALITY(P):	0	1	2	3
	INTENTION(I):	0	1	2	3
	REPUTATION(R):	0	1	2	3
conscientious - careless	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
easy to talk to - unapproachable	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
independent - dependent	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
quick - slow	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
interesting - boring	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
good sense of humour - poor sense of humour	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
competitive - cooperative	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
exact - vague	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3

ADJECTIVAL PAIRS		SCALES			
		not at all	slightly	fairly	highly
eager - indifferent	COMPETENCE(C):	0	1	2	3
	PERSONALITY(P):	0	1	2	3
	INTENTION(I):	0	1	2	3
	REPUTATION(R):	0	1	2	3
socially sensitive - socially obtuse	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
friendly - distant	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
tolerant - unsympathetic	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
decisive - indecisive	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
likes to be with people - self sufficient	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
energetic - lazy	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
educated - ignorant	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3
interesting - dull	(C):	0	1	2	3
	(P):	0	1	2	3
	(I):	0	1	2	3
	(R):	0	1	2	3

ADJECTIVAL PAIRS		SCALES			
		not at all	slightly	fairly	highly
dominant - submissive	COMPETENCE(C):	0	1	2	3
	PERSONALITY(P):	0	1	2	3
	INTENTION(I):	0	1	2	3
	REPUTATION(R):	0	1	2	3

Self-Rating Scale

NAME:

First of all I am going to read to you a number of personal qualities. I want you to rate yourself carefully on each of these traits. You may give one of 9 possible responses:

1. extremely above average
2. well above average
3. fairly above average
4. slightly above average
5. average
6. slightly below average
7. fairly below average
8. well below average
9. extremely below average.

I'll just go over those responses again. (Reads them out again) Is that quite clear? Then we'll begin.

	Response		Response
1.	rationality	16.	ability to be interesting *
2.	cheerfulness	17.	ability to think clearly
3.	ability at accepting directions	18.	tolerance
4.	social alertness	19.	conscientiousness
5.	creativity	20.	likeability
6.	geniality	21.	successfulness
7.	popularity	22.	candidness
8.	motivation	23.	meticulousness
9.	intelligence	24.	informedness *
10.	helpfulness	25.	honesty
11.	perseverance	26.	orderliness
12.	sense of humour	27.	modesty
13.	inventiveness	28.	sophistication.
14.	friendliness		
15.	attentiveness		

(* These questions may require rephrasing in the term "How well informed are you?", "How interesting are you?")

APPENDIX 6: The Personality and Competence Dossiers

The two forms of the dossiers giving information on the interviewer targets are reproduced below.

PERSONALITY DOSSIER

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION (Block Capitals Please) (HANDWRITTEN)

SURNAME: Willmott DATE OF BIRTH: 7/10/1947

CHRISTIAN NAME(s): Peter SEX: Male

PLACE OF BIRTH: Nuneaton, Leicestershire.

FATHER'S NAME: Thomas

FATHER'S OCCUPATION: Postman

EDUCATIONAL HISTORY: (Give dates)

1. Edgeware Road, Primary 1952-1959
2. Nuneaton G.S. 1959-1963
3. Leicester Further Ed. Centre 1964-1966 (Evenings)
4. University of Bradford 1966-1969
5. University of Stirling 1971-

OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY: (Give Dates)

1. Clerical Assistant,(GPO Leicester) 1963-1964
2. Clerical Assistant, (Dept. of Employment, Leicester) 1964-1966
3. Trainee Personnel Manager (Plessey Ltd., Ilford, Essex) 1969-1971

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS: (Give places, dates, grades)

1. English, History, General Studies — 'O' Level — 1963 (Nuneaton G.S.)
2. General Studies, English — 'A' Level — B, C — 1964 (Leicester Further Ed. Centre)
3. B.A. (Ord.) Sociology and Psychology. 1969 (Bradford U.)
4. Presently working on M.Sc. Research Project in Industrial Science Department, on "The Role of Interpersonal Relations in Industry".

THE PLESSEY COMPANY LIMITED

ILFORD · ESSEX

TELEPHONE 01-478 8040 TELEX 23166 CABLES PLESSEY ILFORD

Our ref: JT/GJ
Your ref: EC/PMcE

24th April, 1971.

Professor Bradbury,
Department of Industrial Science,
University of Stirling,
STIRLING.

Dear Professor Bradbury,

Postgraduate M.Sc. in Industrial Science: Mr. P. Willmott

Thank you for your letter of the 15th inst. enquiring about the suitability of the above named applicant for your postgraduate degree. As the referee of the applicant I enclose the following information, which I hope you find useful.

Mr. Peter Willmott first joined our company in August, 1969, under our Graduate Recruitment Scheme. His first six months were spent gaining first hand experience of various aspects of the managerial function. However, his personal make-up, as well as his interest and motivation led him to spend the last 15 months in the Personnel Department of the Company, where I was his immediate superior.

Since he has become involved in the personnel side of industry Mr. Willmott has shown considerable aptitude and ability. His main strength lies undoubtedly in a particular gift in getting along with people. He has consistently striven towards, and succeeded in, improving both worker-management and, equally important, worker-worker relations. Generally, his personal qualities and approach have greatly enriched the atmosphere in which people work together. He remains very popular both with workers and his fellow managers. As is required in personnel work, he has had contact with many different types of people and has consistently made such contacts, both formal and informal, not only meaningful and rewarding, but enjoyable as well.

In summary I would say that it is Mr. Willmott's personal and social qualities which make him so suited to personnel work. On the academic side he is probably not quite so gifted, tending to see problems in human rather than more abstract terms. However, I think his intellectual capacities will prove adequate to the needs of the course he intends to embark upon. He should certainly benefit from it. I hope that these remarks prove useful; if you wish further information I would be quite happy to receive your request either by phone or letter.

Yours sincerely,

T.R. Colling

T.R. Colling
Personnel Manager.

UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING

M.SC. CANDIDATE : ANNUAL REPORT

SESSION: 1971/72

Name of candidate... WILLMOTT, PETER.....

Registration number... 719046.....

Department... INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE.....

Research topic... THE ROLE OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY.....

Supervisor(s) ... M.S. MAKOWER (SENIOR LECTURER).....

Status in 1972/73 : F (P) W C

(please ring the correct one)

Supervisor's report (to be continued overleaf, if necessary)

Average ability. Finds the academic part of the course a bit of a struggle, but excellent on the practical side of industrial and human relations. Progress satisfactory so far. Should succeed in completing the course.

Has integrated well into the department, especially on a social level.

Signature... M.S. Makower Date... 29/7/72

PLEASE RETURN TO MISS L. M. BEGG NOT LATER THAN 1 SEPTEMBER

Name WILLMOTT, PETER Date 23/10/72
Last First Middle Initial

Sex (M or F) M

PERSONALITY PROFILE



Average Male Profile ———— Average Female Profile - - - - - - - -

Interpretation

The profile can be given a further meaning if the scores obtained are compared with the following ranges.

MEN

	I	E	A	S	P	R
Highest 10%	41-60	39-60	35-60	47-60	35-60	49-60
Next 20%	36-40	34-38	28-34	43-46	30-34	35-48
Middle 40%	30-35	27-33	20-27	37-42	23-29	19-34
Next 20%	25-29	22-26	16-19	32-36	18-22	11-18
Lowest 10%	0-24	0-21	0-15	0-31	0-17	0-10

WOMEN

	I	E	A	S	P	R
Highest 10%	39-60	36-60	40-60	48-60	32-60	50-60
Next 20%	34-38	30-35	33-39	44-47	26-31	40-49
Middle 40%	28-33	23-29	24-32	39-43	19-25	26-39
Next 20%	24-27	18-22	18-23	35-38	15-18	14-25
Lowest 10%	0-23	0-17	0-17	0-34	0-14	0-13

Int. = Intelligence

Ext. = Extraversion

Agg. = Aggression

Soc. = Sociability

Prej. = Prejudice

Rat. = Rationality

COMPETENCE DOSSIER

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION (Block Capitals Please) (HANDWRITTEN)

SURNAME: Willmott DATE OF BIRTH: 7/10/1948

CHRISTIAN NAME(S): Peter SEX: Male

PLACE OF BIRTH: London

FATHER'S NAME: Edward

FATHER'S OCCUPATION: Management Consultant

EDUCATIONAL HISTORY: (Give dates)

1. The County Infant School, Brighton. 1953-1955
2. Park Junior School, Hove. 1955-1960
3. Brighton G.S. 1960-1966
4. Cambridge University 1966-1969
5. University of Stirling 1971-

OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY: (Give dates)

1. Trainee Production Control Manager, (Ford Motor Company Ltd., Essex) 1969-1971

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS: (Give places, dates, grades)

1. Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Economics, English, Biology, History, Geography — 'O' levels — 1964 (Brighton G.S.)
2. Mathematics A, Economics A, Further Maths B, General Studies C — 'A' levels — 1966 (Brighton G.S.)
3. B.Sc. (Hons) 1st class: Economics/Statistics, 1969 (Cambridge)
4. Presently working on Ph.D. Thesis in Industrial Science Dept., on "An Analysis of Variables Related to Productivity Increase in the Motor Industry".

Ford Motor Company Limited
Central Office

Eagle Way
BRENTWOOD Essex England
Telephone: 01-592 7300
Telex: 99151

Our ref: JT/GJ
Your ref: EC/PMcE

Professor Bradbury,
Department of Industrial Science,
University of Stirling,
STIRLING.

24th April, 1971.

Dear Professor Bradbury,

Postgraduate Ph.D. in Industrial Science: Mr. P. Willmott

Thank you for your letter of the 15th inst. enquiring about the suitability of the above named applicant for your postgraduate degree. As the referee of the applicant I enclose the following information, which I hope you find useful.

Mr. Peter Willmott first joined our company in August, 1969, under our Graduate Recruitment Scheme. His first six months were spent gaining first hand experience of various aspects of the managerial function. However, his personal make-up, as well as his interest and motivation led him to spend the last 15 months in the Production Control Department of the Company, where I was his immediate superior.

Since he has become involved in the production side of industry Mr. Willmott hasshown considerable aptitude and ability. His main strength lies undoubtedly in a first class intellect. He has the ability to quickly grasp and conceptualise a problem, and in so doing very often reaches original and highly productive solutions. In the relatively short time he has been with our department he has already made several innovations in our production methods which have proved highly rewarding. Over and above his natural talent, Mr. Willmott has also shown excellent application to his work. He keeps well abreast of current developments, both in his own field of work and in many other areas, and is certainly one of our hardest working and most energetic people.

In summary, I would say that it is Mr. Willmott's intelligence and application which have made him successful in his work so far, and should continue to do so in his pursuit of a higher degree. On the personal and social side Mr. Willmott tends to be a little reserved. He generally prefers to work on his own. I hope that these remarks prove useful; if you wish further information, I would be quite happy to receive your request either by phone or letter.

Yours sincerely,

N. J. Baldwin

N.J. Baldwin
Production Control Manager.

UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING

PH D CANDIDATE : ANNUAL REPORT

SESSION: 1971/72

Name of candidate....WILLMOTT, PETER.....

Registration number....719046.....

Department....INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE.....

Research topic....AN ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES RELATED TO PRODUCTIVITY INCREASE IN THE MOTOR INDUSTRY.....

Supervisor(s) ...M. S. MAKOWER (SENIOR LECTURER).....

Status in 1972/73 : F (P) W C

(please ring the correct one)

Supervisor's report (to be continued overleaf, if necessary)

Very high ability. Shows considerable intelligence and creativity in his research. Works well & hard.

Has made excellent progress so far. No reason why this should not continue.

Hasn't yet integrated into the department. Tends to keep to himself although his work certainly hasn't suffered as a result of this.

Signature....M. S. Makower.....Date 29/7/72

PLEASE RETURN TO MISS L. M. BEGG NOT LATER THAN

Name WILLMOTT, PETER Date 23/10/72
Last First Middle Initial

Sex (M or F) M

PERSONALITY PROFILE



Average Male Profile ——— Average Female Profile - - - - - -

Interpretation

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MEN

	I	E	A	S	P	R
Highest 10%	41-60	39-60	35-60	47-60	35-60	49-60
Next 20%	36-40	34-38	28-34	43-46	30-34	35-48
Middle 40%	30-35	27-33	20-27	37-42	23-29	19-34
Next 20%	25-29	22-26	16-19	32-36	18-22	11-18
Lowest 10%	0-24	0-21	0-15	0-31	0-17	0-10

WOMEN

	I	E	A	S	P	R
Highest 10%	39-60	36-60	40-60	48-60	32-60	50-60
Next 20%	34-38	30-35	33-39	44-47	26-31	40-49
Middle 40%	28-33	23-29	24-32	39-43	19-25	26-39
Next 20%	24-27	18-22	18-23	35-38	15-18	14-25
Lowest 10%	0-23	0-17	0-17	0-34	0-14	0-13

Int. = Intelligence

Ext. = Extraversion

Agg. = Aggression

Soc. = Sociability

Prej. = Prejudice

Rat. = Rationality

TECHNICAL NOTES

1. Of the 430 students to whom the personality battery was addressed 225 completed it. Of these 225, only 141 volunteered (on the return form) to participate in a psychological experiment. Our selected subjects were therefore a sub-sample of volunteers of a larger sub-sample of responders. This fact should be borne in mind in examining the results of the experiment.

2. The mean scores of the group on each scale were 413.8 and 414.2. This difference of 0.4 points was not significant ($t = 0.5$, $df = 29$, NS). This gives added support to the parallelism of the 2 matched scales.

3. The mean scores of the group on each scale were + 14.5 and + 14.7. This difference of 0.2 points was not significant ($t = 0.3$, $df = 28$, NS). This gives added support to the parallelism of the 2 matched scales.

4. It should be noted that in interpreting the differences between SP_A and SB_{B1} we are, strictly speaking, comparing unlike situations. The two situations are dissimilar not only in terms of the saliency of the motivation to ingratiate but also in that one is completed orally as against privately. Any differences identified between the two scores may be a product of the mode of completion as well as motivation. A stricter control comparison would involve an oral completion of SP_A. However, this too would have its problems since there is a likelihood that such a situation may create an excessive degree of ingratiation motivation. It was therefore decided to retain the present experimental set up since our main aim was to create 2 situations with differing degrees of ingratiation motivation.